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Abstract
In this thesis we apply mathematical modelling techniques to investigate the implica-
tions of social influence on decision making processes in two related contexts.
The first problem concerns the mathematical modelling of civil unrest. We consider
the collective action problem facing individuals who are deciding whether or not to join a
political revolution or protest in a dictatorial regime that employs censorship and repres-
sion. In studying this problem we develop both a population-level model and a network-
based individual-level (or agent-based) model. The population-level model establishes a
conceptual framework that can be used to understand the role that new communication
technologies (e.g. the Internet, satellite television, Short Message Service (SMS) text mes-
saging, social media, etc.) may have played in facilitating the political revolutions of the
Arab Spring. We establish the consistency between the individual-level model and the
population-level model, and show methodologically how these two modelling strategies
can be applied to complement one another, establishing a hierarchy of differential equa-
tion models that explicitly take the structure of the social network into account. Finally,
using proxy network data for network structure pre- and post-adoption of new communica-
tion technologies, we perform small-scale computational simulations of our individual-level
model in order to establish quantitative evidence that the political revolutions of the Arab
Spring may have been facilitated by new communication technologies.
The second problem concerns the spread of smoking and obesity in populations. We
consider two conformity problems that individuals face when deciding whether to join one
population sub-group over another (or possibly over many others) in the context of two
non-communicable diseases. We begin by studying the smoking epidemic over the past
century, where individuals are given the choice to smoke or not to smoke. We establish
a new data set for smoking prevalence over the past century in seven developed coun-
tries and use it to calibrate a population-level mathematical model for the dynamics of
smoking prevalence. We compare our model’s predictions to an independently established
measure of individualism/collectivism, i.e. Hofstede’s Individualism versus Collectivism
(IDV) measure, and find evidence that a society’s culture can have a quantitative effect
on the spread of a contagion. Finally, we study the dynamics of individuals’ body mass
index (BMI - defined as weight divided by height squared). We establish an individual-level
model that also has implications at the population level. At the population level our model
fits empirical BMI distributions better than the log-normal and skew-normal distribution
functions, i.e. two distributions commonly used to fit right-skewed data, and provides a
mechanistic explanation for the right-skewness observed in empirical BMI distributions.
At the individual level our model is able to reproduce the average and standard deviation
iv
in individuals’ year-over-year change in BMI. At both the individual and population levels
our model finds evidence in support of the hypothesis that social factors play a role in the
dynamics of individuals’ BMI.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Human beings are undoubtedly social creatures. Consciously or unconsciously, conspicu-
ously or inconspicuously, the decisions we make and the actions we take are being influenced
by the innumerable social interactions that are an unavoidable part of everyday life. The
primary focus of this thesis is to apply mathematical modelling techniques to investigate
the implications of social influence on decision making processes. Broadly speaking, we in-
vestigate two different ways in which social influence manifests itself. First, in Chapters 2-3
we investigate collective action problems, i.e. tasks whose successful completion requires
the participation of a minimum fraction of the population. Second, in Chapters 4-5 we
investigate problems involving conformity, i.e. situations where individuals choose to con-
form their behaviour to one social group over another (or possibly over many others). The
methods used in this thesis vary depending on the problem under consideration and fall
into two broad categories. At one extreme, we use agent-based models (ABMs) [20, 117]
that model the behaviour of each individual in a population. At the other extreme, we
use population-level models that model the aggregate behaviour of large sub-groups in a
population [99, 101, 191]. We now provide additional context for collective action and
conformity problems and compare and contrast the methods used in this thesis in Sec-
tions 1.1-1.2, respectively, before summarizing the main results and contributions of this
thesis in Section 1.3.
1
1.1 Collective Action and Conformity Problems
1.1.1 The Stag Hunt Game
Of all the animal species on Earth, human beings are among the most, if not the most,
cooperative. Even when compared against our nearest neighbours (e.g. chimpanzees),
humans are especially cooperative beings [172, 173]. Although exactly how the cooperative
nature of human beings evolved is not known, and indeed can likely never be known for
sure, it seems likely that human beings’ cooperative nature evolved in response to selection
pressure that can be conceptually identified with “The Stag Hunt” game [28], a symmetric
two player game that is played as follows. Two players each choose between cooperating
(c), i.e. hunting a stag collaboratively, or defecting (d), i.e. hunting a rabbit individually.
Capturing a stag requires that both players cooperate and results in a large payoff, whereas
capturing a rabbit is a purely individual effort and results in a lower payoff. If both players
cooperate, then they succeed in capturing a stag and they each receive the highest possible
payout (p3). In contrast if they both defect, i.e. if they each choose to hunt rabbits
individually, then they each receive a small payout (p1). If one cooperates and the other
defects then the defecting player gets a medium payout (p2)
1, i.e. they successfully hunt
a rabbit, and the cooperating player gets a small penalty (p0), i.e. they receive neither
the payoff from the capture of a rabbit or from a stag. The magnitudes of the payoffs are
p3 > p2 ≥ p1 > p0. This game is illustrated in Fig. 1.1.
The Stag Hunt game is useful as a conceptual tool for understanding the most simplified
form of a collective action problem, i.e. a task whose successful completion requires a
certain minimum collective participation. The Stag Hunt game has two Nash Equilibria2:
one where both players cooperate (c, c) and one where both players defect (d, d). Clearly the
desired equilibrium is the cooperative one, however, maintaining this equilibrium is non-
trivial. Intuitively, we expect that maintaining the cooperative equilibrium (c, c) requires
1We note that the payoff from hunting a rabbit depends on whether your opponent also chooses to hunt
a rabbit, i.e. p2 ≥ p1 in order to allow for the possibility that capturing a rabbit is easiest when you are
not in competition with your opponent for rabbits.
2In a multiplayer game a Nash Equilibrium is a set of strategies for each player such that (a) each
player knows the strategies of the other players, and (b) given the strategies of the other players no player
can improve their outcome by changing strategy. For example, in a two player game a pair of actions
(x, y), i.e. where Player 1 chooses x and Player 2 chooses y, is a Nash Equilibrium if (a) given that Player
2 chooses y, Player 1 achieves their highest possible payoff from action x, and (b) given that Player 1
chooses x, Player 2 achieves their highest possible payoff from action y. In the Stag Hunt game (c, c) is a
Nash Equilibrium because, given that Player 1 chooses to cooperate, Player 2 achieves their highest payoff
from also choosing to cooperate, and vice versa.
2
Player 1\2 c d
c p3, p3 p0, p2
d p2, p0 p1, p1
Figure 1.1: The Stag Hunt game. Rows represent possible actions of Player 1. Columns
represent possible actions of Player 2. Payoffs are given as ordered pairs for Players 1 and
2, respectively, where p3 > p2 ≥ p1 > p0. For example, if Player 1 defects (d) and Player 2
cooperates (c) then Player 1 receives payoff p2 and Player 2 receives payoff p0.
that players be able to communicate with and also to trust each other.
Using the Stag Hunt game as a point of reference, one possible narrative for the evo-
lution of the especially cooperative nature of human beings, as posited by evolutionary
anthropologists [172, 173], proceeds in two stages. In the first, humans are exposed to
evolutionary pressure in the form of small-scale collective action problems analogous to
the Stag Hunt game. Successful adaptation in the first stage resulted in an increasing
population, which in turn led to competition between groups of individuals. In this second
stage, collaboration between individuals (and groups of individuals) is drastically scaled
up in order to defend against other groups of humans, i.e. invaders. The necessity of in-
tergroup collaboration in order to defend from invaders necessitated organization of small
groups, i.e. tribes, into larger groups. Communication, coordination, trust, and ultimately
collaboration, between these small tribes laid the foundation for the development of cul-
ture. Individuals of different, but related, tribes became able to identify potential partners
for collaboration through shared language, foods, and social norms. A corollary of the
development of culture and group identity, therefore, is the desire of and for individuals to
conform to social norms.
Although the narrative presented above is only one of many, it is nevertheless useful in
that it provides a conceptual framework for the two broad themes that will be discussed
in this thesis: collective action problems (see Chapters 2-3) and conformity problems (see
Chapters 4-5).
3
1.1.2 Collective Action Problems
An early mathematical model for collective action problems in the context of social spread-
ing phenomena was provided by Granovetter in 1978 [75]. This work considers a binary
choice collective action problem, i.e. individuals are given a choice between one of two
alternatives, where the payoffs depend on the choices made by the population in aggre-
gate. Examples of phenomena where this model might apply include, but are by no means
limited to, the enforcement of unpopular norms [36], social influence in marketing [98],
the spread of health behaviours [27, 106], rumour spreading [153], and even in engineering
applications (e.g. the spread of failures in electrical grids) [187]. Most of these situations
can be summarized conceptually as follows. Individuals are given the choice between in-
action and action. The payoff for inaction, i.e. the payoff of their default state, is zero.
The payoff for action depends on the number of other individuals that also chose action.
Individuals who choose action are choosing to contribute to a collaborative endeavour that
will only succeed if sufficiently many individuals participate. If only very few individu-
als choose action then the collaboration fails and their payoff is negative. However, if a
sufficiently large number of individuals choose action then the collaboration is successful
and their payoff is positive. Individuals will therefore only choose action if they expect a
sufficiently large fraction of the population to also choose action. This situation can be
modelled mathematically by a linear threshold process where each individual i is given a
threshold θi and will only choose action if the fraction of the population that has chosen
action meets or exceeds θi. We note that, given this characterization, these processes can
be considered as straightforward generalizations of the Stag Hunt game.
The concept of the linear threshold model was revived in the context of political rev-
olution after the 1989 Eastern European revolutions [107]. A linear threshold model was
applied in this context in order to explain the unanticipated nature of the 1989 revolutions
as well as the incredible speed with which they spread. The argument presented is that,
while much of the population may have relatively high thresholds for action θi, a cascade
of activations may nevertheless be possible so long as a critical fraction of the population
has developed sufficiently low thresholds. This provides a satisfactory explanation for the
speed with which the revolution occurred, since the sequence of activations of low to high
threshold individuals acts as a chain reaction. It also provides a satisfactory explanation
for the unforeseen nature of the revolution, since only a relatively small minority of the
population is required to have low thresholds (i.e. only a relatively few people need to be
biased towards action).
Although the distribution of thresholds is of critical importance in a linear threshold
model, so too is the structure of the underlying communication network. Indeed, if you are
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isolated and unable to communicate or coordinate your actions with other individuals then
you will likely never choose to act, regardless of the value of your threshold for action θi.
In 2010-2011 another wave of massive protests culminated in revolutions in several Arab
countries [19, 92, 152]. As with the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, these political
protests and revolutions, which came to be collectively known as the Arab Spring, were
largely unforeseen and spread with an incredible speed across a huge geographical area.
What was notably different from the 1989 revolutions, however, was the degree to which
the Arab Spring was broadcast to the world. New communication technologies allowed
real time communication and coordination between protesters and the rest of the world.
Indeed, the dominant narrative that was developed by the media was how the Internet
and social media played a critical role in facilitating the Arab Spring [5, 89, 92, 100, 116,
144, 162, 165, 192]. In Chapters 2-3 we apply a linear threshold model to investigate this
hypothesis and to describe a mechanism through which new media technologies may have
facilitated the protests and revolutions of the Arab Spring.
1.1.3 Conformity Problems
In the binary choice collective action problems studied in the previous section, individuals
are given a choice of action or inaction. If they choose action then they are choosing to
join a collaborative effort, the outcome of which depends on the number of collaborators
they have. In contrast, in the binary choice conformity problem individuals are given the
choice to belong to one of two population sub-groups: A or B, or equivalently A or not A.
Instead of choosing whether or not to join a collective endeavour, individuals are choosing
whether or not to join a collective identity. But, suppose that we identify the choice to
belong to group A with action and the choice to belong to group B with inaction. Then,
using the terminology developed for collective action problems in the previous section,
the basic premise of the binary choice conformity problem can be described as follows.
Individuals are given a choice of either action (i.e. joining group A) or inaction (i.e.
joining group B). Individuals who choose inaction receive a composite payoff made up of
the individual utility they derive from inaction (i.e. the utility they derive purely from
conforming their behaviour to the standards of group B) and the social utility they derive
from social interactions with other inactive individuals (i.e. the utility they derive from
social interactions with other group B members). Similarly, individuals who choose action
receive a composite payoff made up of the individual utility they derive from action (i.e.
the utility they derive purely from conforming their behaviour to the standards of group
A) and the social utility they derive from social interactions with other active individuals
(i.e. the utility they derive from social interactions with other group A members). While
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at first glance the binary choice collective action and conformity problems appear to be
distinct, they are in fact very closely related - at least from the mathematical modelling
perspective adopted in this thesis. We remark that this observation is consistent with the
narrative developed in Section 1.1.1, which identifies both collective action and conformity
problems as potentially having a common evolutionary origin.
In Chapter 4 we apply the concept of a binary choice conformity problem to study
the dynamics of smoking prevalence. Specifically, individuals are given a choice between
smoking (i.e. belonging to group A) and not smoking (i.e. belonging to group B). They
are assigned a composite payoff made up of individual utility (i.e. smokers receive utility
derived purely from the act of smoking and non-smokers receive utility derived purely from
the act of not smoking) and social utility (i.e. smokers receive utility from interactions with
other smokers, and non-smokers receive utility from interactions with other non-smokers).
Using this conceptualization to frame the problem of modelling the dynamics of smoking
prevalence, Chapter 4 applies a mathematical model that is closely related to an antecedent
model of social group competition applied to both the dynamics of language death [1] and
the decline of religious affiliation [2]. The first case divides the population into a group A
that speaks a particular minority language (e.g. Scottish Gaelic in Scotland, or Quechua in
Peru) and a second group B that does not speak this minority language. Over the period of
time that the model is applied (roughly a century) the groups speaking minority languages
decline in size monotonically. The second case divides the population into a group A
that is religiously unaffiliated and a second group B that is religiously affiliated. Over the
period of time that the model is applied (again, roughly a century) the groups of religiously
unaffiliated increase in size monotonically. We note that in both of these previous cases the
dynamics that are being modelled are monotonic. In contrast, the dynamics of smoking
prevalence over the past century are not monotonic, and therefore, the model presented
in Chapter 4 must be modified accordingly, see Section 1.3 or Chapter 4 for additional
details.
A natural generalization of the binary choice conformity problem is the multiple choice
conformity problem, i.e. the situation where individuals are given the choice to belong
to one of many different population sub-groups. This is the case studied in Chapter 5,
which generalizes the mathematical model presented in Chapter 4 (and also [1, 2]) for the
dynamics of the body mass index (BMI). Since BMI can take any value in a continuous
range, this model presents individuals not with a choice between membership in one of two
groups, but between membership in one of an infinite number of groups.
In both Chapters 4 and 5 we develop our experimental design in order to investigate
the hypothesis that social interactions play an important, and indeed quantifiable, role
in contagion processes. Specifically, we find that for two epidemics of non-communicable
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diseases (i.e. the smoking and obesity epidemics) we are able to provide evidence in support
of this hypothesis by investigating the importance of the contribution from social utility
with respect to individual utility, see Section 1.3 and Chapters 4-5 for additional details.
1.2 Agent-based versus Population-level Modelling
Population-level mathematical modelling is a modelling strategy that aggregates individ-
uals according to some characteristic and then formulates a mathematical model in terms
of individuals’ average behaviours. The classic example of a population-level model is the
Kermack-McKendrick Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) model for the evolution of an
epidemic [99]3, which divides individuals into three compartments according to their sta-
tus: Susceptible (S) individuals may become infected through contact with an Infected
individual (I), and Infected individuals become Removed (R) through recovery or death.
Once compartments have been established, the model is formulated in terms of individuals’
average behaviour by specifying an ordinary differential equation (ODE) for the evolution
of each compartment. For the Kermack-McKendrick SIR model, with infection (β) and re-
moval (γ) rates that are assumed to be constant over the lifetime of an Infected individual,
the system of ordinary differential equations is
S˙ = −βSI,
I˙ = βSI − γI, and
R˙ = γI,
where X˙ denotes the time derivative of X. Because the Kermack-McKendrick SIR model
divides the population into three distinct compartments, this population-level model is
commonly known as a compartmental model. Whereas the SIR model divides the pop-
ulation into distinct compartments, however, there exist applications where individuals
can take on a continuum of states, e.g. see Chapter 5 which models individuals’ body
mass index (BMI). In this case, the population-level model is given by a partial differential
equation (PDE) that describes the dynamics of the distribution of individuals over the con-
tinuum of possible states. We note that this partial differential equation can be thought of
as analogous to the compartmental model in the limit where the number of compartments
goes to infinity.
3For more contemporary examples of simple compartmental models and their applications we suggest
[101] and [191].
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At the opposite extreme of population-level models are individual-level models, i.e.
agent-based models (ABMs) in which the behaviour of each individual is specified sepa-
rately. Recently, despite difficulties in analyzing ABMs, they have become increasingly
popular due to advances in scientific computing and techniques in numerical and compu-
tational analysis that have allowed for the efficient computational analysis of ABMs via
simulation. As a result, there is a growing body of research on the strengths and weaknesses
of ABMs relative to compartmental models [114, 136, 149].
As an undergraduate student I was taught that when developing a mathematical model
there are two important factors that need to be balanced. First, it is important that the
mathematical model be sophisticated enough to be able to capture the essence of the phe-
nomenon being studied. Second, it is important that the mathematical model be kept as
simple as possible. The first point is self-evident. Obviously, a mathematical model that
is incapable of capturing the phenomenon being modelled is useless. The second point,
although less obvious than the first, is really just a rephrasing of Occam’s razor in the
context of mathematical modelling. Alternatively, the second point, i.e. our preference
for simplicity over complexity, can be justified by considering the tradeoffs inherent when
comparing a simple model to a more complex model. Specifically, although more complex
models (e.g. ABMs) are better able to capture nuanced behaviour than simple models (e.g.
population-level models), it is important to note that they may also (a) require additional
assumptions in order to specify behaivour of individuals in greater detail, (b) become less
analytically tractable and more computationally expensive to simulate, (c) require the cal-
ibration of many more additional parameters, and (d) result in overfitting and otherwise
spurious results. In this thesis we attempt to apply ABMs and simple population-level
models in parallel in order to take advantage of their complementary strengths and weak-
ness. For example, although simple population-level models typically admit a complete
mathematical analysis and straightforward interpretation, they are limited in their abil-
ity to model fine scale structure or nuanced phenomena. Conversely, although ABMs are
able to model fine scale structure and nuanced phenomena, they generally do not admit
a complete mathematical analysis and are susceptible to overfitting. Using both ABMs
and simple population-level models together allows one modelling technique to be used to
complement or enhance the other. Specifically, we note that the works of Chapters 3 and
5 both take advantage of this important relationship, see Section 1.3 for additional details.
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1.3 Thesis Summary
Chapter 2 begins by investigating how changing patterns of social interaction brought about
by new media, e.g. social networks, satellite television, Short Message Service (SMS) text
messaging, etc..., might have facilitated the surprising and dramatic events of the political
protests and revolutions of the 2010-2011 Arab Spring. Specifically, using both conceptual
and network based justifications, we develop a simple one-dimensional ordinary differential
equation model, i.e. the step visibility function (SVF) model, describing the dynamics of
a political protest in a dictatorial regime that employs censorship and repression. This
situation represents a collective action problem, since individuals who choose to protest
unilaterally face significant reprisal from the regime, whereas individuals who protest in
sufficient numbers are immune to retaliation from the regime due to the regime’s finite
resource constraint. We discuss the model interpretation and implications in the context
of the Arab Spring revolutions, among others. In this context it is important that we
select a simple mathematical model that admits a complete mathematical analysis. This
allows us to completely understand all possible dynamical behaviours exhibited by the
model, and hence, allows us to develop a straightforward interpretation in the context of
political revolutions in dictatorial regimes. The major contribution of our simple model
is that it provides a conceptual framework for understanding potential outcomes from
political protests/revolution in dictatorial regimes, and how these potential outcomes are
influenced by the structure of the underlying network of social interactions.
The work of Chapter 3 follows the mathematical model presented in Chapter 2. As we
discussed above, the model presented in Chapter 2 is a simple compartmental model that
is useful as a conceptual tool for understanding the role of new communication technology
in political protests/revolutions in dictatorial regimes. However, in order to arrive at this
simple mathematical model, many significant assumptions were necessary. Specifically,
instead of explicitly accounting for the communication network (and how this network
changes over time), the model presented in Chapter 2 makes a number of assumptions
that allows us to implicitly model the communication network. Chapter 3 relaxes these
assumptions by explicitly incorporating the communication network into a linear threshold
agent-based model (ABM) for the dynamics of political protest in dictatorial regimes. In
so doing, the ABM allows us to directly investigate the role of new communication tech-
nologies, and also to justify the assumptions made in our simple compartmental model a
posteriori. Moreover, although the ABM of Chapter 3 does not admit a complete mathe-
matical analysis, we note that because we carefully specify the ABM to be consistent with
the simple compartmental model previously developed in Chapter 2, we are able to use the
analysis provided in Chapter 2 as a guide for the computational analysis performed for our
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ABM. Finally, we use insights gained from the ABM to refine the original simple model
of Chapter 2 to enhance its ability to approximate the aggregate behaviour of the ABM.
Small scale numerical simulations of the ABM on a physical contact network, and on a
subset of the Facebook network, support the thesis that new communication technologies
facilitated the protests and revolutions of the Arab Spring. The major contributions of this
section are that it (a) confirms a posteriori the assumptions made to develop the simple
model of Chapter 2, (b) provides evidence for the hypothesis that the Arab Spring was
facilitated by new communication technologies, and (c) outlines methodologically how sim-
ple low dimensional compartmental models and high dimensional ABMs can be developed
in a consistent fashion and how they can be used together to complement each others’
weaknesses.
Whereas Chapters 2-3 investigate social effects in the context of political movements,
Chapters 4-5 investigate social effects in epidemiological contexts, i.e. in the context of non-
communicable diseases. Chapter 4 models the dynamics of smoking prevalence as a binary
choice conformity problem where individuals choose to belong to one of two social groups
(i.e. smokers or non-smokers). Specifically, Chapter 4 uses a simple compartmental model
for the dynamics of smoking prevalence over the time span of approximately one century.
As with Chapter 2, the simple compartmental model that we develop admits a complete
mathematical analysis, as well as a straightforward interpretation. More importantly,
however, given the relative sparsity of the data on smoking prevalence, the selection of
a simple mathematical model also allows us to minimize the likelihood that our model
suffers from problems of overfitting. The main contributions of this chapter are threefold.
First, since antecedent mathematical models for binary choice conformity problems [1,
2] are only capable of modelling monotonic changes in prevalence, and since smoking
prevalence peaked in the mid-twentieth century, we modify these previous approaches by
including a term modelling the known health risks of smoking. This quantity, which
increases over the time frame of our model and which decreases the utility that individuals
receive directly from the act of smoking, allows our model to capture the rise and fall
of smoking prevalence over the past hundred years. Second, we use data on tobacco
consumption to estimate smoking prevalence in seven advanced economies over the past
century. In each of these countries, therefore, we have established the longest reported
time series for smoking prevalence. Finally, by calibrating our model to estimated smoking
prevalence data, and comparing our fitted parameters to a previously established measure
of individualism (Hofstede’s IDV), we provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that
a society’s culture (in this case its level of individualism) can have a quantifiable influence
on the dynamics of a social spreading process.
Whereas Chapters 2-4 investigate binary choice problems, i.e. situations where in-
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dividuals choose between one of two alternatives (e.g. to protest or not to protest, to
smoke or not to smoke), Chapter 5 modifies our approach for the case where individuals
choose between a continuum of choices. Specifically, Chapter 5 develops a mathematical
model for the dynamics of the body mass index (BMI)4. As with Chapter 3, Chapter 5
proposes models at both the individual and population-levels. More precisely, we specify
an agent-based model for the dynamics of BMIs at the individual level. This agent-based
model, which consists of a system of coupled Langevin equations, has known implications
at the population-level. Specifically, the system of Langevin equations that we develop is
related to a Fokker-Planck partial differential equation that describes the evolution of the
probability density function for BMIs, i.e. the evolution of the distribution of BMIs in
the population. Using three independently collected data sets we show that our model is
capable of reproducing empirical BMI data at both the individual and population levels.
We make two main contributions at both the individual and population-levels. At the
population-level our model provides a mechanistic explanation for the right-skewness of
the BMI distribution, and is also better at reproducing the distribution of BMIs in the
population than two other probability distribution functions (i.e. the skew-normal and
log-normal distributions) commonly used to describe right-skewed data. At the individual
level, our model is able to reproduce empirical data for the average and standard deviation
of year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI, and also provides evidence in support of the
hypothesis that social influences play an important role in the dynamics of individuals’
BMI. Finally, we note that one of the three BMI data sets mentioned above, which is com-
prised of anonymized medical records from the Northwestern Medical network of hospitals
and clinics, was compiled specifically as part of this research project. The compilation of
this data set represents a major contribution, since it represents the largest known collec-
tion of BMI panel data, i.e. individuals’ year-over-year change in BMI can be calculated
for 329,543 distinct individuals resulting in over 1,017,518 data points spanning a 17 year
period.
Publications resulting from the work performed in this thesis are summarized in the
following section. Following Chapters 2-5, the conclusion of this thesis is given in Chapter 6.
4The body mass index is defined as the ratio of body mass (in kilograms) to height (in meters) squared
and is a commonly used indicator for body composition, i.e. the higher an individual’s BMI the greater
the percentage of fat in overall body composition.
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Chapter 2
The Arab Spring: A Simple
Compartmental Model for the
Dynamics of a Revolution
This chapter is based on research published in Mathematical Social Sciences [109].
2.1 Introduction
“After decades of political stagnation... new winds of hope were felt in
the Middle East, accompanied by a new catchword making the rounds in the
American media, ‘Arab Spring’... The age of the old patriarchs, it appeared,
was nearing its end. And the new media - satellite television, mobile phones,
the Internet - were often regarded as having precipitated this development by
undermining governments’ hegemonic control over the flow of information.”
When A. Hofheinz wrote these words about the Arab Spring he was referring to modest
advancements being made in democracy and political liberalization in a handful of Middle
Eastern countries in 2005 [85]. He did not foresee the events sparked by Mohamed Bouaz-
izi’s self-immolation in a small Tunisian city on December 17, 2010 that ultimately led to
the 2010-2011 Arab Spring revolutions1. Nevertheless, his analysis of new media and their
impact on Arab society is eerily prescient, especially considering that in 2005 social media
1Henceforth, when we use the term Arab Spring when referring to the 2010-2011 Arab Spring.
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was either in its infancy or completely non-existent. Indeed, Facebook was launched in
2004 and was still an invitation-only service in 2005, YouTube was founded in early 2005,
and Twitter was not founded until the spring of 2006 [21].
The predominant (but not universal [7]) view today is that the Internet and social media
played a critical role in the Arab Spring [5, 89, 92, 100, 116, 144, 162, 165, 192]. Although
some rigorous work has been done attempting to determine a link between social media
and protests using, for example, Twitter data [89, 116], most of these opinions are based
on anecdotal evidence and ad hoc reasoning. Thus, the goal of this chapter is twofold.
First, we introduce a simple compartmental model for the dynamics of a revolution in
dictatorial regimes that employ censorship and police repression. A defining property of
the model is the use of visibility and policing terms that feature rapid transitions as a
function of the size of the revolution, for which we provide conceptual and network-based
mathematical justifications. The complete mathematical classification of the dynamical
behaviour of the model leads to a division in parameter space that is interpreted naturally
in terms of stability of the regime (stable police state, meta-stable police state, unstable
police state, and failed state). We show that these dynamical properties of the model are
generic for a broad class of visibility and policing functions that feature rapid transitions.
Second, we investigate how the model can be applied to the Arab Spring revolutions in
Tunisia and Egypt, taking into account the influence of the Internet and new media on
the visibility of the revolution and the ensuing reduced efficacy of censorship. Within the
model this leads to significant, discontinuous changes in regime stability, which greatly
increase the probability of realized revolutions. These properties of the model inform
possible answers to questions on causes and timing of the Arab Spring revolutions, and
the role of the Internet and new media. The broader relevance of the model classification
is also investigated by applying it to the current political situation in some other countries
with regimes that employ censorship and police repression.
It should be noted that models of opinion/norm formation [36], conflict [9, 43, 105, 151],
and revolution [71, 107] already exist. However, these models either do not apply specif-
ically to the peaceful political revolutions of the Arab Spring or are highly complex. Al-
though complex models may in principle be able to offer a more complete description, they
also have limitations such as requiring the calibration of a large number of parameters.
This makes complex models analytically intractable, difficult to interpret, and computa-
tionally expensive to simulate. In Epstein’s categorization of reasons to model [51], ours is
to illustrate the core dynamics of the balance between, on one hand, the growth of a revo-
lutionary movement and the influence of censorship and information flow on this growth,
and on the other hand, the suppression of the revolution by police force. As a simple con-
ceptual model, our model follows the tradition of well-known differential equation models
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in conflict analysis like the Richardson arms race model [151]. Thus, we emphasize that the
main goal of this chapter is to develop a simple model that is nevertheless able to capture
essential features of political revolutions in dictatorial regimes that employ censorship and
police repression.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five additional sections. We specify and
justify our model in Section 2.2, and we provide a mathematical analysis of our model in
Section 2.3. Section 2.4 specifies and analyzes an extension to our model that relaxes some
of the simplifying assumptions made in the basic form of the model, confirming that the
dynamical properties of the basic model are generic for a broader class of models. We inves-
tigate how our model can be applied to the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt,
and the current situation in some other countries with regimes that employ censorship and
police repression, in Section 2.5. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 2.6.
2.2 Model Specification
2.2.1 Basic Model
We begin by specifying a simple model describing the process by which citizens engage in
revolution in regimes that employ censorship and police repression. Let r = r(t) be the
fraction of protesters or revolutionaries in the population at time t. The model is given by
a single differential equation for r(t),
r˙(t) =
dr
dt
= c1 v(r;α) (1− r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(r)
− c2 p(r; β) r︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(r)
, (2.1)
where α, β ∈ (0, 1) and c1, c2 > 0 are parameters, and where the functions g, d: [0, 1]→ R+
are called the growth and decay terms, respectively, since they model the growth and decay
of the fraction of protesters.
In our model the fraction of protesters can only grow when the protest movement is
sufficiently large to be visible to the general population, defying attempts at censorship by
the regime. We call the proportionality constant c1 and the parameter α the enthusiasm
and visibility of the protesters, respectively. The visibility term v(r;α) is modelled as a
step function which shuts off the growth term when the fraction of protesters is below the
visibility threshold 1− α, i.e.
v(r;α) = I{r>1−α},
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where I{·} is the indicator function, i.e.
I{X} =
{
1 if X is true
0 if X is false
.
We illustrate the visibility term v(r;α) and the growth term g(r) in Fig. 2.1a. The policing
term p(r; β), is also modelled as a step function, which shuts down the decay term when
the fraction of protesters is above the police capacity β, i.e.
p(r; β) = I{r<β}.
We illustrate the police term p(r; β) and decay term d(r) in Fig. 2.1b. We call the pro-
portionality constant c2 the policing efficiency . Finally, we observe from Eq. (2.1) that if
r = 0 or r = 1 then r˙ = 0. Thus, we call r = 0 and r = 1 the equilibria of total state
control and of the realized revolution, respectively.
We provide a conceptual justification for the model developed above, as well as a
network-based mathematical justification for the step function, in the following section.
2.2.2 Conceptual Justification of Basic Model (Eq. (2.1))
In order to arrive at the model given in Eq. (2.1) some simplifying assumptions were
made. First, our model is developed for describing rapid revolutionary transitions on a
short time scale (on the order of months), and neglects demographic and other long-term
effects. Second, we assume that the regime is very unpopular and that all individuals
would privately like to see the regime changed. While this does not apply to all cases of
political revolution (e.g., the 2011 revolutions in Libya or the current civil war in Syria), it
is nevertheless a reasonable modelling approximation in many cases (e.g. the Arab Spring
revolutions in Tunisia or Egypt). These two assumptions imply a constant population
that can be divided into two compartments: the population participating (r(t)) and not
participating (1 − r(t)) in the revolution. We note that, by the second assumption, the
fraction of the population potentially willing to join the revolution at time t is 1− r(t).
Dictatorial regimes are known to keep tight control on the flow of political information
through state control of the media and through censorship [36, 47, 85, 92, 100, 107], for
obvious reasons: if political protests are kept hidden from the general population, protest
movements have little chance of growing. We model this effect through the visibility term
v(r;α), which we assume undergoes a rapid transition from 0 to 1 that, for simplicity,
we model as a step function. As soon as the fraction of protesters reaches the visibility
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Figure 2.1: Visibility v(r;α), growth g(r), policing p(r; β), and decay d(r) terms for the
basic model (Eq. (2.1)).
threshold 1− α and is large enough to be visible to the general population, the revolution
is assumed to grow proportional to 1− r, where the time scale of growth is determined by
the protesters’ enthusiasm c1.
As further motivation for the rapid transition from 0 to 1 in v(r;α) consider that, given
the policing limitations of the regime, the decision of individuals whether or not to act
is a collective action problem [107]. If individuals protest individually then the state is
capable of severe retaliation, however, if individuals protest in sufficient numbers then the
state loses its ability to punish. Thus, the case can be made that the most important
factor for individuals deciding to join a revolution is the perceived size of the revolution. A
network-based mathematical justification of how this would lead to rapid transitions from
0 to 1 in the visibility term of our model is provided in the following section.
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We assume that the regime is capable of arresting/dispersing protesters at a rate pro-
portional to the size of the revolution r(t), provided that the number of protesters does
not exceed the regime’s finite police capacity β. Provided that no new protesters join the
revolution (v = 0) and that the number of protesters does not exceed the regime’s police
capacity (p = 1), this corresponds to exponential decay in the number of protesters with
the time scale determined by the policing efficiency c2. We make the further simplifying
assumption that the regime loses all ability to punish once the number of protesters exceeds
the regime’s police capacity. Thus, p(r; β) takes the form of a step function in our basic
model.
We note that the growth term in our model (with parameters c1 and α) can be related
to aspects of grievance [43], the utility of protest, and the overall emotional state of the
population [138]. In contrast, parameters c2 and β can be related to aspects of political
opportunity [43] and state capacity [82].
In Section 2.4 we relax the step function transitions of v(r;α) and p(r; β) to broader
classes of sigmoid-type rapid transitions between 0 and 1, and show that the resulting
more general models are capable of exhibiting the same dynamics as our basic model with
step functions. This shows that the discontinuities in the step function transitions between
0 and 1 are not essential for obtaining the dynamics of the model and do not introduce
artifacts in the dynamics, and that the dynamics are indeed generic for a broader class of
models with rapid transitions between 0 and 1 in visibility and policing terms. We choose
step functions in our basic model because they require the smallest number of parameters
in describing rapid transitions between 0 and 1, and yet maintain the essential dynamics
of more complicated models with more generic rapid transitions between 0 and 1.
Finally, due to the simplicity of our model, it is unable to capture singular events
such as the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010. Although this
type of event could be modelled stochastically, to keep our model as simple as possible we
introduce the concept of shocks : events external to our model which affect the fraction of
revolutionaries r(t) either directly, or indirectly via a change in the parameters α, β, c1, or
c2.
2.2.3 Network-Based Justification of Basic Model (Eq. (2.1))
Section 2.2.2 introduced the decision of an individual to participate in a revolution as a
collective action problem. If individuals protest individually then the state is capable of
severe retaliation, however, if individuals protest in sufficient numbers then the state loses
its ability to punish. It is a reasonable assumption, therefore, that each individual i in a
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network has a threshold θi ∈ (0, 1) which determines his or her participation. In particular,
an individual is considering joining the revolution only if the fraction of the individual’s
neighbors participating in the revolution is at least θi [107]. We use this basic framework
to justify the choice of v(r;α) as a rapid transition between 0 and 1 (modelled by a step
function in our basic model) by considering the following derivation.
Let individuals in a population be represented by nodes V in a network G = G(V,E),
where edges E linking individuals represent social interactions. We define the average
degree and threshold of individuals V to be φ and θ, respectively. Suppose that in the
time interval (t, t+ ∆t) an individual i ∈ V who is considering joining the revolution joins
with probability c1∆t. Equivalently, taking ∆t → 0, a node that is considering joining
the revolution will join at the first arrival time of a Poisson process with rate c1. In order
to estimate the fraction of the average individual’s neighbours that are participating in
the revolution, without having to specify additional information about the structure of the
underlying network, it is necessary to make a simplifying assumption. Specifically, following
[104, 128, 137] we assume that the states of an individual’s neighbors are uncorrelated. It
now follows that the probability that an average individual considers joining the revolution
is
bφc∑
j=dθφe
(bφc
j
)
rj(1− r)bφc−j
=
bφc−dθφe∑
j=0
(bφc
j
)
(1− r)jrbφc−j
= BinCDF(bφc − dθφe; bφc, 1− r), (2.2)
where BinCDF(x;n, p) is the cumulative distribution function for the binomial distribution
with n trials and probability of success p evaluated at x. An approximation for the number
of nodes considering joining the revolution is thus
(1− r) BinCDF(bφc − dθφe; bφc, 1− r).
It follows that
∆r ≈ c1 ∆t (1− r) BinCDF(bφc − dθφe; bφc, 1− r).
Dividing by ∆t and taking the limit ∆t→ 0 yields
dr
dt
≈ c1 (1− r) BinCDF(bφc − dθφe; bφc, 1− r),
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where BinCDF(bφc − dθφe; bφc, 1 − r) corresponds to the visibility term v(r;α) of
model (2.1).
Individuals only consider joining the revolution if it has already grown to a certain
extent, but an individual’s ability to determine the extent of the revolution is constrained
by the number of neighbors the individual has. Specifically, the more neighbors one has
the more certain one can be about the true extent of the revolution. We emphasize that
determining the true extent of the revolution before deciding to act is of critical importance
because if one overestimates the support for a revolution then one risks acting unilaterally.
We would, therefore, expect the average threshold θ and average degree φ to be nega-
tively correlated (increased φ corresponds to decreased θ). We illustrate the dependence of
Eq. (2.2) on the parameters θ and φ in Fig. 2.2. All panels of Fig. 2.2 show that Eq. (2.2)
is a function of r with a steep transition from 0 to 1, with the transition becoming steeper
as φ increases, which lends justification to our choice of a rapid transition from 0 to 1
for v(r;α). Although we do not know the exact relationship between θ and φ, Fig. 2.2
illustrates how when θ and φ are negatively correlated Eq. (2.2) can be approximated by
a steep transition from 0 to 1 that has one parameter determining where the transition
occurs (corresponding to parameter α in the visibility term v(r;α)). In our basic model we
model this steep transition from 0 to 1 as a step function, while more general sigmoid-type
transitions are considered in Section 2.4. Note that, in a macroscopic view, the average
number of effective neighbors φ that individuals can interact with is increased significantly
by new media, which corroborates our interpretation of v(r;α) as a visibility term.
We conclude this section with a few remarks regarding the assumption made above
that the states of an individual’s neighbors are uncorrelated. Given that the process we
are studying spreads over social networks, which tend to have high clustering coefficients,
this assumption would benefit from additional justification. The primary justification we
offer for this assumption is empirical. First, we note that this assumption is applied in
many models of spreading processes, for example rumour spreading processes [128] and
epidemiological processes [104, 137]. These models have been shown to be good first
order approximations of higher order “effective degree” or Agent Based models that do
not employ assumptions about the correlations of the states of an individual’s neighbors
[114]. Second, we have recorded preliminary results confirming that the visibility function
in a simple model that includes effects of the network (by statistically sampling real social
network data sets without assuming uncorrelated neighbors) takes the form of a rapid
transition of the type illustrated in Fig. 2.2 also for these real networks. Further details
are given in Chapter 3.
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(a) Constant φ = 100 with (solid line)
θ = 0.75, (dashed line) θ = 0.5, and
(dotted line) θ = 0.25.
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(b) Constant θ = 0.5 with (solid line)
φ = 200, (dashed line) φ = 100, and
(dotted line) φ = 50.
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(c) Negatively correlated θ and φ.
(Solid line) (θ, φ) = (0.75, 50), (dashed
line) (θ = 0.50, φ = 100), and (dotted
line) (θ, φ) = (0.75, 50).
Figure 2.2: Dependence of BinCDF(bφc − dθφe; bφc, 1− r), i.e. of the probability that an
average individual considers joining the revolution (Eq. (2.2)), on average threshold θ and
average degree φ.
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2.3 Model Analysis
2.3.1 Classification of Parameter Regimes
The mathematical classification of the different types of dynamical behaviour that may
occur in model (2.1) proceeds case-wise by considering parameter regions α + β = 1,
α + β < 1, and α + β > 1, which we call Regions I, II, and III, respectively, see Fig. 2.3a.
See Fig. 2.3b for the phase portraits of the different regions.
Before considering Regions I, II, and III separately we begin by considering the equi-
libria r = 0 and r = 1. When
r < min{1− α, β}
we have v(r;α) = 0 and p(r; β) = 1, which implies
r˙ ≤ 0 and r˙ = 0 ⇐⇒ r = 0.
Similarly, when
r > max{1− α, β}
we have v(r;α) = 1 and p(r; β) = 0, which implies
r˙ ≥ 0 and r˙ = 0 ⇐⇒ r = 1.
It follows that r = 0 and r = 1 are locally asymptotically stable equilibria whose basins of
attraction contain the intervals [0,min{1− α, β}) and (max{1− α, β}, 1], respectively.
Region I: α + β = 1
When r = β = 1 − α we have v(r;α) = p(r; β) = 0, which implies r˙ = 0. It follows
that r = β = 1 − α is an unstable equilibrium, and that r = 0 and r = 1 are locally
asymptotically stable equilibria with basins of attraction [0, β) and (1−α, 1], respectively.
We note that Region I, because it is one-dimensional, is unlikely to manifest itself and so
we mostly disregard it in what follows.
Region II: α + β < 1
As in the previous section, r = 0 and r = 1 are locally asymptotically stable equilibria
with basins of attraction [0, β) and (1 − α, 1], respectively. When r ∈ [β, 1 − α] we have
v(r;α) = p(r; β) = 0, which implies r˙ = 0. It follows that all r ∈ (β, 1 − α) are locally
stable equilibria and r ∈ {β, 1− α} are unstable equilibria.
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β III0
II III1
IIIe
c2/(c1+c2)
c1/(c1+c2)
(a) Division of α−β parameter space of model (2.1) into Regions I, II, IIIe, III0, and III1. Region
I is given by the solid line α+ β = 1.
IIIe 
0 1 β= 1-α 
I 
II 
0 1 β 1-α 
0 1 β 1-α c* 
III0 
0 1 β 1-α c* 
III1 
0 1 β 1-α c* 
(b) Equilibria, stability and basins of attraction on the r-axis (r ∈ [0, 1]) for parameters α, β, c1
and c2 of model (2.1) lying in Regions I, II, III0, IIIe and III1. Closed (open) circles represent
locally asymptotically stable (unstable) equilibria. Left (right) arrows indicate regions where
r˙ < 0 (r˙ > 0). The thick horizontal line indicates locally stable equilibria. Square (“[” and “]”)
or curved (“(” and “)”) brackets indicate boundaries of basins of attraction that contain or do
not contain their boundary points, respectively. Short vertical lines indicate special values of r
that are not equilibria or boundaries of basins of attraction.
Figure 2.3: Parameter regime and phase diagram for Regions I, II, III0, IIIe, and III1 of
the basic model (Eq. (2.1)).
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Region III: α + β > 1
When r = 1 − α we have v(r;α) = 0 and p(r; β) = 1, which implies r˙ < 0. Analogously,
when r = β we have v(r;α) = 1 and p(r; β) = 0, which implies r˙ > 0. Thus, the locally
asymptotically stable equilibria r = 0 and r = 1 have basins of attraction containing
[0, 1 − α] and [β, 1], respectively. Restricting our attention to the interval r ∈ (1 − α, β)
and solving the algebraic equation r˙ = 0 gives r = c∗, where
c∗ =
c1
c1 + c2
.
We now observe that our analysis breaks down into a further three sub-cases:
• Region III0 (c∗ ≤ 1− α < β): If c∗ ∈ [0, 1− α] then
∀r < β : r˙ ≤ c1(1− r)− c2r < 0,
which implies that the interval (1− α, β) lies in the basin of attraction of r = 0.
• Region III1 (1− α < β ≤ c∗): If c∗ ∈ [β, 1] then
∀r > 1− α : r˙ ≥ c1(1− r)− c2r > 0,
which implies that the region (1− α, β) lies in the basin of attraction of r = 1.
• Region IIIe (1− α < c∗ < β): If c∗ ∈ (1− α, β) then
r˙ = c1(1− r)− c2r

> 0 if r ∈ (1− α, c∗)
= 0 if r = c∗
< 0 if r ∈ (c∗, β)
,
which implies that there exists a third locally asymptotically stable equilibrium r = c∗
with basin of attraction (1− α, β).
2.3.2 Analytic Solution to the Basic Model (Eq. (2.1))
Although the analysis of the previous section is more useful in the interpretation and
classification of the parameter regimes of model (2.1), it is also possible to solve model (2.1)
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explicitly using the technique of separation of variables. Doing so for the initial condition
r(t0) = r0 yields the following. In Region I (1−α = β) and Region II (1−α > β) we have
r(t) =

r0e
−c2(t−t0) if r0 < β
r0 if r0 ∈ [β, 1− α]
1− (1− r0)e−c1(t−t0) if r0 > 1− α
.
In Regions III0 (c∗ ≤ 1−α < β), IIIe (1−α < c∗ < β), and III1 (1−α < β ≤ c∗) we have
r(t) =

r0e
−c2(t−t0) if r0 < 1− α[
c∗ + (r0 − c∗)e−(c1+c2)(t−t0)
]
I{t<tα}
+(1− α)e−c2(t−tα)I{t≥tα} if r0 ∈ [1− α, β] and c∗ ≤ 1− α < β
c∗ + (r0 − c∗)e−(c1+c2)(t−t0) if r0 ∈ [1− α, β] and 1− α < c∗ < β[
c∗ + (r0 − c∗)e−(c1+c2)(t−t0)
]
I{t<tβ}
+
[
1− (1− β)e−c1(t−tβ)] I{t≥tβ} if r0 ∈ [1− α, β] and 1− α < β ≤ c∗
1− (1− r0)e−c1(t−t0) if r0 > β
,
where
tα = t0 − 1
c1 + c2
log
(
1− α− c∗
r0 − c∗
)
, and
tβ = t0 − 1
c1 + c2
log
(
β − c∗
r0 − c∗
)
.
2.4 Model Extension: Sigmoidal visibility v(r) and
policing p(r) terms
The assumption that the visibility v(r;α) and policing p(r; β) terms are step functions is a
strong assumption that results in discontinuities in the vector field of Eq. (2.1) at r = 1−α
and r = β. Specifically, choosing v(1−α;α) = p(β; β) = 0 results in r ∈ {1−α, β} (a) being
unstable equilibria in Regions I and II, and (b) being in the basin of attraction of r = 0
and r = 1, respectively, in Regions III0, IIIe, and III1. We acknowledge that this choice
is arbitrary in nature, and that defining v(1 − α;α) and p(β; β) differently would change
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the vector field of Eq. (2.1) at the points r ∈ {1 − α, β}. Nevertheless, we conclude this
section by showing that essentially the same dynamics can occur when the step functions
in the visibility and policing terms are relaxed to generic sigmoid-type transitions between
0 and 1. This more general model does admit additional dynamical regimes that are not
present in model (2.1). However, as we will show in Chapter 3, the dynamics of model
(2.1) are sufficient to characterize the dynamics of the more general model when the general
model is implemented with sigmoidal visibility functions that have been computed from
two examples of real world empirical communication networks. Thus, we confirm that
approximating the rapid transitions in the visibility and policing terms by step functions is
justified by greatly simplifying Eq. (2.1) and its analysis, without fundamentally altering
its dynamics or interpretation.
2.4.1 Specification of Sigmoidal visibility v(r) and policing p(r)
terms
Consider the equation
dr
dt
= r˙ = c1 (1− r) ν(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ(r)
− c2 r ρ(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ(r)
, (2.3)
where ν(r) and ρ(r) are the visibility and policing terms, and where γ(r) and δ(r) are the
growth and decay terms, respectively. We choose ν(r) from the family of sigmoidal func-
tions S comprised of (twice piecewise differentiable) functions s : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfying
(i) ∃s0, s1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
• ∀r ∈ (s0, s1) : s(r) is twice differentiable,
• ∀r ≤ s0 : s(r) = 0, and
• ∀r ≥ s1 : s(r) = 1,
(ii) ∀r ∈ (s0, s1) : s′(r) > 0,
(iii) ∃ξ ∈ (s0, s1) such that
• ∀r ∈ [s0, ξ] : s′′(r) ≥ 0 and
• ∀r ∈ [ξ, s1] : s′′(r) ≤ 0,
(iv) ∀r ∈ (s0, s1) : s′′(r)s(r) ≤ [s′(r)]2.
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Analogously, we choose ρ(r) so that ρ(1 − r) ∈ S. The functions s(r) in S follow a
sigmoidal profile of the type illustrated in Fig. 2.4. Specifically, for r ∈ (s0, s1) s(r) is
twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and changes concavity at most once,
as specified by conditions (i)-(iii). Condition (iv) is imposed to guarantee that the growth
and decay terms of models (2.1) and (2.3) are qualitatively similar in the sense that they are
all single peaked2, see the right panels of Figs. 2.1a and 2.1b, and Fig. 2.5. In the following
section, Proposition 2.4.1 shows that the growth term γ(r) and decay term δ(r) of model
(2.3) are single-peaked if conditions (i)-(iv) are satisfied. S describes a fairly broad class of
functions s(r) that transition monotonously from 0 to 1 in a way that γ(r) = c1 (1−r) s(r)
is single-peaked. These functions can be continuous, e.g. the linear transition from (s0, 0)
to (s1, 1)
s(r) =

0 if x ≤ s0
r−s0
s1−s0 if x ∈ (s0, s1)
1 otherwise
,
they can have continuous first derivatives, e.g. the truncated, scaled, and translated sin(·)
function
s(r) =

0 if x ≤ s0
1
2
sin
[
pi
2
(
2r−s0−s1
s1−s0
)]
+ 1
2
if x ∈ (s0, s1)
1 otherwise
,
or they can have arbitrarily many derivatives exist, e.g. the scaled and translated tanh(·)
function
s(r) =

0 if x ≤ s0
1
2
tanh [log(r − s0)− log(s1 − r)] + 12 if x ∈ (s0, s1)
1 otherwise
.
By construction, each of these examples satisfy conditions (i)-(iii). For detailed calculations
confirming that these functions satisfy condition (iv) see Appendix B.1.
2A function is single peaked if it has a unique global maximum and no other local maxima.
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Figure 2.4: Sigmoidal visibility function ν(r) ∈ S with a fast transition from 0 to 1 for
model extension (Eq. (2.3)).
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(a) (Solid line) Growth term γ(r).
(Dotted line) γ(r) = c1(1 − r) + o(1),
as r → 1−.
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(b) (Solid line) Decay term δ(r). (Dot-
ted line) δ(r) = c2r + o(1), as r → 0+.
Figure 2.5: Growth (γ(r)) and decay (δ(r)) terms for model extension (Eq. (2.3)).
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2.4.2 Analysis of Model Extension (Eq. (2.3))
We begin by considering the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4.1 Let s ∈ S. Then the function γ(r) = c1(1− r)s(r) is single peaked.
Proof: Let V = (s0, s1). Observe that ∀r ∈ V : γ′(r) ≥ 0 if and only if
s′(r)
s(r)
≥ 1
1− r .
Now, observe that by property (iv), ∀r ∈ V :
d
dr
[
s′(r)
s(r)
]
=
s′′(r)s(r)− [s′(r)]2
s2(r)
≤ 0.
We now have that for r ∈ V the function s′(r)/s(r) is monotonically decreasing and the
function (1− r)−1 is strictly monotonically increasing. Observe that
lim
r→s+0
log(s(r0)) = −∞ =⇒ lim
r→s+0
d
dr
[log(s(r))] = +∞.
Since d
dr
[log(s(r))] = s
′(r)
s(r)
, it follows that
lim
r→s+0
s′(r)
s(r)
=∞ > lim
r→s+0
1
1− r =
1
1− s0 .
If
lim
r→s−1
1
1− r > limr→s−1
s′(r)
s(r)
then there exists a unique point r∗ ∈ V where curves s′(r)/s(r) and (1−r)−1 intersect such
that γ′(r∗) = 0, at which γ(r) achieves its global maximum. Otherwise, ∀r ∈ V : γ′(r) > 0
and γ(r) achieves its global maximum at r = s1.

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Proposition 2.4.1 allows us to roughly sketch the growth and decay terms, see Fig. 2.5.
The number of intersections between the growth and decay functions determines the num-
ber of equilibria in model (2.3). In what follows, we explain how the dynamics of model
(2.3) with generic sigmoidal visibility and policing functions closely follows the correspond-
ing dynamics of model (2.1) in Region II (an open interval of equilibria ⊂ (0, 1)), Regions
III0 and III1 (one equilibrium ∈ (0, 1)), and Region IIIe (three equilibria ∈ (0, 1)), thus
establishing the equivalence in terms of dynamic behaviour of models (2.1) (with step func-
tions) and (2.3) (with sigmoidal functions) for the specific parameter Regimes II, III0, IIIe,
and III1. We summarize the phase portraits of Regions II, III0, IIIe, and III1 for model
(2.3) in Fig. 2.6. In the following chapter we compute the sigmoidal visibility function
for two empirical communication networks and confirm that our analysis of Regions II,
III0, IIIe, and III1 is sufficient to describe the possible dynamical behaviours that we ob-
serve. However, we note that for arbitrary visibility and policing functions the dynamical
behaviours of model (2.3) are not necessarily limited to Regions II, III0, IIIe, and III1.
0 1 
III1 
r** 
0 1 
II 
0 1 
r** 
III0 
IIIe 
0 1 
r* rL** rR** 
Figure 2.6: Equilibria, stability and basins of attraction on the r-axis (r ∈ [0, 1]) for model
extension (Eq. (2.3)). Closed (open) circles represent locally asymptotically stable (un-
stable) equilibria. Left (right) arrows indicate regions where r˙ < 0 (r˙ > 0). We note
that although these behaviours are sufficient to describe the possible dynamics observed
when sigmoidal visibility functions are computed from two empirical communication net-
works (see Chapter 3), the dynamics of model (2.3) are not necessarily limited to these
behaviours.
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Region II
Suppose that the support of γ(r) and δ(r) have no points in common. In this situation we
have (a) r = 0 and r = 1 are locally asymptotically stable equilibria, (b) there exists an
open interval I ⊂ (0, 1) of locally stable equilibria, and (c) the infimum and supremum of
I are unstable equilibria. This situation is analogous to Region II of model (2.1).
Regions III0 and III1
Consider the situations depicted in Fig. 2.7. In both panels, r = 0 and r = 1 are locally
asymptotically stable equilibria whose basins of attraction are separated by an unstable
equilibrium point r = r∗∗. Figure 2.7a depicts the situation where maxr γ(r) < maxr δ(r),
γ′(r∗∗) < 0, and δ′(r∗∗) < 0. Because the decay term is dominant, we consider this situation
to be analogous to Region III0 of model (2.1). Similarly, we consider the Fig. 2.7b to depict
a situation analogous to Region III1 of model (2.1).
r
0 1
0
c1
c2
(a) Region III0: maxr γ(r) < maxr δ(r),
γ′(r∗∗) < 0, and δ′(r∗∗) < 0.
r
0 1
0
c2
c1
(b) Region III1: maxr γ(r) > maxr δ(r),
γ′(r∗∗) > 0, and δ′(r∗∗) > 0.
Figure 2.7: Growth (γ(r) - solid line) and decay (δ(r) - dashed line) terms for model
extension (Eq. (2.3)) with one interior intersection (Regions III0 and III1). (Dotted line)
γ(r) = c1(1− r) + o(1), as r → 1− and δ(r) = c2r + o(1), as r → 0+.
Region IIIe
Consider the situation depicted in Fig. 2.8 in which there are three locally asymptotically
stable equilibria r = 0, r = r∗ and r = 1 (0 < r∗ < 1) whose basins of attraction are
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separated by two unstable equilibria r = r∗∗L and r = r
∗∗
R (r
∗∗
L < r
∗∗
R ). This situation is
analogous to Region IIIe of model (2.1).
r
0 1
0
c2
c1
Figure 2.8: Growth (γ(r) - solid line) and decay (δ(r) - dashed line) terms for model
extension (Eq. (2.3)) with three interior intersections (Region IIIe). (Dotted line) γ(r) =
c1(1− r) + o(1), as r → 1− and δ(r) = c2r + o(1), as r → 0+.
Note that, corresponding to Region I of model (2.1), there are also special limiting
cases of parameter choices for model (2.3) in which, for example, some of the equilibria
in Fig. 2.6 may coincide. We choose to neglect these cases in our analysis due to the
unlikelihood of them being manifested (generic small perturbations of γ(r), δ(r), c1, or
c2 would take us away from such a special case). Alternativelty, model (2.3) also admits
additional behaviours that are not relevant in the context of political revolutions. For
example, when the initial slope of the policing function is less than the initial slope of
the visibility function then the equilibrium r = 0 becomes unstable. From a practical
perspective it would not be possible to observe a state in this parameter regime at the
equilibrium of total state control (r = 0), since any arbitrarily small shock would cause
the fraction of revolutionaries r(t) to grow away from r = 0. This dynamical regime is,
therefore, clearly not relevant in the context of the Arab Spring, since each of the political
revolutions and protests of the Arab Spring occured in regimes that were initially in the
equilibrium of totatl state control (r = 0). These additional behaviours are also neglected
from our analysis.
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2.4.3 Remarks: Relationship between basic model (Eq. (2.1)) and
model extension (Eq. (2.3))
Figures 2.3b and 2.6 show that models (2.1) and (2.3) have equivalent phase portraits for
Regions II, III0, IIIe, and III1. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the dynamical
regimes identified in model (2.1), and that we have shown to be present in model (2.3),
are sufficient to characterize the behaviours observed when we implement model (2.3)
with sigmoidal visibility functions computed from two real world empirical communication
networks. This means that the simplifying assumption of model (2.1) representing the steep
increase in the visibility and policing terms by a step function (which is desirable because
it gives a model with fewer parameters) is not limiting in the sense that it describes the
same dynamical behaviour that is observed in a more complicated model in which the steep
increases are modelled by generic sigmoidal functions, at least when the sigmoidal visibility
functions are computed from empirical network data as in Chapter 3. This justifies the
choice of step functions in model (2.1), since it leads to the simplest model that captures
the relevant dynamics. In addition, it indicates that the dynamics we identified for model
(2.1) will also occur in more complicated models for the dynamics of revolutions of type
(2.3) that feature visibility and policing terms that change rapidly between 0 and 1 in a
sigmoidal fashion.
2.5 Model Interpretation
In this section we first provide an interpretation of the classification of parameter regions,
see Fig. 2.3a, in terms of political regime types and their stability and potential for revolu-
tionary events, see Fig. 2.3b. We then investigate the application of the model to the Arab
Spring revolutions, discussing the Arab Spring context and events, and societal factors
relevant for the Arab Spring that have been identified in the political science literature.
Finally, we discuss applying the classification resulting from the model to the current po-
litical situation in some other countries with regimes that employ censorship and police
repression.
2.5.1 Interpretation and Classification of Parameter Regimes
We first provide an interpretation of the parameter regions of the model, previously sum-
marized in Fig. 2.3, in the context of dictatorial regimes and their stability.
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States with parameters in Region II have uncountably many stable equilibria between
β and 1 − α, which occur because the police capacity β of the regime is too low to clear
the protesters and the visibility α is too low to attract new protesters, thus preventing any
one group from taking control, see Region II in Fig. 2.3b. We therefore interpret Region II
to correspond to failed states . In the context of our model, we investigate the application
of the failed state parameter region to the case of Somalia, in Section 2.5.3.
Regions III0, IIIe, and III1 differ only in the stability of the interval (1 − α, β). For
Region III0 the interval (1−α, β) lies in the basin of attraction of total state control r = 0.
Because of the contribution of (1− α, β) to the stability of the regime, we refer to Region
III0 as a stable police state. Examples of states that, in the context of our model, are
consistent with the parameter regime of Region III0 may include Tunisia and Egypt prior
to 2010, see Section 2.5.2, and Iran in 2009, see Section 2.5.3. Analogous to the case of
Region III0, we refer to RegionIII1 as an unstable police state, since (1 − α, β) lies in the
basin of attraction of the realized revolution r = 1. Region IIIe introduces an intermediate
locally asymptotically stable equilibrium r = c∗, which lies between the equilibria of total
state control r = 0 and of the realized revolution r = 1, and which has the interval
(1 − α, β) as its basin of attraction. We refer to r = c∗ as the equilibrium of civil unrest
and to Region IIIe as a meta-stable police state. We hypothesize that Egypt and Tunisia
transitioned to Region IIIe, and possibly to Region III1, in Section 2.5.2. Section 2.5.3
provides an additional example of a country, China, that in the context of our model shows
characteristics of countries that would be classified in Region IIIe.
The examples given above of countries that could potentially be classified according
to the above interpretation are discussed in detail in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, and are
summarized conceptually in Fig. 2.9. We note that as the situation in a particular country
evolves the regime may pass from one parameter region to another. In the context of
the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, we discuss how adoption of new media may affect
the parameter region of a country and how moving from one parameter region to another
affects the likelihood of a realized revolution in Section 2.5.2.
2.5.2 Application: Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt
We now investigate the application of the model to the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia
and Egypt. We first provide a timeline of the main events in the revolutions, followed by
discussions on the effects of new media on the model parameters, and the effects of the
model parameters on model stability. We then investigate how the model can be related
to the events of the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.
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Figure 2.9: Division of α−β parameter space of basic model (Eq. (2.1)) into Regions I, II,
IIIe, III0, and III1, and conceptual summary of the case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, Iran,
China, and Somalia.
Timeline of Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt
To aid in the interpretation of our model in the cases of the Tunisian and Egyptian Arab
Spring we provide the following rough timeline of major events [19, 47, 89, 92, 144, 152, 157].
• Dec. 17, 2010: Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolates in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid.
• Dec. 18, 2010: Protests erupt in Sidi Bouzid. Protesters begin recording and up-
loading videos of the protests and police response to the Internet.
• Dec. 27 - 28, 2010: Protests break out in the Tunisian capital, Tunis. Tunisian
President Ben Ali denounces protests in a televised address.
• Jan. 5, 2011: Mohamed Bouazizi dies from burn injuries.
• Jan. 14 - 15, 2011: Ben Ali resigns and flees to Saudi Arabia. An interim government
is formed.
• Jan. 25, 2011: The “Day of Protest” in Tahrir Square, Cairo, is the first major Arab
Spring protest in Egypt.
• Jan. 26, 2011: Egyptian police clear Tahrir Square.
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• Jan. 28, 2011: Protesters occupy Tahrir Square, Egyptian President Mubarak ad-
dresses the nation, and major Internet disruptions begin.
• Feb. 1, 2011: US President Obama withdraws support for the Mubarak regime, the
army refuses to act against protesters, and major Internet disruptions end.
• Feb. 2, 2011: State vandals and thugs attack protesters in Tahrir Square. Army
officers intervene on behalf of protesters.
• Feb. 11, 2011: President Mubarak resigns.
Effects of New Media on Protesters’ Enthusiasm c1 and Visibility α
As outlined in Section 2.1, our development of model (2.1) was motivated by our interest
in providing a basic dynamic model for Arab Spring revolutions and studying the effect
of new media on censorship and the stability of dictatorial regimes as in the Arab Spring.
We propose that the Internet, social media, satellite TV, and cell phone communication
technologies may have empowered protesters by enhancing their
(1) capacity for organization and coordination [15, 92, 144],
(2) ability to assess the current public support for the revolution [5, 92, 100, 144, 192],
and
(3) awareness of the nature and severity of government repression [92, 159].
(1) The decision of whether or not to protest is a coordination problem [107], the
realization of which led activists to use the Internet to coordinate protests in Tunisia and
Egypt [92, 100, 144, 192]. For example, technologies such as SMS and Twitter messaging
were used between co-revolutionaries to communicate which streets were the most/least
obstructed by security forces [92]. This enhanced the speed with which revolutionaries
mobilized, and in the context of our model this corresponds to an increase in protesters’
enthusiasm c1. Social media and the Internet also contributed to the relatively leaderless
way in which the Arab Spring revolutions developed. Compared to revolutions with a
more hierarchical leadership structure, a leaderless revolution is difficult if not impossible
to disrupt by targeting only a handful of individuals [15, 92]. This increased resilience also
corresponds to an increase in protesters’ enthusiasm c1 in our model.
(2) Dictatorial regimes attempt to control protests through censorship by lowering visi-
bility α in order to ensure that protests remain virtually invisible to the general population.
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The Internet, social media, satellite TV, and cell phones all work towards increasing visibil-
ity α by disrupting the regime’s monopoly on the distribution of information. For example,
in Tunisia the Internet and social media created a virtual space where Tunisians could ex-
press their true opinions with minimal censorial oversight or fear of reprisal [92, 100, 144].
In the microscopic network model of Section 2.2.3, an increase in the number of links (aver-
age degree in the graph) along with a decrease in the threshold for action result in a shift of
the sharp increase in participation toward smaller fractions of the population, see Fig. 2.2
(bottom panel). Cell phones and social media sites vastly increased the speed with which
information travelled, allowing Tunisians - and the entire world - to follow the revolution
with unprecedented detail and speed [92, 116, 192]. Satellite TV further enhanced visibility
α by corroborating and then rebroadcasting stories relating to the size of the revolution
and the regime’s brutal response [5].
(3) Awareness of the brutality and severity of the government’s reaction may increase
both protesters’ enthusiasm c1 and visibility α. An increase in protesters’ enthusiasm c1
may be a direct result of increasing resentment of the regime. In contrast, the increase
of visibility α is likely to be indirect. Specifically, otherwise apolitical individuals may be
induced to join the revolution [92, 159], presumably by lowering their personal thresholds
for participation.
Sensitivity of Model (2.1) to Protesters’ Enthusiasm c1 and Visibility α
The Internet and social media had at best modest penetration in countries of the Arab
Spring prior to the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi. Indeed, approximately 25% of
Tunisians and 10% of Egyptians had used the Internet at least once prior to the Arab
Spring [89]. Given this fact, it is reasonable to ask how a modest level of adoption of new
technologies might have a significant impact on the outcome of a revolution. Recall that in
Section 2.2.2 we argued that keeping our model simple requires introducing the concept of
external shocks: events external to our model which affect the fraction of revolutionaries
r(t) either directly, or indirectly via a change in the parameters α, β, c1, or c2. An analysis
of how changes in parameters may affect the outcome of a revolution must take into account
these shocks.
A small increase in visibility α or protesters’ enthusiasm c1 can move parameters from
the stable (Region III0) to the meta-stable (Region IIIe) police state, see Fig. 2.9. For
parameters in Region III0 a shock ∆r > β is required to pass from total state control
r = 0 to the basin of attraction of the realized revolution r = 1, see Fig. 2.10 (top line). In
contrast, for parameters in Region IIIe passing from total state control r = 0 to the basin of
attraction of the realized revolution r = 1 can result from two smaller shocks ∆r1 > 1− α
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and ∆r2 > β − c∗, where ∆r1 + ∆r2 may be significantly smaller than β, see Fig. 2.10
(bottom line). Note that for parameters in Region IIIe the lower bounds for sufficiently
strong ∆r1 and ∆r2 decrease with increasing visibility α and protesters’ enthusiasm c1,
respectively. If shocks occur distributed according to some probability distribution, then it
is reasonable to assume that shocks of sufficient magnitude to mobilize large fractions of the
population lie in the tail of this distribution. For many reasonable probability distributions,
halving the size of shock necessary to trigger a revolution more (and potentially much more)
than doubles the likelihood of a revolution occurring in any given amount of time. Thus,
small increases in visibility α or protesters’ enthusiasm c1 resulting from modest Internet
penetration or social media usage can have a large impact on the expected amount of time
one has to wait until a revolution is triggered.
0 1 
] 
β 1-α c* 
IIIe 
0 β 1-α c* 
IIIe 
III0 
0 1 β 1-α c* 
Figure 2.10: Sensitivity of basic model (Eq. (2.1)) to visibility parameter α. Closed circles
represent locally asymptotically stable equilibria. Left (right) arrows indicate regions where
r˙ < 0 (r˙ > 0). Square (“[” and “]”) or curved (“(” and “)”) brackets indicate boundaries
of basins of attraction that contain or do not contain their boundary points, respectively.
Short vertical lines indicate special values of r that are not equilibria or boundaries of
basins of attraction.
The sensitivity of the final outcome of a revolution to the protesters’ enthusiasm c1
and visibility α also provides us with a potential explanation for why the revolutions of
the Arab Spring, and indeed revolutions in general, come as such a surprise to so many
regimes and political observers [5, 89, 92, 107]. Increasing either protesters’ enthusiasm c1
or visibility α eventually decreases the size of the basin of attraction of total state control
r = 0, and does so in a discontinuous fashion. (See, e.g., Fig. 2.10: when α increases such
that, at first, c∗ is just below 1−α, and then becomes slightly larger than 1−α, the basin
of attraction of r = 0 changes from [0, β) to [0, 1 − α) in a discontinuous fashion.) This
undermines the regime by decreasing the size of shock necessary to trigger a revolution.
However, since (a) r = 0 always remains locally asymptotically stable, (b) large shocks
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are exceedingly rare, and (c) determining the precise extent to which a regime controls
the society through media control and policing (corresponding to determining accurate
values for the parameters in a model like ours) is very difficult [82], the exact size of shock
necessary to trigger a revolution is impossible to determine until such a shock occurs. It
follows that for someone observing a regime before and after the adoption of social media
there would be few, if any, outward signs of instability: the regime appears stable until it
isn’t.
Dynamics of Arab Spring Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt
Guided by the discussion in the previous two sections, it is interesting to consider hy-
potheses for the Tunisian and Egyptian Arab Spring in the context of our model. It is a
reasonable hypothesis that Tunisia and Egypt were, in the context of our model, in param-
eter Region III0 (stable police state) for a long time in the years before 2010 (Ben Ali was
in power in Tunisia for 24 years (1987-2011) and Mubarak was in power in Egypt for 30
years (1981-2011)). However, the realized revolutions of 2010-2011 appear to indicate that
Tunisia and Egypt had evolved to significantly less stable regimes (Region IIIe or III1) by
2010, see Fig. 2.9. Once in Region IIIe or III0, we observe that there are many potential
candidates for shocks, including but not limited to those listed at the beginning of this
section in the Timeline of Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, that may, within the context
of our model, have moved the regime to a state of civil unrest or realized revolution.
While it is clear that, in the context of our Arab Spring revolution model, reliable time
series measurements of quantities that would correspond to the fraction of protesters in
the revolution are not available, and while it is thus not realistic to consider fitting the
model and its parameters to observed time series, it is interesting to note that there are
recent efforts that attempt to gather quantitative data that can be used for social science
research using, for example, Blogs and online social media platforms like Twitter. See, e.g.,
[89, 116] for the case of the Arab Spring revolutions. Unfortunately, with the currently
available data this type of comparison can only be done at a superficial level, but it is an
intriguing prospect that this kind of approach may offer new ways to quantitatively test
models in social science in the future when more and higher-quality quantitative data of
this type may become available.
2.5.3 Application: Non-Arab Spring countries
Although our model was developed with the specific goal of modelling revolutions in dic-
tatorial regimes that employ censorship and police repression initially applied to the Arab
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Spring, it is interesting to consider its application to various situations in other countries.
In this section we consider the cases of the failed 2009 “Green Revolution” in Iran, and of
present-day China and Somalia.
2009 Iranian “Green Revolution”
The protests following Iran’s 2009 election, dubbed the “Green Revolution”, were ulti-
mately put down by the regime despite widespread use of social media technology. The
large amount of resources that were available to the Iranian regime and the relative novelty
of applying social media for use in protest [23, 162] may be consistent with a regime with
parameters, in the context of our model, in Region III0 (stable police state). This, in turn,
would be consistent with the failure of the Green Revolution.
China
While the current regime in China differs from the pre-revolutionary regimes in Tunisia and
Egypt in many aspects, it is interesting to consider how our model may apply to China in
terms of the influence of state control on the media and the Internet, and police control of
dissident opinion. The number of “mass group incidents” reported annually in China has
been rising consistently for at least two decades [188]. Constant low levels of protest may
correspond to the civil unrest equilibrium (r = c∗) in the meta-stable police state (Region
IIIe). In our model rising levels of protest would correspond to rising c∗. We note that,
in the context of our model, a continued rise of c∗ through increased Internet and social
media exposure may eventually result in increasing the chance of a realized revolution, as
argued in Section 2.5.2.
Somalia
The failed state region (Region II) features low visibility α (weak media) and low police
capacity β (weak government), which prevents individuals from joining any popular move-
ments and prevents the government from reigning in existing movements, respectively. This
results mathematically in an uncountable number of equilibria contained in (β, 1−α). This
appears consistent with the slow and erratic rise and fall of local militia and the succession
of weak central governments seen in Somalia from 1991 [122]. Our model predicts that a
successful national state could arise from either (a) improving police capacity of the transi-
tional government (increasing β), or (b) increasing social cohesion and the capacity of the
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media in Somalia (increasing α). Interestingly, Somalia has developed a sophisticated and
affordable telecommunications sector [53], which may mean that an increased visibility α
is not unrealistic.
2.6 Conclusion
We have introduced a simple compartmental model for the dynamics of a revolution in
dictatorial regimes that employ censorship and police repression. The model features
visibility and policing terms that describe rapid transitions between 0 and 1 as a function
of the size of the revolution, for which we have provided conceptual and network-based
mathematical justifications. The dynamical behaviour of the model was classified, leading
to a division in parameter space that is interpreted naturally in terms of stability of the
regime (stable police state, meta-stable police state, unstable police state, and failed state).
We show in Section 2.4 that these dynamical properties of the model are generic for a broad
class of visibility and police capacity functions that feature rapid transitions between 0 and
1. We investigated how the model can be applied to the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia
and Egypt, taking into account the influence of the Internet and new media on the visibility
of the revolution and the ensuing reduced effectiveness of censorship. Within the model this
leads to significant, discontinuous changes in regime stability, which greatly increases the
probability of realized revolutions. These properties of the model inform possible answers to
questions on causes and timing of the Arab Spring revolutions, and the role of the Internet
and new media. The broader relevance of the model classification was also investigated
by applying it to the current political situations in Iran, China and Somalia. We note
here that our model is general enough to potentially capture a wide range of social change
phenomena in democratic regimes as well. Consider, for example, social norms such as the
recognition of gay marriage [10] or the practice of cremation versus burial [42]. Both of
these issues have recently gained substantial support over a relatively short period, despite
significant resistance. We emphasize, however, that in these cases the opposition to these
issues comes not from the policing capacity of a government but from elements of society
that are reluctant and/or resistant to change, and may fiercely oppose the change until
the case is deemed lost. We note that both of these social issues can also be considered
to be binary choice conformity problems. This further illustrates the close relationship
between collective action problems and conformity problems that we previously discussed
in Chapter 1. Although we do not develop models for either of these two issues specifically,
a detailed model of a binary choice conformity problem is provided in Chapter 4 which
models the prevalence of smoking as a binary choice conformity problem where individuals
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choose either to become smokers or non-smokers.
Simple models like ours have the advantage of relying on just a few basic assumptions
about individual and communal behaviour. More elaborate models can easily be imagined,
but adding detail to a model comes at the expense of its tractability. Indeed, the very
simplicity of our model is what admits a complete and rigorous mathematical classification
of its dynamical behaviour, as well as an interpretation that offers interesting hypotheses
about how Arab Spring-type revolutions may unfold. Of course, simple models like ours are
also subject to many limitations. For example, our model is not capable of describing the
Arab Spring revolution in Libya and Syria, or the counter-revolution in present-day Egypt,
because they do not correspond to our basic assumption that the population is uniform in
its dislike for the current regime. In particular, tribalism in Libya [135], religion in Syria
[87], and religion, secular democracy, and the vested interests of the military in present-
day Egypt [103] divide the population into factions that cannot easily be accounted for
in a one-dimensional mathematical model. Moreover, events in these countries are further
complicated by significant external interference and interventions. These complications,
among others, must be addressed by more sophisticated models and constitute a significant
avenue of future research.
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Chapter 3
A Hierarchy of Linear Threshold
Models for the Spread of Political
Revolutions on Social Networks
This chapter is based on research published in the Journal of Complex Networks [110].
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
In this chapter, we propose a linear threshold agent-based model (ABM) for the spread
of political revolutions on social networks in dictatorial regimes. In our ABM, nodes of
the network can be in two states: active, i.e., participating in the revolution, or inactive.
Transitions from the inactive to the active state are governed by a growth process that uses
a traditional linear threshold mechanism: an individual v may change from the inactive
to the active state if the fraction of neighbours in the active state exceeds the linear
threshold θv. Linear threshold models have been studied before in the context of influence
maximization [98], enforcement of unpopular norms [36], and general “complex contagion”
processes [34, 35, 69, 72, 75, 107, 187]. The development and analysis of linear threshold
processes has been highly influenced by more established epidemiology [6, 12, 84] and
rumour spreading [113, 191] models, with one key difference: whereas a contact with
a single “infected” individual is enough to spread a contagion in most epidemiology or
rumour spreading applications, i.e. in “simple contagion” processes, multiple contacts
with infected individuals are generally necessary to spread a contagion in a linear threshold
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process. Indeed, epidemiological and rumour spreading models can be considered to be a
special case of linear threshold models where the threshold parameter is chosen sufficiently
small such that one infected neighbour enables propagation. Most of the linear threshold
models that have been studied in the context of social spreading or contagion processes
[34, 35, 36, 69, 75, 98, 187] do not incorporate a mechanism by which active nodes become
inactive (which is relevant to the context of our application), evolve in discrete time, and
are primarily interested in the final fraction of active nodes. In contrast, our ABM specifies
a mechanism by which active nodes become inactive, evolves in continuous time, and is
concerned with modelling the temporal dynamics of the number of active nodes.
The main justification for our linear threshold modelling approach in the context of
political revolutions is that the decision to join a political revolution can be assumed to
be a collective action problem [107]: if individuals act unilaterally they are subject to
retaliation by the regime, whereas if they act collectively then the regime loses the ability
to punish due to a lack of resources. The linear threshold modelling approach is consistent
with the collective action principle, since an individual transitions from an inactive to an
active state only after the number of neighbours in the active state has been observed to
reach the critical fraction θv, and the individual deems the revolution of sufficient size to
consider participation. In order to incorporate communication network structure explicitly,
we represent interactions between individuals v ∈ V by edges e ∈ E in an undirected graph
G = G(V,E). This contrasts with previous attempts to model political revolutions using
linear threshold models that assume homogeneous mixing [75, 107], i.e. that assume that
G = G(V,E) is the complete graph.
The goals and contributions of this chapter are as follows. We start by presenting the
linear threshold ABM for the spread of political revolutions on social networks, and then
derive a hierarchy of simplified ordinary differential-equation (ODE) models of varying
degrees of sophistication that characterize the solutions of the linear threshold ABM, see
Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.1. Simplified aggregate or population-level dynamical models can
provide more cost-effective dynamical simulations, and can give insight in the qualitative
dynamics of the ABM and its parameter regimes through dynamical analysis of the simpli-
fied model. It is a significant challenge to incorporate actual network structure in simple
ODE models, and in this chapter we present two new effective ways to incorporate network
structure into the one-compartmental ODE that approximates the dynamical evolution of
the expected fraction of the population that participates in the revolution in the linear
threshold ABM model. These approaches make use of the degree distribution of the graph
or samplings of the network1, and result in the binomial visibility function (BVF) and the
empirical visibility function (EVF) population-level ODE models, which we demonstrate
1We use the terms graph and network interchangeably.
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to be equivalent in the limit of large network and sample size. The performance of these
ODE models in approximating the ABM is compared to the performance of the degree
approximation (DA) model, a more expensive higher-order model that we modify from
[128].
Table 3.1: Summary of hierarchy of models from highest (network-level) to lowest
(population-level) complexity.
Model Abbreviation Section Equation(s)
Agent-Based Linear Threshold ABM 3.3 (3.1) and (3.2)
Degree Approximation* DA 3.5 (3.15)
Binomial Visibility Function BVF 3.4.1 (3.7) and (3.10)
Empirical Visibility Function EVF 3.4.1 (3.7) and (3.11)
Step Visibility Function SVF 2.2.1 (2.1) and (3.8)
*The Degree Approximation (DA) model is modified from the approach of [128].
Agent-Based	Linear	
Threshold	Model	
(Sec7on	3.3)	
Popula7on-Level		
ODE	Model	
(Sec7on	3.4)	
Step	Visibility	Func7on	
Model	
(Sec7on	2.2.1)	
Binomial/Empirical	
Visibility	Func7on	Model	
(Sec7on	3.4.1)	
Higher	Order	Model:	
Degree	Approxima7on	Model	
(Sec7on	3.5)	
Model	Comparison	
(Sec7on	3.4.3)	
Model	Comparison	
(Sec7on	3.5.2)	
Figure 3.1: Summary of hierarchy of models from highest (network-level) to lowest
(population-level) complexity.
We also relate the ABM to the population-level one-compartmental ODE model for
the spread of political revolutions that was proposed in Eq. (2.1) of Section 2.2.1 (see also
[109]). Because model (2.1) indirectly takes network structure into account through a step
function, whose single parameter (i.e. the protester visibility parameter α)2 determines
2We recall that interpretation of the visibility parameter α is that people will only join the revolution
when the revolution is of sufficiently large size to be visible to the population, while repressive regimes
attempt to make unrest invisible through censorship.
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the fraction of participants at which the growth term (for the size of the revolution) is
switched on discontinuously, we call model (2.1) the step-visibility function (SVF) model.
The SVF model was justified in Section 2.2.3 (see also [109]) by a simplified network model
with strong assumptions (e.g. we assume that the states of an individual’s neighbours are
uncorrelated), and as such it is a precursor of the BVF/EVF models introduced in this
chapter. In this chapter, we show that our ABM is mathematically consistent with the
SVF model and we test the assumptions from Section 2.2.3 with the BVF/EVF models
and the ABM model on real networks, corroborating a posteriori the assumptions from
Section 2.2.3, and showing that model (2.1) (i.e. the SVF model) reproduces the qualitative
behaviour of the ABM and the spread of a revolution under a linear threshold model. This
provides further justification for the SVF model, and at the same time provides inexpensive
ways to predict the parameter regime behaviour of the ABM presented in this chapter using
simple compartmental models like the SVF and the new BVF/EVF models.
A further contribution of this chapter is that we propose an extension of the concept
of basic reproduction number (R0) from epidemiological modelling [84] to characterize the
potential of networks to spread the revolution and show that this quantity is proportional
to the initial slope of the BVF/EVF we introduce in this chapter. The basic reproduction
number for our ABM with a linear threshold process is easy to compute, and we show that
it gives useful predictions for the extent of the spreading of the revolution. In small-scale
numerical tests we investigate experimentally the differences in spreading behaviour that
occur under the linear threshold ABM model when applied to some empirical (modern)
online social networks versus (traditional) oﬄine social networks, searching for quantitative
evidence that political revolutions may be facilitated by the modern online social networks
of social media. We emphasize that the broad applicability of the linear threshold process
implies that the framework, methods, and results presented in this chapter are relevant to
the study of many related social spreading processes.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the Facebook
and physical contact empirical networks on which we test our ABM and approximations.
Sections 3.3-3.4 describe the linear threshold ABM and how population-level ODE models
can be derived from it, respectively. This includes the SVF model from Section 2.2.1, and
the new BVF and EVF models which explicitly incorporate the structure of the network.
Section 3.4 also explores the equivalence of the BVF and EVF and provides a detailed
numerical comparison between the ABM, the SVF, and the BVF/EVF models. Section
3.5 confirms the usefulness of the BVF and EVF models by showing that they perform no
worse than the higher order degree approximation model of [128], while being much less
expensive to evaluate. Section 3.6 extends the concept of basic reproduction number (R0)
from epidemiology [84] to the linear threshold process specified in Section 3.3 and illustrates
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how it can be interpreted in terms of the BVF/EVF. Finally, Section 3.7 explores how our
methods can be used to study the differences in spreading behaviour of political revolutions
on online and oﬄine social networks under the linear threshold mechanism, and Section
3.8 concludes.
3.2 Network Data
In this section we describe the two empirical social networks that will be used in this
chapter to validate and compare the ABM, DA, BVF/EVF and SVF models (Table 3.1
and Fig. 3.1) for the spread of political revolutions on social networks under the linear
threshold model.
The first network we consider is the Facebook subnetwork presented in [120]. It was
constructed by combining the ego-networks3 of ten individuals and then taking the largest
connected component of the resulting network. We refer to this network as the Facebook
social network (GF ). The second network we consider is the physical contact network
presented in [158]. It was constructed by distributing wireless sensors to students, teachers,
and staff at a U.S. high school during a one day period. When two wireless sensors are
in proximity of one another, i.e. when they are less than approximately 3m apart, they
register an interaction with a temporal resolution of 20s. Therefore, the communication
network we extract from this data is referred to as the physical contact network (GP ). For
details on the network extraction protocol for GP we refer to Appendix C.1. To facilitate
the comparison of experimental results, the minimal contact duration to register an edge
in GP is chosen such that GP and GF have approximately the same average degree, see
Appendix C.1.
The Facebook network GF has N = 3, 963 nodes with sparsity
4 S = 0.01, and is
visualized in Fig. 3.2a. The physical contact network GP has N = 776 nodes with sparsity
S = 0.06, and is visualized in Fig. 3.2b. The cumulative degree distributions5 are displayed
in Fig. 3.3. The distributions of local clustering coefficients are displayed in Fig. 3.4.
3For a network G = G(V,E) the ego-network of an individual v ∈ V is a subnetwork of G composed of
the individual v (called the ego-node), the neighbours of individual v, and all of the connections between
these individuals.
4The sparsity of a network is defined as the fraction of possible edges that are present in the network.
5If ρk is the fraction of nodes with degree k (i.e., the degree distribution) of the graph, then the
cumulative degree distribution is the function F (k) =
∑k
j=1 ρj . The cumulative degree distribution is
displayed in place of the degree distribution because the degree distribution is subject to significantly
more noise than the cumulative degree distribution. This is a common approach for empirical networks.
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(a) Facebook social network (GF ) (b) Physical contact network (GP )
Figure 3.2: Visualization of Facebook (GF ) social and physical contact (GP ) networks
using the Gursoy-Atun algorithm [78] as implemented in the Matlab Boost Graph Library
package [70].
It is interesting to consider how the physical contact and Facebook networks differ
on some common network measures, see Table 3.2. Comparing the physical contact and
Facebook social networks along these admittedly limited measures nevertheless highlights
substantial structural differences between these networks. The physical contact network
appears more homogeneous than the Facebook social network, in the sense that the Face-
book social network can be visually grouped into distinct communities, whereas the phys-
ical contact network cannot (Fig. 3.2). The network measures presented in Figs. 3.3-3.4
and Table 3.2 are generally supportive of this observation. For example, the cumulative
degree distributions displayed in Fig. 3.3 show that the physical contact network has an
approximately normal distribution with a relatively small standard deviation, and hence,
a thin tail. In contrast, the Facebook social network has a much broader distribution
(possibly scale-free or exponential, although this cannot be determined conclusively with
such a small network size) with a relatively large standard deviation, and hence, a fat tail.
Similarly, it is known that online social networks often have larger clustering coefficients
than oﬄine social networks. In Section 3.7 we use the Facebook and physical contact net-
works as representatives of online and oﬄine social networks, respectively, to investigate
differences in propagation properties that may arise between online and oﬄine social net-
works within the linear threshold propagation model. We also use these networks to test
and compare the propagation models we derive in this chapter.
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative degree distribution of Facebook social (GF - solid) and physical
contact (GP - dashed) networks.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of local clustering coefficient for Facebook social (GF ) and physical
contact (GP ) networks.
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Table 3.2: Summary of common network measures for Facebook social (GF ) and physical
contact (GP ) networks.
Quantity
Network
Physical Contact (GP ) Facebook (GF )
Number of Nodes (N) 776 3,963
Average Degree (µk ± σk) 44.8± 18.2 44.5± 52.4
Minimum/Maximum Degree (kmin/kmax) 1/109 2/1034
Sparsity (S) 0.06 0.01
Diameter (D) 8 8
Average Path Length(µl ± σl) 2.37± 0.82 3.77± 1.29
Average Local Clust. Coeff. (µc ± σc) 0.29± 0.12 0.62± 0.20
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3.3 Specification of the Linear Threshold Agent-
Based Model (ABM)
Consider a population of individuals who are represented by nodes V = {vi}Ni=1, and whose
interactions are represented by edges E = {ei}Mi=1, of the graph G = G(V,E) with degree
distribution ρk. An individual v ∈ V at time t can be in one of two states, i.e. sv(t) = 0
(inactive in the revolution) or sv(t) = 1 (active in the revolution). We assume that the
network G is static so that the dynamics of the ABM can be fully specified by providing
rules for the transition of individuals from an inactive state to an active state and vice
versa, together with parameter values and an initial condition. For the moment, we set
aside the issue of the choice of parameters and initial conditions and restrict the remainder
of this section to the specification and justification of the transition rules.
3.3.1 Growth Process: Inactive (sv = 0) to Active (sv = 1)
To specify the growth process of the ABM, we use the standard linear threshold model
that has been used before in the context of social spreading or contagion processes such
as opinion formation, technology adoption, marketing, rioting, and political movements
[34, 35, 36, 75, 98, 187]. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the choice of individuals to join a
revolution is a collective action problem [107]: individuals are averse to unilateral action
against the regime for fear of severe retaliation, but are willing to take action collectively in
the belief that the regime will lack sufficient resources to punish the entire collective. Thus,
an individual v ∈ V will decide to join the revolution if he or she believes that it has grown
sufficiently large to reduce the risk of retaliation from the regime to an acceptable level. It
is reasonable, therefore, to assume that individuals will decide to join the revolution only
after a large enough fraction of their neighbours in the social network have done so. This
behaviour is captured by the following transition rule: if individual v ∈ V has k neighbours
{wj}kj=1, if sv(t) = 0, and if
k∑
j=1
swj(t) ≥ θvk, (3.1)
i.e., if v is inactive at time t and has at least a fraction θv of its neighbours that are active,
then node v transitions from state 0 to state 1 at time t′ = t+ ξ1, where ξ1 > 0 is the first
arrival time of a Poisson process with rate c1. We say that nodes that satisfy Eq. (3.1) can
“see” the revolution, i.e. the revolution is visible to them. Alternatively, we say that these
nodes are “considering joining the revolution”. Parameter c1 determines the timescale of
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the growth process. In other words, c1 determines the rate at which individuals join the
revolution, and hence, we call c1 the protesters’ enthusiasm parameter.
While most of the linear threshold models that have been studied in the context of
social spreading or contagion processes [34, 36, 35, 98, 75, 187] consider evolution in discrete
time by choosing ξ1 constant, we have specified ξ1 so that Eq. (3.1) evolves in continuous
time. Specifying ξ1 in this way is often considered in biology and epidemiology [6, 12],
since it (a) facilitates the comparison of the ABM with continuous-time population-level
models (see Section 3.4), and (b) eliminates the problem of choosing a suitable time-
step for iterating the discrete-time process (see Gillespie’s Algorithm in Appendix C.2).
Furthermore, we note that by choosing ξ1 to be the first arrival time of a Poisson process,
we are assuming that the decision making process is a Markov, or memoryless, process.
Specifically, conditioned on the state of the system at time t, we assume that the likelihood
of an individual joining the revolution in the time interval [t, t+ ∆t] is independent of the
state of the system at any time t˜ < t. In words, the future is independent of the past,
given the present.
3.3.2 Decay Process: Active (sv = 1) to Inactive (sv = 0)
We assume that once an individual v ∈ V has become active the regime will attempt to
arrest or disperse him or her, thus returning v to an inactive state. As in the previous
section, we assume that this is a memoryless process. We further assume that the regime
can only arrest or disperse protesters so long as the total fraction of active protesters
remains less than the regime’s finite police capacity β ∈ (0, 1). The transition rule can
then be characterized by the following: if sv(t) = 1 and
1
N
∑
w∈V
sw(t) < β, (3.2)
i.e., if v is active at time t and the fraction of active individuals is less than the regime’s
police capacity β, then the node v transitions from state 1 to state 0 at time t′ = t + ξ2,
where ξ2 > 0 is the first arrival time of a Poisson process with rate c2, which determines
the timescale of the decay process. In other words, c2 determines the rate at which the
regime can disperse protesters, and hence, we call c2 the policing efficiency parameter.
This fully specifies the evolution of the ABM, which we simulate using Gillespie’s algo-
rithm, see Appendix C.2.
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3.4 Population-Level ODE Approximation for the
ABM
Due to the difficulty of analyzing and computational cost of simulating the ABM, we
consider the following derivation of a one-dimensional ODE approximation that can be
applied to lend insight into how the ABM process behaves on different networks. We begin
by defining ra(t) = ra(t|t0) to be the fraction of nodes (in the ABM) that are expected to
be in state 1, i.e. the expected fraction of active nodes at time t conditioned on information
at time t0:
ra(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E [svi(t)|t0] .
The fraction of nodes that are expected to be in state 0 (inactive) at time t, conditioned
on information at time t0, is then 1 − ra(t). We now write the change in ra from time t0
to time t as
∆ra(t) = ra(t)− ra(t0) = g(t|t0)− d(t|t0), (3.3)
where ∆t = t− t0, and the expected growth and decay of the fraction of active nodes are
modelled by the non-negative growth and decay functions g(t) = g(t|t0), and d(t) = d(t|t0),
respectively. In order to obtain the one-compartment model we will need to approximate
the quantities g(t) and d(t) in terms of ra(t0), {θvi}Ni=1, and β.
For notational convenience we begin by considering the case where ∀v ∈ V : θv = θ.
The pool of individuals that can go from active to inactive at time t0 is ra(t0). Active nodes
become inactive at the first arrival time of a Poisson process with rate c2, provided that
the fraction of active nodes does not exceed the regime’s police capacity, i.e. ra(t0) < β.
Thus,
d(t) = [c2 ra(t0) ∆t+ o(∆t)] p(ra(t0); β) = c2 ra(t0) p(ra(t0); β) ∆t+ o(∆t), (3.4)
where we take p(ra(t0); β) = I{ra(t0)<β}, and where I{·} is the indicator function, i.e.
I{X} =
{
1 if X is true
0 otherwise
.
Next, let
ν(ra(t0); θ) =
1
N
[∑
v∈V
I{∑kvj=1 swv,j (t0)≥θkv}
]
, (3.5)
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where {wv,j}kvj=1 denotes the neighbours of individual v ∈ V . In words, we let ν(ra(t0); θ)
be the fraction of the total population at time t0 that can see the revolution. We call
ν(ra(t0); θ) the visibility function of the ABM. In the chosen notation for ν it is emphasized
that ν depends on ra(t0), i.e. on the fraction of nodes that are active at time t0. At time
t = t0, the pool of individuals that can go from inactive to active, i.e. that are considering
joining the revolution, is therefore approximately (1 − ra(t0)) ν(ra(t0); θ). Since inactive
nodes that can see the revolution become active at the first arrival time of a Poisson process
with rate c1, we have
g(t) = c1 (1− ra(t0)) ν(ra(t0); θ) ∆t+ o(∆t). (3.6)
Combining Equations (3.3)-(3.6) and dividing by ∆t gives
∆ra
∆t
= c1 (1− ra(t0)) ν(ra(t0); θ)− c2 ra(t0) p(ra(t0); β) + o(1).
Taking the limit as ∆t→ 0 and suppressing the t0 argument yields
dra
dt
= c1 (1− ra) ν(ra; θ)− c2 ra p(ra; β). (3.7)
This establishes a general population-level ODE model that approximates the linear thresh-
old ABM, with visibility function ν(ra; θ). To close the model, the visibility function has
to be specified, guided by Equation (3.5). We observe that the model of Section 2.2.1,
given in Eq. (2.1), turns out to be of the form (3.7) as derived for the ABM, when ν(r; θ)
is chosen to be the step-visibility function (SVF) vs(r;α), i.e. when ν(r; θ) in Eq. (3.7) is
taken to be
ν(r; θ) = vs(r;α) ≡ I{r>1−α}. (3.8)
This is the simplest closure for Eq. (3.7). In the following section we introduce two novel
candidates for the visibility function that explicitly take into account the structure of
the underlying network: the binomial and empirical visibility functions (BVF and EVF,
respectively). These two visibility functions can be seen to be equivalent in the limit of
large network and sample size, as shown in Section 3.4.2.
We conclude this section by noting that the above derivation can easily be modified for
the case where the θv are not uniform. In this case the growth and decay functions g and
d, respectively, can be computed by averaging over the distribution of the θv’s. As such,
the procedures outlined below for the SVF, BVF, and EVF, can also easily be modified
for the case of non-uniform θv.
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3.4.1 Visibility Functions for Population-Level ODE Models
Binomial Visibility Function
Consider the following derivation. Suppose that v ∈ V is a node in the network G =
G(V,E) with degree k, and that the fraction of nodes active in the revolution is r. Also,
assume that the states of v’s neighbours are active with probability r independently so
that the probability of v having j neighbours active in the revolution is(
k
j
)
rj(1− r)k−j.
The probability that the fraction of v’s neighbours exceeds the linear threshold θ is, there-
fore,
k∑
j=dθke
(
k
j
)
rj(1− r)k−j = BinCDF(k − dθke; k, 1− r), (3.9)
where BinCDF(x;n, p) is the cumulative distribution function for the binomial distribution
with n trials and probability of success p evaluated at x. This quantity can be used to
approximate the function ν(r; θ) (the expected fraction of the population that can see the
revolution). In the network-based justification of the SVF model given in Section 2.2.3 we
argued that Eq. (3.9) with k = bφc, i.e. Eq. (3.9) with k taken to be the average degree, is
a sigmoidal function that can be approximated by step-visibility function vs(r;α) for some
appropriate visibility parameter α. One possible improvement on adopting
ν(r; θ) = vs(r;α(θ))
in Eq. (3.7) (resulting in the SVF model) is to actually adopt
ν(r; θ) = BinCDF(bφc − dθφe; bφc, 1− r)
instead. However, we can improve on this even further in terms of using more relevant
information about the real graph by choosing ν(r; θ) to be equal to
vb(r; θ, ρ) =
∑
k
ρkBinCDF(k − dθke; k, 1− r) =
∑
k
k−dθke∑
j=0
ρk
(
k
j
)
(1− r)jrk−j, (3.10)
where ρk is the degree distribution. We call the function vb(r; θ, ρ) in Eq. (3.10) the binomial
visibility function (BVF), see Fig. 3.5. Note the steep sigmoidal shape of vb(r; θ, ρk) for
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the two empirical networks of Fig. 3.5, further justifying the choice of a step visibility
function as an appropriate approximation in the SVF model of Section 2.2.1 [109]. We
note that computing the binomial visibility function on some grid of µ+1 discrete r-values
r ∈ {ri}µ+1i=1 requires calculating a double sum for every i = 1, . . . µ + 1. In practice, this
can be very expensive, especially for degree distributions ρk with fat tails. For this reason,
the following section introduces a complementary but less expensive approximation to the
visibility function that is equivalent to the binomial visibility function of Eq. (3.10) in the
limit of large network and sample size.
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Figure 3.5: Binomial visibility function (solid green) and empirical visibility function
(dashed blue) for Facebook social (GF ) and physical contact (GP ) networks generated
for linear thresholds θ = {0.13, 0.17, 0.21, 0.25} (curves from left to right). The binomial
and empirical visibility functions are computed on the grid r ∈ {0, 1
512
, 2
512
, . . . , 1}.
Empirical Visibility Function
We now propose to reconstruct the binomial visibility function vb(r; θ, ρk) empirically by
sampling the underlying network directly. Specifically, for fixed θ we approximate vb by a
discrete function ve ∈ Rµ+1 where ∀j = 1, . . . , µ + 1 : ve,j ≈ vb( j−1µ ). Since vb(0) = 0 and
vb(1) = 1, we set ve,1 = 0 and ve,µ+1 = 1. We calculate ve,j for j = 2, . . . , µ as follows.
1. Seed the network with fraction rj =
j−1
µ
active nodes in expectation. (Generate
N random numbers drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]: randi for i =
1, . . . , N . If randi <
j−1
µ
then node i is active, otherwise node i is inactive.)
2. Determine the fraction of nodes that can see the revolution.
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3. Repeat 1-2 a total of rep times and set ve,j to be the average over the realizations.
(We choose rep = 100 in our numerical experiments.)
We denote the linear interpolation between the ve,j by the function ve(r; θ), i.e.
ve(r; θ) =
{
ve,j if r =
j−1
µ
for some j = 1, . . . , µ+ 1
ve,j
j/µ−r
1/µ
+ ve,j+1
r−(j−1)/µ
1/µ
if r ∈ [ j−1
µ
, j
µ
] for some j = 1, . . . , µ
, (3.11)
which we call the empirical visibility function (EVF), see Fig. 3.5.
We now make several brief remarks about the procedure for calculating the empirical
visibility function, outlined above. Firstly, we remark that this procedure is easily extended
to the case where θv are specified for each individual node. However, to keep our analysis
as simple as possible we continue to restrict ourselves to the case where θv ≡ θ. In the next
section we show that the empirical and binomial visibility functions are equivalent in the
limit of large network and sample size. Figure 3.5 shows that they can also be expected to
give similar results for finite network and sample size. Finally, we emphasize that compared
to the binomial visibility function, the procedure for calculating the empirical visibility
function is in practice significantly less costly to implement, especially for networks with
fat-tailed degree distributions.
3.4.2 Equivalence of Binomial and Empirical Visibility Functions
We briefly argue that the empirical and binomial visibility functions are equivalent in the
limit of large network and sample size, i.e. as N, rep → ∞, see also Fig. 3.5. Let v ∈ V
be a node in the network G = G(V,E) with degree k. Now, fix θ and suppose that we
are calculating ve,j ≈ vb( j−1µ ) = vb(rj) via the algorithm presented in Sec. 3.4.1. The lth
iteration of Step 1 of this algorithm selects Nl nodes uniformly at random to be active and
results in Vl nodes that can see the revolution. Note that by the Law of Large Numbers
[52]
Nl
N
p→ rj = j − 1
µ
as N →∞, and
ve,j =
1
rep
rep∑
l=1
Vl
N
p→ E
[Vl
N
]
= E
[V1
N
]
as rep→∞,
where
p→ denotes convergence in probability. Since the Nl activated nodes are chosen
uniformly at random, the statuses of the neighbours of v are independent. Therefore, the
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probability that v can see the revolution is
k∑
l=dθke
(
k
l
)(Nl
N
)l(
1− Nl
N
)k−j
= BinCDF
(
k − dθke; k, 1− Nl
N
)
.
It follows that the expected fraction of nodes that have degree k and can see the revolution
is
E
[
ρkBinCDF
(
k − dθke; k, 1− Nl
N
)]
,
and hence, the expected fraction of nodes that can see the revolution is
E
[Vl
N
]
= E
[∑
k
ρkBinCDF
(
k − dθke; k, 1− Nl
N
)]
.
We conclude the proof by observing that by the Continuous Mapping Theorem [18] Nl
N
p→ rj
as N →∞ implies
E
[Vl
N
]
p→
∑
k
ρkBinCDF (k − dθke; k, 1− rj) = vb(r; θ, ρk) as N →∞,
and hence,
ve,j → vb(rj; θ, ρ) as N →∞, rep→∞.
3.4.3 Comparison of ABM, SVF, and BVF/EVF Models
Before we compare the ability of the SVF/BVF/EVF models to approximate the ABM
we make several remarks. First, for a given θ in the ABM the SVF model requires that
we specify α. We will propose an optimization procedure for choosing such an optimal
α, which we call αˆ. However, in order to preserve the continuity of our narrative we
choose to defer this discussion to the end of this section. Second, we note that since the
BVF and EVF are equivalent in the limit of large network and sample size, and are very
close in practice (see Fig. 3.5), the observations we make below about the behaviour of
the BVF model also apply to the behaviour of the EVF model. Finally, our numerical
results will show that the behaviour of the BVF/EVF model has parameter regimes that
induce behaviours analogous to those observed in the SVF model. Since the BVF/EVF
have sigmoidal shape, this can be understood from the analysis presented in Section 2.3
for visibility and policing functions of general sigmoidal shape. This analysis shows that
sigmoidal visibility functions (such as BVF and EVF) lead to parameter regimes that are
very similar to the regimes of the SVF described in Fig. 2.3.
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Numerical Comparison of ABM, SVF, and BVF/EVF Models
We now present a numerical comparison of ABM simulations with SVF and BVF/EVF
models6. Figures 3.6-3.10 show some representative results when the SVF and BVF models
are used to approximate the ABM. As illustrated in Fig. 3.6, for many combinations of
parameters the SVF model is able to approximate the behaviour of the ABM in parameter
Region IIIe (left panels of Fig. 3.6) and parameter Region III1 (right panels of Fig. 3.6)7.
However, we observe that under certain circumstances stochastic effects and details of the
network structure become important and the SVF model fails to approximate, even in a
qualitative sense, the behaviour of the ABM. Specifically, the SVF model fails to capture
the behaviour of the ABM when the initial condition is small (r0 << 1), when the initial
condition is near the boundary between the basins of attraction of r = 0 and r = 1 in
Fig. 2.3b, and when parameters c1, c2, α, and β are close to the boundary between param-
eter Regions III0, IIIe, or III1 in Fig. 2.3a, see Figs. 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9, respectively. These
are well-known limitations of population-level ODE models that attempt to approximate
detailed network dynamics [6, 12].
6All computations are performed in Matlab. ABM simulations are performed using Gillespie’s Al-
gorithm, see Appendix C.2. Solution to the BVF/EVF models are computed using the Matlab function
ode45. We describe in detail the solution to the SVF model at the end of this section, see also Appendix C.3
7For additional details on the analysis of the SVF model and a description of the parameters regimes
III0, IIIe, and III1 see Section 2.3.
59
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
Time (t)
r
(t
)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Time (t)
r
(t
)
(a) Facebook social network (GF , 1− αˆ = 0.131)
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(b) Physical contact network (GP , 1− αˆ = 0.134)
Figure 3.6: Parameter values for which the SVF and BVF models approximate the ABM
satisfactorily. (Left) Parameter Region IIIe (c2 = 3, 1 − αˆ < c∗ < β). (Right) Parameter
Region III1 (c2 = 1, 1− αˆ < β ≤ c∗). Time traces of rep = 100 ABM simulations (grey),
solution to the SVF model (solid black), and BVF model (dashed black) with parameters
θ = 0.11, β = 0.3, c1 = 1, and r0 = 0.2.
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(a) Facebook social network (GF , 1− αˆ = 0.131)
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(b) Physical contact network (GP , 1− αˆ = 0.134)
Figure 3.7: The SVF model can fail to approximate the ABM when the initial condition
is small (r0 = 0.01, left), or is near the boundary between the basins of attraction of r = 0
and r = 1 (r0 = 0.1 ≈ 1 − αˆ, right). Time traces of rep = 100 ABM simulations (grey),
solution to the SVF model (solid black), and solution to the BVF model (black dashed)
with parameters θ = 0.11, β = 0.3 and c1 = c2 = 1 (Region III1, 1− αˆ < β ≤ c∗).
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Figure 3.8: The SVF model can fail to approximate the ABM when the initial condition
is near the boundary between the basins of attraction of r = 0 and r = 1, i.e. when
r0 ≈ 1 − α. (Left) Facebook social network (GF , 1 − αˆ = 0.179) and (right) physical
contact network (GP , 1− αˆ = 0.180). Time traces of rep = 100 ABM simulations (grey),
solution to the SVF model (solid black), and solution to the BVF model (dashed black)
with parameters θ = 0.17, β = 0.3, c1 = 1, and c2 = 3, and initial condition r0 = 0.2
(Region IIIe, 1 − αˆ < c∗ < β). For these parameters, the SVF model has solution in
Region IIIe, while the ABM and BVF models have solution in Region III0.
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Figure 3.9: The SVF model can fail to approximate the ABM when parameters are close
to the boundary between regions. (Left) Facebook social network (GF , 1 − αˆ = 0.163)
with parameters in Region III1 (c2 = 2.3, 1 − αˆ < β ≤ c∗). For these parameters, the
SVF model has solution in Region III1, while the ABM and BVF models have solution
in Region IIIe. (Right) Physical contact network (GP , 1− αˆ = 0.165) with parameters in
Region IIIe (c2 = 2.4, 1 − αˆ < c∗ < β). For these parameters, the SVF and BVF models
have solution in Region IIIe, while the ABM has solution in Region III1. Time traces of
rep = 100 ABM simulations (grey), solution to the SVF model (solid black), and solution
to the BVF model (dashed black) with parameters θ = 0.15, β = 0.3, and c1 = 1 and with
initial condition r0 = 0.2.
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(a) Both SVF and BVF models fail to
approximate the dynamics of the ABM
on the Facebook social network (GF ,
1− αˆ = 0.163) with parameters in Re-
gion III0 (c2 = 1.4, 1 − αˆ < β ≤ c∗ ≈
0.417).
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(b) The SVF and BVF models provide
complementary approximations of the
dynamics of the ABM on the physical
contact network (GP , 1 − αˆ = 0.165)
with parameters in Region III0 (c2 =
1.2, 1− αˆ < c∗ ≈ 0.455 < β).
Figure 3.10: The SVF and the BVF models can (a) both fail to approximate the dynamics
of the ABM, or (b) act as complementary approximations to the dynamics of the ABM.
Time traces of rep = 100 ABM simulations (grey), solution to the SVF model (black), and
solution to the BVF model (dashed black), with parameters θ = 0.15, β = 0.3, and c1 = 1
and with initial condition r0 = 0.1.
We observe four types of outcomes when comparing the ability of the BVF model to
approximate the ABM to the ability of the SVF model to approximate the ABM:
1. The BVF model may succeed better in approximating the dynamics of the ABM than
the SVF model, even if the improvement is only qualitative in nature, see Fig. 3.7
(right panels), 3.8, and 3.9 (left panel),
2. The BVF model may complement the dynamics predicted by the SVF model, see
Fig. 3.10b,
3. The BVF model may produce qualitatively similar predictions to the SVF model,
see Figs. 3.6, 3.7b (left panel) and 3.9 (right panel), or
4. Both the BVF and the SVF models fail to approximate the dynamics of the ABM
either qualitatively or quantitatively, see Figs. 3.7b (left panels) and 3.10a.
For each of these outcomes, the approximation of the ABM by the BVF model is no
worse than the approximation by the SVF model, and, in many cases the approximation
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of the ABM by the BVF model is much better than the approximation by the SVF model.
Therefore, we conclude that the BVF model, and hence the EVF model, represents an
improvement over the SVF model with respect to their ability to approximate the behaviour
of the ABM. This is no surprise, since the BVF/EVF model takes important information
of the real network into account.
Optimizing α for the SVF model
We now outline the procedure we used in Figs. 3.6-3.10 for choosing an appropriate α in
the SVF model (i.e. using ν(ra; θ) = vs(ra;α) in Eq. (3.7)) for a given θ of the ABM.
Specifically, we simulate the ABM on the physical contact and Facebook networks for
a fixed set of model parameters and find αˆ, the optimal value of α for Eq. (3.8) that
minimizes the difference between the ABM realizations and the output of the SVF model
(Eqs. (3.7)-(3.8)). We begin by fixing the initial condition ra(0) = r0
8 and the parameters
θv ≡ θ, β, c1, and c2. To compare realizations of the ABM with the solution to the SVF
model we use Gillespie’s Algorithm (summarized in Appendix C.2) to simulate rep = 100
realizations of the ABM, recording ra at each t ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 1}, and then find
the α that minimizes the difference (in L2 norm) between the ABM realizations and the
solution to the SVF model. This optimization procedure is performed in Matlab using the
command fminsearch, see Appendix C.3 for Matlab code. The results of this procedure for
ABM simulations performed on the physical contact and Facebook social networks with
parameters r0 = 0.25, θ = 0.15, β = 0.3, c1 = 1, and c2 = 9 are given in Fig. 3.11.
For these parameters we find the optimal α is given by αˆ = 0.835 and αˆ = 0.834 for the
Facebook and physical contact networks, respectively. Equivalently, the fitted value for
the visibility threshold 1 − α is given by 1 − αˆ = 0.165 and 1 − αˆ = 0.166, respectively.
Holding the initial condition r0 = 0.25 and parameters β = 0.3, c1 = 1 and c2 = 9
constant, we are able to repeat the above fitting procedure to find fitted values of α for
θ ∈ {0.105, 0.11, 0.115, . . . , 0.25}. These results are displayed in Fig. 3.12 and illustrate
that for a large range of individual thresholds θ the Facebook social network has a slightly
lower fitted visibility threshold 1− αˆ than does the physical contact network.
Observe that, for the parameters employed in Figs. 3.11-3.12 (θ ∈
{0.105, 0.11, 0.115, . . . , 0.25}, β = 0.3, c1 = 1, and c2 = 9), the SVF model lies in
the stable police state dynamical regime (Region III0, c∗ = c1/(c1 + c2) ≤ 1 − αˆ < β).
This is critical to the fitting procedure, since the parameter α appears in the solution
to the SVF model only when (a) the parameters α, β, c1, and c2 lie in Region III0, and
8Note that for simulations of the ABM an initial condition ra(0) = r0 is implemented by choosing
dr0Ne nodes uniformly at random to be active.
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(a) Facebook social network (GF , αˆ = 0.835)
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(b) Physical contact network (GP , αˆ = 0.834)
Figure 3.11: The optimal visibility parameter αˆ is found by fitting the SVF model to
rep = 100 ABM simulations with parameters θ = 0.15, β = 0.3, c1 = 1, c2 = 9, and
r0 = 0.25 (Region III0, c
∗ ≤ 1 − αˆ < β). (Left) Time traces of ABM simulations (grey)
and solution to SVF model with optimally fitted αˆ (black). (Right) L22 error between ABM
realizations and the SVF solution versus α.
(b) r0 ∈ (1 − α, β), see Section 2.3.2. Therefore, for a given θ, fitted values of αˆ used in
attempts to approximate the ABM by the SVF model are computed using parameters
β = 0.3, c1 = 1, and c2 = 9, and initial condition r0 = 0.25, as in Figs. 3.11-3.12. These
values of αˆ are also used for the SVF model when parameters lie in Regions IIIe and III1
and when the initial condition r0 6∈ (1− α, β).
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Figure 3.12: Result of finding optimal visibility parameter αˆ as a function of linear thresh-
old θ by fitting Eq. (3.8) (the SVF) to rep = 100 ABM simulations with parameters
β = 0.3, c1 = 1, c2 = 9, and r0 = 0.25 (Region III0, c
∗ ≤ 1 − αˆ < β). (Blue circles)
Facebook social network (GF ). (Red diamonds) Physical contact network (GP ). Line of
best fit for networks given by solid (m = 0.690 ± 0.022, b = 0.058 ± 0.008) and dashed
(m = 0.764±0.032, b = 0.050±0.006) lines, respectively (note: ± indicates 95% confidence
interval).
3.5 A Higher Order ODE Model: The Degree Ap-
proximation (DA) Model
In the previous section we introduced the BVF/EVF models as extensions to the SVF
model. In particular, we showed that the BVF/EVF models are better able to approx-
imate the ABM than the SVF model. However, both the BVF/EVF and SVF models
are one-dimensional ODEs. This section now compares the performance of the BVF/EVF
models as approximations to the ABM to the performance of a higher order (i.e., higher
dimensional) compartmental ODE model which we modify from [128]. We call this model
the degree approximation (DA) model because it compartmentalizes individuals based on
their state as well as their degree. We demonstrate numerically that the BVF model,
and hence the EVF model, is no worse at approximating the aggregate behaviour of the
ABM than the DA. This highlights the usefulness of the BVF/EVF model, especially since
the DA is in practice much more computationally expensive to solve and much harder to
analyze than the BVF/EVF model.
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3.5.1 Degree Approximation Model Specification
Before we detail the approach which we modify from [128], it is useful to introduce some
notation. We define Vk to be the set of nodes with degree k and Nk to be the set of nodes
that have at least one neighbour of degree k,
Vk = {v ∈ V : dv = k}, and
Nk = {w ∈ V : ∃v ∈ Vk such that (v, w) ∈ E},
respectively, where we denote the degree distribution of Nk by ρk,j, i.e.
ρk,j =
number of nodes of degree j that have at least one neighbour of degree k
number of nodes that have at least one neighbour of degree k
=
|Vj ∩Nk|
|Nk| .
As mentioned above, the degree approximation aggregates individuals according to their
state and degree. Thus, conditioning on the state of the system at time t0, we define
r(k)(t) = r(k)(t|t0) as follows
r(k)(t) =
1
|Vk|
∑
v∈Vk
E [sv(t)|t0]
to be the fraction of nodes with degree k that are expected to be in state 1 at time t.
Since nodes and edges are neither created nor destroyed, the fraction of nodes with degree
k that are expected to be in state 0 at time t is given by 1− r(k)(t). Analogously, we define
rd(t) = rd(t|t0) as follows
rd(t) =
1
N
∑
k
|Vk|r(k)(t) =
∑
k
ρkr
(k)(t)
to be the fraction of nodes expected to be in state 1 at time t.
Applying the notation introduced above with the rules characterizing the dynamics of
the process we find an equation analogous to Eq. (3.3)
∆r(k)(t) = r(k)(t)− r(k)(t0) = g(k)(t|t0)− d(k)(t|t0), (3.12)
where the expected growth and decay of the fraction of active nodes is modelled by the
nonnegative growth and decay functions g(k)(t) = g(k)(t|t0) and d(k)(t) = d(k)(t|t0), respec-
tively. In order to close the degree approximation we need to approximate the quantities
g(k)(t) and d(k)(t) in terms of r(k)(t), {θv}v∈V , and β.
67
For notational convenience we first suppress the time argument, and consider the case
where θv ≡ θ. In order to approximate g(k)(t) or d(k)(t) in terms of r(k), θ, and β, we
are now required to make an assumption about how the states of nodes sharing a common
neighbour are correlated. Specifically, as for the BVF and EVF models, for any fixed v ∈ Vk
we assume that the states of any two neighbours of v are independent. This assumption
implies that the probability of v having exactly j active neighbours is
(
k
j
)
n¯jk(1 − n¯k)k−j,
where n¯k =
∑
l ρk,lr
(l) is the fraction of nodes in Nk with state 1. So, the probability of v
having at least dθke active neighbours is
k∑
j=dθke
(
k
j
)
n¯jk(1− n¯k)k−j = 1− BinCDF(dθke − 1; k, n¯k) = BinCDF(k − dθke; k, 1− n¯k).
It follows that
g(k)(t) = c1 (1− r(k)(t0)) BinCDF(k − dθke; k, 1− n¯k)∆t+ o(∆t). (3.13)
As in Eq. (3.4), we choose
d(k)(t) = c2 r
(k)(t0) p(rd(t0); β)∆t+ o(∆t). (3.14)
Combining equations (3.12)-(3.14) and dividing by ∆t gives
∆r(k)
∆t
= c1 (1− r(k)(t0)) BinCDF(k − dθke; k, 1− n¯k)− c2 r(k)(t0) p(r(k)(t0); β) + o(1).
Now, taking the limit as ∆t→ 0 yields
drk
dt
= c1(1− r(k))BinCDF(k − dθke; k, 1− n¯k)− c2 r(k) p(r(k); β). (3.15)
3.5.2 Comparison of ABM, BVF and Degree Approximation
In Section 3.4.3 we showed that the approximation of the ABM by the BVF/EVF model is
no worse, and usually much better, than the approximation of the ABM by the SVF model.
In this section we show that the approximation of the ABM by the BVF/EVF model is
usually no worse than the approximation of the ABM by the DA given in Eq. (3.15).
Specifically, we observe that the BVF and DA models produce similar qualitative predic-
tions for most choices of parameters θ, β, c1, and c2, see for example Fig. 3.13. Also,
although this is an atypical result, we present one set of parameters where the BVF model
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outperforms the DA on the Facebook social network (GF ), and where the BVF model
complements the DA on the physical contact network (GP ), see Fig. 3.14. We observe
that, for the specific parameters and networks used in the simulations of Figs. 3.13-3.14,
the DA does not significantly outperform the BVF model. It was confirmed in extensive
additional simulations that this occurs generically for large parts of the parameter space
of the models. This is worth emphasizing once more, since the BVF model is much easier
to analyze and much less costly to solve than the DA. This supports our proposition that
the BVF (or EVF) model is a powerful tool for approximating and analyzing the ABM
and a general technique for formulating tractable models for spreading processes on social
networks that take real network characteristics into account.
0 20 400
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0.3
Time ( t)
r
(t
)
(a) Facebook social network (GF ) with
parameters c1 = 1, c2 = 3, θ = 0.15,
and β = 0.3, with initial condition r0 =
0.2.
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(b) Physical contact network (GP )
with parameters c1 = 1, c2 = 1.2,
θ = 0.15, and β = 0.3, with initial con-
dition r0 = 0.1.
Figure 3.14: Example of parameters for which (a) The BVF model outperforms the DA on
the Facebook social network (GF ), and (b) the BVF model and the DA complement each
other on the physical contact network (GP ). Time traces of rep = 100 ABM simulations
(grey), solution to the BVF model (dashed black) and the DA (solid black).
3.6 Extending the Basic Reproduction Number (R0)
from Epidemiology to the Linear Threshold ABM
In epidemiological models the basic reproduction number R0 is defined to be the number of
secondary infections caused by a single infected individual introduced into a population that
is entirely susceptible [84]. Note that in this context exposure to one infected individual is
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sufficient for a new infection. If R0 < 1 then an infected individual is, on average, unable to
replace himself and the outbreak terminates on its own in short order. On the other hand, if
R0 > 1 then an infected individual is, on average, more than able to replace himself and the
outbreak may spread into a full-blown epidemic. We define the basic reproduction number
for our linear threshold model of political revolution analogously: the basic reproduction
number is the average number of individuals that become active in the revolution due
directly to the introduction of a single active individual into a population that is otherwise
completely inactive. In this section, we show that the basic reproduction number in our
linear threshold ABM is related to the initial slope of the BVF/EVF by the equation
R0 = c
∗v′b(0; θ, ρ), (3.16)
where c∗ = c1/(c1 + c2), and discuss efficient ways to compute R0. We remark that our
attempt to derive a threshold value, R0, that predicts whether or not a small initial protest
will grow into a full scale revolution, is related to work done by [69, 187]. These works
estimate final outbreak size for an activation-only linear threshold model (i.e. a linear
threshold model where nodes, once active, cannot become inactive) on tree-like networks,
incorporating information about the degree distribution and initial condition. We remark
that, although these works present interesting and useful methodology, they cannot be
directly applied to our linear threshold ABM model, since our model includes a mechanism
for activated nodes to become inactive, and since our model is applied to social networks
with high clustering coefficients.
We begin by deriving an expression for R0. Suppose that we activate individual v ∈ V
in the population, and suppose that individual v has degree k. Further, suppose that this
individual has V neighbours who can see the revolution (i.e., the linear threshold criterion
is satisfied) once individual v is activated. Let w ∈ V be a neighbour of v’s that can see
the revolution, and let τ1 and τ2 be the first arrival time of Poisson processes with rates c1
and c2, respectively. The probability that individual w becomes active before individual v
becomes inactive is
P (τ1 < τ2) =
∫ ∞
0
P (τ1 < t|τ2 = t)P (τ2 = t) dt
=
∫ ∞
0
[1− exp(−c1t)]c2 exp(−c2t)dt
=
c1
c1 + c2
= c∗.
Since we only consider activations that result directly from v’s activation (and not acti-
vations caused by a combination of the activation of v and the subsequent activation of
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v’s neighbours), for our purposes the behaviour of each of v’s neighbours is independent.
Thus, the expected number of v’s neighbours which become active is Vc∗.
Recall that the social network G = G(V,E) has N nodes, M edges, degree distribution
ρk and secondary degree distribution ρk,j. For the single activated individual v with degree
k the expected number of neighbours who can see the revolution is
E[V ] = k
∑
j
ρk,jI{jθ≤1}.
Averaging over all possible degrees k now yields the basic reproduction number
R0 = c
∗E [V ] = c1
c1 + c2
∑
k,j
kρkρk,jI{jθ≤1} = c∗
∞∑
k=1
bθ−1c∑
j=1
kρkρk,j.
It is now possible to prove the relationship given in Eq. (3.16). Writing
R0 =
c1
c1 + c2
bθ−1c∑
j=1
∞∑
k=1
kρkρk,j,
it suffices to show that
jρj =
∞∑
k=1
kρkρk,j,
since
vb(r; θ, ρ) =
∞∑
k=1
ρkBinCDF(k − dθke; k, 1− r)
=
∞∑
k=1
k−dθke∑
j=0
ρk
(
k
j
)
(1− r)jrk−j
=
∞∑
k=1
ρk
[(
k
0
)
rk + . . .+
(
k
k − dθke
)
(1− r)k−dθkerdθke
]
=⇒ v′b(0; θ, ρ) =
∞∑
k=1
kρk I{θk≤1} =
bθ−1c∑
k=1
kρk. (3.17)
We note that together with Eq. (3.16), Eq. (3.17) gives an exact and cheap way to compute
the basic reproduction number R0.
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From the undirected social network G = G(V,E) from the directed social network G′ =
G(V,E ′), where E ′ = {(v, w) : {v, w} ∈ E}. In this case, the number of edges emanating
from all nodes of degree k is kρkN . It follows that the number of edges emanating from
nodes of degree k and incident on nodes of degree j is kρkNρk,j. Thus, the number of
edges incident on nodes of degree j is
N
∞∑
k=1
kρkρk,j.
Equivalently, the number of edges incident on nodes of degree j is
jρjN.
Putting these two expressions together, we find
jρj =
∞∑
k=1
kρkρk,j,
which completes the proof.
Intuitively, this makes sense since the number of nodes that can see the revolution when
one node is activated can also be approximated by
N vb
(
1
N
; θ, ρk
)
=
vb
(
1
N
; θ, ρk
)− =0︷ ︸︸ ︷vb (0; θ, ρk)
1
N
≈ v′b (0; θ, ρk) .
3.7 Application: Linear Threshold Propagation on
Online versus Oﬄine social networks
In this section we investigate experimentally the differences in spreading behaviour that
occur under the linear threshold model for the spread of political revolutions when applied
to some empirical online and oﬄine social networks, searching for some initial quantitative
evidence that political revolutions may be facilitated by the network structure of online
social networks of social media.
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3.7.1 Network Structure: Online versus Oﬄine social networks
It is often assumed that the connectivity of modern online social networks was an impor-
tant factor in the spread of political revolutions in the past decade, e.g., in the Arab Spring
revolutions of 2011 [50, 100, 102, 177], while traditional oﬄine social networks (using in-
person physical contact, or phone or mail interaction for safe communication) featured
a different connectivity structure that was often severely restricted by censorship of the
regime. Unfortunately, representative samples of the oﬄine, traditional communication
networks that were in existence prior to the adoption of new media technologies are un-
available at sufficient scale for countries affected by the Arab Spring, or indeed for any
country. As opposed to the online networks of social media which are, by their nature,
digitally stored and available, the oﬄine social networks of pre-Internet societies have not
been recorded at scale, simply because it was impractical in terms of cost and effort. This
is a serious roadblock when investigating the effects of the structure of new media networks
on the dynamics of political revolution, and if one wants to compare with propagation on
pre-Internet social networks, it is necessary to identify proxy networks that are likely to be
reasonable approximations to pre-Internet social networks, in terms of network structure.
In this section, we use simulations of our ABM model on two empirical networks as a
starting point to investigate differences in propagation properties that may arise between
online and oﬄine social networks within the linear threshold propagation model. We choose
the small physical contact network GP between individuals from [158] as a representative
for oﬄine social networks, and we choose the Facebook network GF as a representative for
online social networks.
3.7.2 Linear Threshold Agent-Based Model on Facebook Social
GF and Physical Contact GP Networks
We now briefly examine the differences in how the political revolution spreads on the Face-
book social and physical contact networks via direct simulation of the ABM. In particular,
choosing parameters θ = 0.1, β = 0.3, c1 = 1, and c2 = 0.2 in the unstable police state re-
gion (Region III1, 1− αˆ < β ≤ c∗), we simulate rep = 100 realizations of the ABM for each
initial condition r0 ∈ {0, 0.0015, 0.003, . . . , 0.0495} from time t = 0 until time t = 20. The
average final size (at t = 20) for each initial condition 〈rfinal|r0〉 = 〈ra(20)〉|r0 is recorded
and displayed in Fig. 3.15, which demonstrates that for these parameters the political
revolution described by our ABM propagates to a much greater extent on the Facebook
social network, i.e. the online proxy network, than on the physical contact network, i.e.
the oﬄine proxy network.
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Figure 3.15: Average final size rfinal of rep = 100 realizations of ABM simulations on
Facebook social (GF ) and physical contact (GP ) networks with r0 ∈ [0, 0.05], θ = 0.1,
β = 0.3, c1 = 1, and c2 = 0.2 (Region III1, 1 − αˆ < β ≤ c∗). Realizations are allowed to
run until time tfinal = 20. Basic reproduction numbers R0 for Facebook social and physical
contact networks are R0 = 1.12 > 1 and R0 = 0.35 < 1, respectively.
As an important illustration of the usefulness of the basic reproduction number R0
we defined in Section 3.6, we find that this is consistent with a difference in R0 for the
two networks: the basic reproduction number is R0 = 1.12 (above the value of 1 which is
expected to be required for propagation) for the Facebook network, and R0 = 0.35 < 1 for
the physical contact network.
These results indicate that the oﬄine social network is less conducive to spreading the
revolution in the ABM than the online social network: it has a smaller basic reproduc-
tion number, and in simulations a larger initial population of revolutionaries is required to
spread the revolution. This is consistent with the initial slopes of the BVF/EVF illustrated
in Fig. 3.5: the initial slope of the BVF/EVF for the Facebook network is always greater
than that of the physical contact network. This provides some initial quantitative evidence
that the spread of revolutions under a linear threshold process may occur more easily on
modern online social networks than on traditional oﬄine networks. While this is an in-
teresting first observation, the next section discusses limitations and further investigations
that are required to address this intriguing but complex question more comprehensively.
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3.8 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter we developed a linear threshold agent based model (ABM) to model the
spread of a political revolution in a dictatorial regime. We showed that this model is
consistent with the previous simple step visibility function (SVF) ODE model developed
in Chapter 2 [109]. The SVF model is useful when little information is known about the
underlying network structure. For example, without having to specify an underlying com-
munication network, the SVF model provides a potential mechanism by which networks
with increased visibility α are more susceptible to political revolution. Using the relation-
ship between these two models as a template we developed a hierarchy of models of varying
complexity that approximate the behaviour of the ABM, see Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.1. Of all
the models we have identified, we find that the BVF and EVF models (models of moderate
complexity) offer the optimal combination of low computational complexity (cost), ease
of analysis, and ability to approximate the behaviour of the ABM. Specifically, we find
that for most parameters and initial conditions the BVF/EVF model is better able to ap-
proximate average ABM behaviour than the SVF. Also, for most networks the BVF/EVF
model is much less costly to solve and much easier to analyze than the degree approxima-
tion from [128]. Importantly, the analysis of the simple ODE models in terms of stability
of solutions for various parameter regimes directly gives insight in the qualitative dynamics
of the linear threshold ABM for the spread of political revolutions.
We extended the concept of the basic reproduction number R0 from epidemiology [84]
to the linear threshold ABM, we showed how it is related to the slope of the empirical
or binomial visibility functions at r = 0, and we provided efficient ways to compute or
estimate it. Analogously to epidemiological models, when R0 > 1 we expect the political
revolution to spread, and when R0 < 1 we expect it to die out. Thus, computing this
quantity for a network can give an indication of how the ABM will behave on that network
without the need to perform simulations, as we have demonstrated for empirical networks.
The Facebook and physical contact networks we consider as case studies, i.e. the online
and oﬄine proxy networks, provide initial support to the hypothesis that the adoption of
online social media may facilitate the spread of political revolutions by effectively changing
the connectivity structure of the population in a way that makes linear threshold spreading
more effective. Specifically, we find that for certain parameters the online proxy network is
more susceptible to the linear threshold spreading process than the oﬄine proxy network.
Moreover, we find that the different behaviour of these two networks is consistent with the
basic reproduction number calculated for these two networks.
In addition to studying the ABM and its approximations on more and larger online and
oﬄine networks, much work remains to be done in the actual modelling of the political
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revolution process. For example, throughout this manuscript we have assumed that indi-
viduals are either active or inactive, i.e. there are not intermediate states of involvement
in the revolution, that the linear threshold of individuals is constant for the population,
that the underlying communication networks are static, that the graph is undirected, and
that the nodes that are initially activated are chosen uniformly at random. Each of these
assumptions represents a major simplification of reality that needs to be addressed to study
further aspects of the spread of political revolutions on online social networks. For example,
models for the formation of extreme positions have been proposed where individuals can
take on a continuum of states [150]. Or, consider that in our model individuals estimate
the current participation in the revolution by sampling their neighbours. Since individuals
with greater sample size, i.e. larger degree, can form more accurate estimates of the current
participation in the revolution, they should be willing to join the revolution at a lower lin-
ear threshold θ than individuals who are more uncertain in their estimate of revolution size.
We would therefore expect the linear threshold to vary from individual to individual as a
function of their network degree. Or, consider that one of the principal strengths of new
media is the ability of individuals to search for both content and like-minded individuals.
Thus, we would expect that the underlying communication network should be changing
on the same time scale as the revolution. These changes in the nature of the communica-
tion network may be effectively modelled by considering revolutions/cascades on multiplex
[90], interdependent [54], or geographic [22] networks. Finally, the growing availability
and analysis of real world data generated from protest movements [72] and information
diffusion processes [139] that identify characteristics of seed and “super-spreader” nodes
may shed light on what initial conditions may be the most appropriate. For example, one
might consider that the nodes that are predisposed to be active at the initial stages of a
revolution, e.g. nodes that represent activists, may also have larger degree (if, for example,
they are charismatic and allowed to accrue followers) or smaller degree (if, for example,
they are the specific target of regime censorship). There is significant value in the kind
of parsimonious ABM model on static networks that we have considered in this chapter,
because much can be learned from this type of model and it is easier to analyze and inter-
pret than more complex models. Nevertheless, extensions along the lines sketched above
are important avenues for further study.
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Chapter 4
The Influence of Societal
Individualism on a Century of
Tobacco use: Modelling the
prevalence of smoking
This chapter is based on research published in BioMed Central (BMC) Public Health [108].
4.1 Background and Motivation
In the fifty years since the first report of the Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee on
Smoking and Health [181] the smoking epidemic has been responsible for more than 20
million deaths in the United States alone [180, 186], and continues to be responsible for
over 6 million deaths worldwide each year [95, 119]. The strong social component of the
dynamics of smoking prevalence has been modelled mathematically [183, 29, 161, 111, 156],
and examined statistically through analysis of social network data [40] and survey data
[88, 179, 94]. However, whereas previous works tend to focus on the micro-level, in this
chapter we investigate how social aspects of smoking affect its prevalence at the societal
level.
Significant inter-country differences exist in smoking prevalence [133]. For example,
Fig. 4.1 shows smoking prevalence estimates over most of the past century for Sweden
and the USA, obtained from surveys and cigarette consumption data (see Section 4.4.1).
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In both countries, smoking prevalence increased rapidly starting from the early decades
of the 20th century and reached a peak in the 1960s–1980s era when the adverse health
effects of smoking became widely known [181], after which smoking prevalence declined
rapidly. However, there are conspicuous differences between the curves: the rate of smoking
adoption and cessation before and after the peak is much greater in the US than in Sweden,
and the peak in prevalence in the US occurs much earlier than in Sweden.
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Figure 4.1: Estimated smoking prevalence xˆ versus time for the United States (red dots)
and Sweden (blue asterisks). The solid lines give the curves of best fit for Eq. (4.1).
Considerable time and resources have been devoted to identifying the factors that con-
tribute to smoking prevalence. Major factors include differences in beliefs about the harm
of smoking [45], socio-economic status [13, 91], cost [67], regulation/tobacco control policies
[171, 127, 96], and gender [134]. However, we note that these advances in the understand-
ing of the factors contributing to smoking prevalence are based primarily on micro-level
data, methods that inform general hypotheses, and non-mathematical descriptive models.
Indeed, comprehensive and quantitative cross-national analyses of how all these factors
affect smoking prevalence are rare [133]. Existing studies that compare national trends in
smoking prevalence, as well as the factors that contribute to these trends, tend to take a
descriptive [115, 118] and/or statistical [133] approach, and do not address the mechanism
underlying the key decision of whether or not to smoke in a quantitative manner [132].
In this chapter we present a new model for the social spreading of smoking. We aim to
create and test a tractable mathematical model, that is, a model for qualitative dynamics
from which insight (including causation) can be drawn. This differs from the statistically-
driven approach often used in areas such as econometrics and medicine, where correlations
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may be uncovered and analyzed without formulating first-principle-based dynamic math-
ematical models. The statistical approach is difficult to apply here because the amount
of available data on historical smoking dynamics is small. Our model-based approach has
much in common with simple explanatory mathematical models that have been successful
in, e.g., epidemiology and population dynamics.
Our model incorporates the concepts of individual utility from smoking , i.e. the util-
ity an individual derives directly from the act of smoking (including awareness of health
effects), and social utility from smoking , i.e. the utility an individual derives indirectly
from smoking through social interactions with other smokers (peer influence and social in-
ertia). Together these two quantities determine the total utility from smoking . Our model
assumes that an individual’s decision to smoke is based on the desire to maximize total
utility. By invoking this decision-making mechanism in a simple mathematical model, our
approach differs from the approaches of the previous mathematical [29, 161, 111, 156] and
descriptive/statistical [133, 115, 118, 132] models. Whereas previous mathematical models
generally require the calibration of many parameters (leading to difficulties in analysis,
interpretation, and overfitting), we propose a simple approach based on principles of so-
cial psychology and sociology whose predictions can be directly compared to smoking
prevalence data. Whereas previous descriptive and statistical models lack an underlying
decision-making mechanism, we propose a model with a decision-making mechanism that is
capable of incorporating factors previously identified as contributing to smoking prevalence.
Specifically, we note that monetary cost, beliefs about the harm/health effects of smoking,
and regulation/tobacco control policies are all implicitly accounted for in the concept of
individual utility from smoking. Our simple model applies to the population level, focus-
ing on major effects that may influence the temporal dynamics of smoking across societies.
It proposes a mechanism for smoking adoption and cessation that hinges on the balance
between individual and social utility (which both encompass other more fine-grained fac-
tors). Matching the model to real-world data reveals that the balance between social and
individual utility indeed is an important factor in the temporal dynamics of smoking, dif-
ferentiating between countries in a way that is consistent with known measures of societal
individualism. This lends support to the compelling hypothesis that the balance between
individual and social utility, which we will show to be related to societal individualism, is
indeed an important society-level driver for the temporal dynamics of smoking prevalence.
This is consistent with previous findings that the level of individualism/collectivism of a
society may have fundamental implications for its biology [38, 57], as well as its behaviour
[88, 37, 59, 148, 166].
The model we propose is explained in Section 4.2 and analyzed in Section 4.3. Sec-
tion 4.4 describes the data and parameter fitting procedure used in calibrating the model.
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In the context of societal individualism/collectivism, the parameter in our model that
controls the relative importance of individual versus social utility (see relative conformity
parameter, defined in Section 4.2) is interpreted as follows: the greater the relative con-
tribution of individual utility to total utility (at the expense of social utility), the more
individualistic the society is interpreted to be. Conversely, the greater the relative con-
tribution of social utility to total utility (at the expense of individual utility), the more
collectivistic the society is interpreted to be. As described in detail in Section 4.5, this
allows us to test the model’s predictions against independently collected smoking preva-
lence and individualism/collectivism data sets in three separate phases, see Fig. 4.2. First,
we compile smoking prevalence data spanning the past century for seven countries belong-
ing to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and find
good agreement between this data and the fitted model (see Phase (i) in Fig. 4.2 and Sec-
tion 4.5.1). Second, the country-specific parameter in our model that controls the relative
importance of individual versus social utility, i.e. the parameter that we interpret as the
degree of societal individualism/collectivism (see Section 4.2), and that we fit to smoking
prevalence data, is found to be significantly correlated to an established measure of societal
individualism for each country (Hofstede’s IDV [86]), in agreement with the predictions of
the model (see Phase (ii) in Fig. 4.2 and Section 4.5.2). Thirdly, the central role played by
societal individualism/collectivism in our model motivates us to investigate directly the role
that individualism (as measured by Hofstede’s IDV) plays in observed historical tobacco
use data. Our model predicts that more individualistic societies will show faster adoption
and cessation of smoking. We investigate this in historical tobacco use data, and find that
IDV is significantly correlated to the average rate of increase in smoking prevalence (sx) in
seven OECD countries for which historical smoking prevalence data is available, and that
it is significantly correlated to the peak year of tobacco consumption (tmax) for 25 countries
in which tobacco consumption data are available, in agreement with model predictions (see
Phase (iii) in Fig. 4.2 and Section 4.5.3). These findings are interpreted according to our
modelling framework, and provide evidence for the compelling hypothesis that individu-
alism/collectivism has an important influence on the dynamics of smoking prevalence at
the aggregate, population level. We next apply our model to investigate the sensitivity of
the model to the relative conformity parameter, i.e. to the parameter that controls the
relative importance of individual versus social utility. Specifically, Section 4.6 considers
how the smoking epidemic in the United States might have evolved if the United States
were slightly less individualistic, i.e. if the Unites States relative conformity parameter was
equal to that of the United Kingdom.
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Figure 4.2: Schematic representation of the development and testing of the smoking preva-
lence model given in Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2). Logic flows from filled circles to arrow heads. (Green
rectangles) Data sets used in this study. (Blue rectangle) Model Specification, see Sec-
tion 4.2. Model predictions are tested in three phases. (Red rectangle) Phase (i), (purple
rectangle) Phase (ii), and (yellow rectangle) Phase(iii), see Sections 4.5.1-4.5.3, respec-
tively.
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We discuss the impact of confounding variables, model limitations, and possible areas
for future research in Section 4.7. We conclude this chapter in Section 4.8, which sum-
marizes our findings, and also briefly discusses the implications of our model with respect
to tobacco control policies and to the broader phenomenon of cultural influence on social
spreading processes.
4.2 Model Specification
We begin formulating our model by observing that individuals derive utility from smoking
via two mechanisms. First, they derive utility directly from the act of smoking (individual
utility). Second, they derive utility from social interaction with other smokers (social
utility). We note that social utility commonly manifests itself in the form of peer influence
or peer pressure [26, 36]. We then proceed using a modelling framework that explicitly
accounts for the effect of competition between individual and social utilities, and that was
first applied to explore the temporal dynamics of language death and religious affiliation
as binary choice problems [1, 2]. Specifically, we propose the model
dx
dt
= b [(1− x) xaux − x (1− x)a(1− ux)] , (4.1)
where x = x(t) ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of smokers in the population (i.e., the prevalence) at
time t, ux ∈ [0, 1] is the individual utility from smoking, and the constant b > 0 determines
the timescale of the equation. The interpretation of the positive term in Eq. (4.1) is,
therefore, that non-smokers 1−x take up smoking at a rate proportional to the total utility
derived from smoking, xaux, which is the weighted product of the individual utility from
smoking ux and the social utility from interactions with other smokers x, with weighting
determined by the constant parameter a > 0. Observe that the ratio of marginal total
utility from social utility and the marginal total utility from individual utility is
d
dx
[xaux]
d
dux
[xaux]
= a
ux
x
.
Since societies with large a weigh changes in social utility more heavily than changes in
individual utility when calculating total utility, we call a the relative conformity parameter .
We therefore interpret societies with large a to be more collectivistic (or less individual-
istic) than societies with small a. The interpretation of the negative term in Eq. (4.1),
which models smoking cessation, follows analogously: smokers x cease smoking at a rate
proportional to the total utility derived from non-smoking, (1− x)a(1− ux), which is the
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weighted product of the individual utility from non-smoking uy = 1 − ux and the social
utility from interactions with other non-smokers 1−x, where we have normalized individual
utilities from smoking ux and from non-smoking uy such that ux, uy ≥ 0 and ux + uy = 1.
We note that this modelling framework is conceptually consistent with the findings pre-
sented in [88]: that personal attitudes about smoking have a stronger influence on smoking
behaviour in individualistic countries than in collectivistic countries.
Next, we observe that a combination of factors, including advances in our understanding
of the health effects of smoking and public policy initiatives designed to curb smoking,
have likely reduced individual utility from smoking (ux) over the past century. Thus, in a
significant departure from previous work that treats individual utility as a constant [1, 2],
we account for this decline in individual utility by using the cumulative number of scholarly
articles on the health effects of smoking (n(t)) as a proxy for the reduction in individual
utility over the past century. Specifically, following the principle of temporal discounting
[66], we assume that each additional article published is discounted by the factor δ ∈ (0, 1)
so that for year t
ux(t) = u∞ + δn(t) (u0 − u∞), (4.2)
where u0 and u∞ are the limiting individual utilities from smoking when there is no knowl-
edge and perfect knowledge of the adverse effects of smoking, respectively. We remark
that since individual utility should be decrease with increasing knowledge of the effects of
smoking, we expect to find u∞ < u0. Since we normalized ux, uy ≥ 0 and ux + uy = 1, this
further implies that 0 ≤ u∞ < u0 ≤ 1. Here, u0, u∞ and δ are parameters to be fitted to
observational data.
4.3 Model Analysis
We now present a brief analysis of the behaviour of the model specified by Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2).
Throughout this section we assume that a, b > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), x0 = x(t0), u0, u∞ ∈ [0, 1], and
n(t) ≥ 0 is a monotonically increasing function. Given these assumptions, we observe that
Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2) have at least two equilibria: x = 0 and x = 1.
4.3.1 Case 1: Relative conformity parameter a = 1
We start by considering the case where a = 1. In this case Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2) become
dx
dt
= b x(1− x) [2u∞ − 1 + 2δn(t) (u0 − u∞)] , (4.3)
84
a separable ordinary differential equation with solution
x(t) =
exp
(
b(2u∞ − 1)(t− t0) + 2b(u0 − u∞)
∫ t
t0
δn(τ)dτ
)
exp
(
b(2u∞ − 1)(t− t0) + 2b(u0 − u∞)
∫ t
t0
δn(τ)dτ
)
+ 1−x0
x0
.
We observe that
lim
t→∞
x(t) =

0 if u∞ < 12
x∞(x0) if u∞ = 12
1 if u∞ > 12
,
where
x∞(x0) = lim
t→∞
exp
(
2b(u0 − u∞)
∫ t
t0
δn(τ)dτ
)
exp
(
2b(u0 − u∞)
∫ t
t0
δn(τ)dτ
)
− x0−1
x0
.
4.3.2 Case 2: Relative conformity parameter a 6= 1
We next consider the case where a 6= 1. We define the function
x∗(t) =
(
ux(t)
1−ux(t)
) 1
1−a
1 +
(
ux(t)
1−ux(t)
) 1
1−a
,
where ux(t) is specified in Eq. (4.2). Next, we observe from Eq. (4.1) that
0 =
dx
dt
= b [(1− x)xaux − x(1− x)a(1− ux)] ⇐⇒ x = 0, x = 1, or x = x∗(t).
Using this information we sketch the phase diagram for Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2) in Fig. 4.3. Fig-
ure 4.3 also illustrates how Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2) might be capable of reproducing solutions
qualitatively similar to smoking prevalence profiles illustrated in Fig. 4.1. Specifically, we
observe that if a solution x(t) to Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2) has a maximum value, then that maximum
occurs at the intersection of the curves x(t) and x∗(t).
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Figure 4.3: Phase diagram for the smoking prevalence mode given by Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2). If
a solution x(t) to Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2) (dotted black lines) has a maximum, then its maximum
occurs at the intersection of the curves x(t) and x∗(t). (Left) When a < 1 we have that
x = 0 and x = 1 are unstable equilibria (dashed red lines) and the vector field points
towards x∗(t) (solid blue line). (Right) When a > 1 we have that x = 0 and x = 1 are
locally asymptotically stable equilibria (solid blue lines) and the vector field points away
from x∗(t) (dashed red line).
4.4 Methods
4.4.1 Data
We note that Eq. (4.1) subject to Eq. (4.2) requires the fitting of four parameters per
country (x0 = x(t0), a, u0, and u∞) and two parameters b and δ that we take equal for
all countries in the data set (see Section 4.4.2). We determine these parameters by fitting
them to estimated historical smoking prevalence data and proxy data on the health effects
of smoking. We summarize the methods used to obtain these data below.
Smoking Prevalence and Cigarette Consumption Data
We consider smoking prevalence x(t) ∈ [0, 1] for 24 OECD countries which we download
from the OECD iLibrary online statistical database [130] in Excel format. We also con-
sider manufactured cigarette consumption (in grams) per person per day c(t) for the same
24 OECD countries plus Romania (which is a non-OECD country) [63, 64]. When avail-
able, cigarette consumption data is downloaded directly from the International Smoking
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Statistics (Web Edition) website [63] in Excel format. Cigarette consumption data for
countries not included in the International Smoking Statistics (Web Edition) are retrieved
from the International Smoking Statistics (2nd Ed.) [64] by manually transferring these
entries into Excel. These data are summarized in Table 4.1. We make these data available
in Additional file 2 of [108], see Appendix D.1.
Unfortunately smoking prevalence data is limited to, on average, only 21.5 observations
over a period of 31.4 years spanning 1960–2012 [130]. As such, it misses much of the
crucial period in the earlier parts of the 20th century during which smoking steadily gained
popularity in many countries. However, historical national cigarette consumption data is
available for the same 24 OECD countries plus Romania for an average of 78.4 observations
over a period of 82.2 years spanning 1900-2012 [63, 64]. Since our model is specified in terms
of smoking prevalence, we estimate smoking prevalence from cigarette consumption in order
to exploit the much richer cigarette consumption data for model fitting purposes. First, we
assume a linear relationship between smoking prevalence x(t) and smoking consumption
c(t)
x(t) = Cc(t) +B. (4.4)
Next, we calculate estimates Ĉ and B̂ by regressing smoking prevalence x(t) on tobacco
consumption c(t) for all years for which both measurements are available. The results of
this regression are summarized in Table 4.2, which illustrates that the assumption that x
and c are linearly related does not hold equally well for all countries. In order to restrict
ourselves to the cases where the assumption of linearity between x and c is valid, we restrict
ourselves to the seven OECD countries with R2 ≥ 0.7, p < 0.001, and nobs ≥ 15: Australia,
Canada, France, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We
display the raw data for these seven OECD nations in Fig. 4.4. The smoking prevalence
for these seven OECD countries is then estimated from tobacco consumption using the
relationship
xˆ(t) = Ĉc(t) + B̂. (4.5)
Note that survey-based prevalence data are susceptible to noise stemming from varia-
tions in the survey methodology. In particular, prior to performing the linear regression of
x on c for France, we removed the outlier x(1960) = 0.32 since it is inconsistent with the
rest of the data for France, see Fig. 4.4(c). Specifically, the Grubbs test on x/xˆ indicates
that the 1960 data point is a significant outlier (p < 0.05). This can also be seen intu-
itively: from t = 1960 until the next measurement at t = 1965 smoking prevalence drops
from x(1960) = 0.32 to x(1965) = 0.25 (a decrease of 21.9%), while cigarette consumption
steadily increases from c(1960) = 3.6 to c(1965) = 4.1 (an increase of 13.9%). Given the
population in France in 1960 (45.5 million) and in 1965 (48.6 million) [129], this would
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Table 4.2: Result from Eq. (4.4) regression of smoking prevalence x on cigarette consump-
tion c.
Country Ĉ × 102 B̂ × 102 R2 p nobs
Australia 4.5± 1.3 −0.3± 8.8 0.80 3.2× 10−6 16
Austria 0.0± 4.9 24.2± 32.4 0.00 0.99 4
Belgium 2.6± 20.3 13.0± 81.5 0.13 0.64 4
Canada 3.5± 0.5 6.3± 3.8 0.87 3.0× 10−13 28
Denmark 0.0± 9.2 40.5± 44.4 0.00 0.99 41
Finland 2.0± 0.7 15.8± 2.8 0.55 1.0× 10−6 32
France 1.8± 0.5 19.1± 2.5 0.72 6.3× 10−7 22
Greece – – – – 0
Hungary 1.9± 1.6 17.4± 11.2 0.93 3.5× 10−2 4
Iceland 4.9± 1.2 0.9± 7.0 0.93 2.6× 10−5 9
Ireland 5.4± 1.1 −4.0± 7.4 0.93 1.7× 10−6 11
Israel – – – – –
Italy 4.8± 2.5 −0.3± 13.2 0.47 6.1× 10−4 21
Japan 1.3± 3.2 25.7± 27.2 0.02 0.43 43
Netherlands 4.8± 3.2 20.5± 15.0 0.32 4.7× 10−3 23
New Zealand 2.0± 0.3 18.8± 1.4 0.86 2.6× 10−12 27
Norway −7.2± 4.3 50.1± 10.6 0.24 1.6× 10−3 39
Poland – – – – 0
Portugal – – – – 1
Romania – – – – 0
Spain 6.0± 6.2 −7.4± 41.7 0.38 5.7× 10−2 10
Sweden 5.4± 0.6 4.3± 2.3 0.92 1.7× 10−15 27
Switzerland 2.8± 5.6 7.2± 38.6 0.69 0.17 4
United Kingdom 5.6± 0.7 1.6± 4.5 0.88 5.3× 10−18 37
United States 3.6± 0.3 −0.1± 2.3 0.95 1.1× 10−22 35
± indicates 95% confidence intervals. We report R2 values for the linear regression of x
on c, the p-value of the correlation between x and c, and the number of years for which
both x and c measurements are available, nobs.
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Figure 4.4: Raw smoking prevalence x (blue asterisks, left axis) and raw cigarette con-
sumption c (black dots, right axis) versus time. Raw cigarette consumption data is given
in grams per person per day. A single outlier for smoking prevalence (x) for the country
of France (panel c) is denoted with a red asterisk.
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correspond to an increase in the average mass of cigarettes smoked (in grams) per smoker
per day from 11.3 to 16.4 (an increase of 45.1%) over a short 5 year period. This is in
sharp contrast with the relatively stable relationship between x and c for France’s remain-
ing data points and justifies the exclusion of the outlier x(1960) = 0.32. With the outlier
removed, France satisfies our data quality requirements for inclusion in the set of seven
OECD countries (R2 ≥ 0.7, p < 0.001, and nobs ≥ 15).
Our assumption of linearity between smoking prevalence x and cigarette consumption
c is not perfect, but it appears to be satisfied at most times in countries where both data
sets are available. Quadratic or other higher order terms could be included, but additional
unknown parameters would have to be introduced and the limitations of our data set
(sparsity, noise) mean that there would be little or no improvement in the model’s fit.
Proxy Data n(t): articles published on the health effects of smoking
We calculate the cumulative number of articles published on the health effects of smoking
n(t) by performing a search of the online research database Scopus for papers with
(i) tobacco, smok*, or cigar* in the title, and
(ii) death, illness, mortality, risk*, tumour*, tumor*, or cancer in the title, and
(iii) medicine, dentistry, nursing, veterinary, health professions, or multidisciplinary in
the subject area, and
(iv) plant*, mosaic, botany, smog, fog, and soot not in the title.
Items (i)-(iii) are search terms included in order to select for papers researching the health
effects of smoking, whereas items (iv) are search terms excluded in order to prevent selection
of papers researching the tobacco mosaic virus (plant*, mosaic, botany) and the health
effects of atmospheric smoke (smog, fog, soot). This provides us with n(t) for integer t,
where time t is measured in years. We make the article data available in Additional file
3 of [108], see Appendix D.2. To calculate n(t) for non-integer and missing values of t
we use linear interpolation, see Fig. 4.5(a). Furthermore, Fig. 4.5(b) displays ux(t) from
Eq. (4.2) using n(t) calculated above for various discount factors δ and with u0 = 0.51 and
u∞ = 0.49. (For comparison, see Table 4.3 for model-fitted values of δ, u0 and u∞.)
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Figure 4.5: Articles retrieved by Scopus with search terms (i)-(iv) and individual utility
profiles from Eq. (4.2) for varying values of δ. (a) (Left axis - blue, solid) Number of
articles published per year and (right axis - black, dashed) cumulative number of articles
published n(t). (b) Discounted utility ux(t) from Eq. (4.2) with u0 = 0.51 and u∞ = 0.49,
using cumulative number of articles published n(t). (Solid black) δ = 0.4, (dashed black)
δ = 0.6, (dotted black) δ = 0.8, (solid blue) δ = 0.9, (dashed blue) δ = 0.99, (dotted blue)
δ = 0.998, and (solid red) δ = 0.9995.
4.4.2 Model Fitting
We now fit Eq. (4.1) to the estimated prevalence, xˆ(t). To reduce the dimensionality
of the optimization problem, we assume that certain universal parameters are constant
across countries. Specifically, we assume that b and δ are universal parameters, and that
xi(ti,0) = xi,0, ai, ui,0, and ui,∞ are local parameters for country i, where ti,0 is the first
year for which cigarette consumption data (c), and hence estimated smoking prevalence
data (xˆ), are available. We denote the smoking prevalence estimated above for country i
at time t by xˆi(t). The time series of estimated smoking prevalences for country i is then
denoted by the vector X̂i. Analogously, we denote the time series of smoking prevalences
predicted by Eq. (4.1) for country i by X˜i. We solve Eq. (4.1) using the Matlab differential
equation solver ode45.
Using the Matlab function lsqcurvefit we now proceed as follows:
1. Holding universal parameters constant, for each country i we find the xi,0, ai, ui,0,
and ui,∞ that minimize Ei,2 = ‖X˜i − X̂i‖22.
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2. Holding local parameters constant for each country i, we find the b and δ that mini-
mize E2 =
∑
i ‖X˜i − X̂i‖22.
3. Repeat steps (1) and (2) until either
(a) the change in the objective function E2 =
∑
i ‖X˜i− X̂i‖2 is below tolerance tol,
or
(b) the number of iterations exceeds a limit maxitn.
We perform the optimization with the initial guess ui,0 ≡ 0.51, ui,∞ ≡ 0.49, xi,0 =
xˆi(ti,0), ai = 1, b = 1, and δ = 0.9985. We also provide the optimization algorithm
lsqcurvefit with constraints
0 ≤ ai, b ≤ 2 and
0 ≤ xi,0, ui,0, ui,∞, δ ≤ 1,
and with parameters tol = 10−6 and maxitn = 150. The fitting procedure terminates after
114 iterations, the results of which are recorded in Table 4.3 and Fig. 4.6. For completeness,
Table 4.3 also records the average of the absolute value of the difference between X˜i and
Xˆi
Ei,1 =
‖X˜i − Xˆi‖1
length of Xˆi
.
Complete model simulation code is provided in Additional file 4 of [108], see Appendix
D.3.
4.5 Results: Testing the Model
We now test the model in three phases, as depicted in Fig. 4.2.
4.5.1 Phase (i): Direct test
Figure 4.1 shows the fit of our model to data sets from the United States and Sweden.
Additional fits and parameter values are displayed for our set of seven OECD countries in
Fig. 4.6 and Table 4.3. The average of the absolute value of the difference between smoking
prevalence estimates xˆ and the output of Eq. (4.1) ranges from a low of 0.005 for France
to a high of 0.018 for the United Kingdom (see Ei,1 in Table 4.3). The good agreement
that we found with all data sets provides support for the model.
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Figure 4.6: The result of fitting Eq. (4.1) to the estimated smoking prevalence xˆ. (Solid
black line) Solution to Eq. (4.1) with parameters from Table 4.3. (Blue dots) Estimated
smoking prevalence values xˆ.
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Table 4.3: The result of fitting smoking prevalence model (Eq. (4.1)) to the estimated
smoking prevalence xˆ.
Universal parameters and Total Error (E2)
b δ E2
1.049 0.9981 0.163
Country Local parameters and local error (Ei,2 and Ei,1)
(i) ai xi,0 ui,0 ui,∞ Ei,2 Ei,1
Australia 1.035 0.033 0.551 0.484 0.032 0.015
Canada 1.020 0.083 0.530 0.483 0.020 0.011
France 1.121 0.198 0.543 0.524 0.004 0.005
New Zealand 1.062 0.202 0.525 0.504 0.012 0.010
Sweden 1.076 0.077 0.555 0.503 0.015 0.009
United Kingdom 0.976 0.079 0.513 0.478 0.060 0.018
United States 0.963 0.063 0.513 0.470 0.024 0.013
4.5.2 Phase (ii): Test of model implications for relative confor-
mity parameter a
If the model and its interpretation are correct and the balance between individual and
social utility is a relevant factor for the temporal dynamics of smoking prevalence, then
we expect that the fitted “relative conformity parameter” a will be different for different
countries and will capture something meaningful about the individualism/collectivism of
a society. To test this we compare with Hofstede’s IDV, an established metric for societal
individualism [86] that has been evaluated in most countries. Panel (a) of Fig. 4.7 shows
the comparison. The relative conformity parameter a shows significant differences for dif-
ferent countries, and, as expected, a is negatively correlated with Hofstede’s IDV (negative
because a increases with collectivism while IDV decreases with it). This concordance with
independently assessed individualism values supports our model.
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Figure 4.7: Relative conformity a and average slope sx versus Hofstede’s IDV for seven
OECD countries. For both panels the line of best fit is given by a solid line. (a) Relative
conformity a is negatively correlated with IDV (ρ = −0.87, p = 0.011, best fit slope:
−5.6× 10−3). (b) The positive correlation between average slope in smoking prevalence sx
and IDV (ρ = 0.85, p = 0.015, best fit slope: 2.2×10−4) is consistent with slower change in
collectivistic societies: the average slope is greater in individualistic societies and smaller
in collectivistic societies.
4.5.3 Phase (iii): Test of model implications for slope and peak
year
Besides the correlation of a with collectivism, we note that another prediction is implicit
in model (4.1). As the relative conformity parameter increases, the model requires that
changes in smoking prevalence occur more slowly (this is true for solutions to Eq. (4.1) for
the range of a and u values corresponding to the observational data). Put another way,
societies with higher levels of individualism should experience faster changes in smoking
prevalence. Intuitively, when smoking prevalence is low the lack of existing smokers inhibits
smoking initiation more strongly in a collectivistic society than in an individualistic society.
Thus, we expect the average rate of increase in a collectivistic society to be smaller than
in an individualistic society. In contrast, when smoking prevalence is high, and once
the deleterious health effects of smoking become widely known and negatively impact
individual utility from smoking, the presence of existing smokers inhibits smoking cessation
more strongly in a collectivistic society than in an individualistic society. In both cases
collectivism acts as a break on change in the status quo (higher cultural inertia [190, 83]).
Panel (b) of Fig. 4.7 and panel (a) of Fig. 4.8 demonstrate that this is indeed the case: the
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average slope sx of the smoking prevalence curves leading up to the peak increases with
Hofstede’s IDV and decreases with a, respectively. Here we define the average slope sx to
be
sx =
xˆ(tmax)− xˆ(t0)
tmax − t0 , (4.6)
where t0 = 1920 is the first year for which smoking prevalence estimates are available in
the subset of seven OECD countries, and where tmax is the earliest year for which the
maximum tobacco consumption was recorded, see Table 4.4. Correlations are significant
(see Table 4.5).
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Figure 4.8: Average slope sx and peak year of smoking prevalence tmax versus relative
conformity parameter a. (a) Average slope sx versus relative conformity parameter a
(ρ = −0.92, p = 0.003). (b) Peak year tmax versus relative conformity parameter a
(ρ = 0.88, p = 0.009). The line of best fit is given by a solid line.
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Table 4.4: Hofstede’s Individualism Index IDV and peak year tmax.
Country Abbreviation IDV Peak year (tmax)
Australia AUS 90 1974
Austria AUT 55 1979
Belgium BEL 75 1973
Canada CAN 80 1976
Denmark DNK 74 1976
Finland FIN 63 1963
France FRA 71 1985
Greece GRE 35 1986
Hungary HUN 80 1980
Iceland ICE 60 1984
Ireland IRE 70 1974
Israel ISR 54 1974
Italy ITA 76 1984
Japan JPN 46 1977
Netherlands NLD 80 1977
New Zealand NZL 79 1975
Norway NOR 69 2004
Poland POL 60 1991
Portugal PRT 27 1994
Romania ROM 30 1995
Spain ESP 51 1985
Sweden SWE 71 1976
Switzerland CHE 68 1972
United Kingdom GBR 89 1973
United States USA 91 1963
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Table 4.5: Correlation between IDV, relative conformity a, average slope sx, and peak year
tmax.
7-country subset 25-country set
a sx tmax tmax
IDV -0.87 (0.011) 0.85 (0.015) -0.76 (0.047) -0.53 (0.006)
a – -0.92 (0.003) 0.88 (0.009) –
Correlations between IDV, a, sx, and tmax are recorded for the seven-country subset.
Correlation between IDV and tmax is recorded for the full set of 25 countries. p-values are
in parentheses. All correlations are significant at the 95% confidence level.
We note that fluctuations in the data due to either volatility in tobacco consumption
or measurement error may affect reported tmax. Smoothing of the data could be applied
prior to calculation of peak year, however, the choice of smoothing algorithm is itself arbi-
trary and unnecessarily complicates our findings without significantly altering the result.
For example, consider the seven OECD countries for which we have estimated historical
smoking prevalence data Xˆi. We observe that the model fitting procedure described in
the Methods section results in the time series X˜i, which we can consider as one possible
smoothing of the data Xˆi. In this case, the measurement for peak year does not change
substantially after smoothing for most countries (see Fig. 4.6(a)-(e)), while the measure-
ment for peak year in the USA would slightly increase from tmax = 1963 to tmax = 1967
and the measurement for peak year in the UK would slightly decrease from tmax = 1973
to tmax = 1966 (see Fig. 4.6(f)-(g)). These changes would result in no discernible net
change in the relationship between peak year and individualism, but would result in added
complexity, and hence, in a greater chance of introducing additional error1.
This reasoning further suggests that the peak year for smoking prevalence tmax should
be later in collectivistic societies and earlier in individualistic countries. As shown in
Fig. 4.9, the raw observational data are consistent with this prediction: tmax is signifi-
cantly negatively correlated with IDV (shown) and significantly positively correlated with
a (see Fig. 4.8(b)). Note that our assumption of a linear relationship between national
cigarette consumption and smoking prevalence is not needed to establish tmax, so Fig. 4.9
is independent of any model assumptions.
1Indeed, these changes would increase the statistical significance of our results, but again, we don’t
believe that they justify the additional complexity and the introduction of additional arbitrary smoothing
parameters.
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Figure 4.9: Peak year tmax in cigarette consumption versus Hofstede’s individualism index
IDV for 24 OECD countries and Romania. The negative correlation between peak year
tmax and IDV in a set of 25 countries (ρ = −0.524, p = 0.008) is consistent with slower
change in collectivistic societies: the peak year in tobacco consumption tends to occur later
in collectivistic societies and earlier in individualistic societies. The seven OECD countries
considered for the mathematical model are indicated by dots (ρ = −0.76, p = 0.047), and
the remaining 18 countries are indicated by asterisks. The line of best fit, calculated using
all 25 countries, is given by a solid line. See Table 4.4 for country abbreviations.
4.6 Application: A counterfactual scenario
In this section we illustrate the effect size of individualism/collectivism on the dynamics of
the smoking epidemic by considering a simple counterfactual scenario. Specifically, holding
all other fitted parameters constant, we consider how the smoking epidemic in the United
States might have evolved if the United States (IDV=91 and a = 0.963) were about 2%
less individualistic (IDV=89 and, using the slope from Fig. 4.7(a), a = 0.974). Fig. 4.10
plots an estimate for the number of cigarettes smoked per year (in trillions) versus time.
Integrating the difference between the number of cigarettes smoked per year versus time
for the United States with fitted (a = 0.963, solid line) and counterfactual (a = 0.974,
dashed line) relative conformity implies that, according to our model, if the United States
had 2% lower individualism during the 90 year period from 1920–2010 then there would
have been approximately 7 × 1012 fewer cigarettes smoked. This is equivalent to a 16%
decrease in the number of cigarettes smoked.
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Figure 4.10: Solution to Eq. (4.1) for the United States with a = 0.963 (solid) and a = 0.974
(dashed). Parameters x0, b, u0, u∞, and δ are as reported for the United States in Table 4.3.
The number of cigarettes smoked per year is estimated as follows. First, we observe
that for year t the number of cigarettes smoked per smoker per day is2 Cd(t) = c(t)/x(t).
Therefore, using Eq. (4.5) we find that the number of cigarettes smoked per smoker per
year Ca(t) = 365 × Cd(t) can be bounded. For example, in the case of the United States,
where Bˆ < 0, we find that Ca(t) is bounded by
1.02× 104 = 365× Cˆ−1 × 365 days
year
≤ Ca(t) = 1− Bˆ/xˆ(t)
Cˆ
× 365 days
year
≤ 1− Bˆ/min xˆ(t)
Cˆ
× 365 days
year
= 1.04× 104.
Since the lower and upper bounds are relatively tight, we estimate the number of cigarettes
smoked per smoker per year to be the average of the lower and upper bounds
C¯a ≈ 2− Bˆ/min xˆ(t)
2Cˆ
× 365 days
year
≈ 1.0× 104.
We cross-check this estimate with the direct estimate of C¯a taken by averaging c(t)/x(t) for
all times where both measurements are available in the raw data (data shown in Fig. 4.6).
2Assuming 1.002 cigarettes per gram, as in [63, 64].
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These two estimates agree to two significant figures. Finally, we estimate the number of
cigarettes smoked per year to be
xˆ(t)×Npop(t)× C¯a,
where Npop(t) is the total population at time t. The total population for the United States
is taken from US census estimates [146, 147] and is given in Additional file 5 of [108], see
Appendix D.4.
We emphasize that in the counterfactual scenario described above we have only changed
a for the United States while keeping all other fitted parameters constant, merely to il-
lustrate that the effect of small changes in a in the model can be large. Therefore, the
broad variation in the fitted a across countries, as illustrated in Fig. 4.7(a), can indeed
be expected to lead to a large effect size on cigarette consumption. Note, however, that
the results from this counterfactual scenario do not imply that less individualism auto-
matically means lower cigarette consumption, since countries with lower IDV (higher a)
than the United States also tend to differ for other fitted parameters and quantities in the
model, resulting in substantially different solutions to Eq. (4.1).
4.7 Discussion
Before discussing the limitations of our model, it is worth discussing the potential effect
of confounding variables on our model. Specifically, we argue that the effect of confound-
ing variables on our results are limited, since most potential candidates for confounding
variables are actually accounted for implicitly in our modelling framework. Consider, for
example, two possible candidates for confounding variables: the wealth (per capita GDP)
and the strength of tobacco control policies in each country. Specifically, consider the trend
in Fig. 4.9 where wealthier countries have, on average, earlier peak year in tobacco con-
sumption (tmax). This relationship is easily explained by our model, since (a) our model
predicts a negative correlation between peak year and Hofstede’s IDV and (b) IDV and
wealth (per capita GDP) are highly positively correlated [86]. An alternative explanation
for wealthier nations having earlier peak year, however, would be that individuals who
are more wealthy are better able to afford cigarettes and, in aggregate, are better able
to implement strong anti-tobacco policies: in theory, the former would lead to a more
rapid increase in smoking prevalence and the latter would lead to a more rapid decline in
smoking prevalence. Although this alternative explanation might seem to be in competi-
tion with our model, we argue that it is in fact accounted for implicitly in our modelling
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framework: both wealth and the strength of tobacco control policies are contributing fac-
tors to individual utility from smoking. Furthermore, we note that although the precise
timing of anti-tobacco policies is not included in the model, it is reasonable to assume that
these initiatives are implemented more frequently and more intensely as the health effects
of smoking are better understood - a phenomenon which is modelled using Eq. (4.2) and
proxy data on smoking related publications. In summary, since most potential confound-
ing variables are actually accounted for in, and not in competition with, our modelling
framework, the exposure of our results to the effects of confounding variables is limited.
Despite the good match between model predictions and data, a number of limitations
remain. First, due to limitations in the quantity and quality of the available smoking preva-
lence and tobacco consumption data, we are only able to fit the parameters in our model
to seven countries, all of which have advanced/developed economies. There is no a priori
reason to believe that, given adequate sources of data, our model would not generalize to
less developed countries with lower income. Indeed, Fig. 4.9 supports the position that the
behaviour in less developed countries is consistent with our mathematical model. Never-
theless, our inability to directly apply our model to a larger set of more diverse countries
due to a lack of good data remains a limitation of our work and an area open to future
research. Second, we have made an implicit “mean-field” approximation in taking social
utility to be a function of the overall smoking prevalence x, rather than the local smoking
prevalence among contacts in an individual’s social network. Similarly, we have taken in-
dividual utility to be uniform across the population (though not in time), whereas a more
detailed model might allow for variation with, e.g., gender, age and income. We note,
however, that the success of our model in reproducing the trends in smoking prevalence
in a manner consistent with its interpretation in the context of individualism/collectivism,
despite these limitations, is generally supportive of the modelling framework we have de-
veloped. In particular, our results and the data indicate that, when averaging over gender,
age and income in a country, a strong net influence remains from societal individualism on
the aggregate temporal dynamics of smoking prevalence. Furthermore, if the mechanism in
our model did not reflect the reality of the decision-making process for smoking then, even
if it still somehow managed to fit the smoking prevalence data, we would not expect to
simultaneously find correlation of (a) the relative conformity parameter a with Hofstede’s
individualism measure IDV (Fig. 4.7(a)), (b) average slope sx with IDV (Fig. 4.7(b)), and
(c) peak year tmax with IDV (Fig. 4.9). Moreover, we would not expect that the sign of
these correlations would be consistent with the predictions of the model.
Our findings suggest that the correlation of individualism with faster societal change
(as a consequence of a sudden change in personal utility) results from a causative influence
as predicted by our model. As already mentioned, other factors such as income levels
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also correlate with individualism. We certainly cannot exclude that there may be other
causative factors. For example, our model in its current form is incapable of explaining
differences in smoking prevalence between genders and why these inter-gender differences
vary between countries [133, 134]. Nevertheless, we remark that many previously pro-
posed causative factors for differences in observed inter-country smoking dynamics can be
accounted for within our modelling framework. In particular, beliefs about the harmful
effects of smoking [45], the price of cigarettes [67], socioeconomic status and inequality
[13, 91], and government regulation [171, 127, 96] have all been cited as potential factors
affecting the differences observed in inter-country smoking dynamics. Each of these fac-
tors can be interpreted within our modelling framework. For example, beliefs about the
harmful effects of smoking, as well as the price of cigarettes, both likely contribute directly
to individual utility derived from smoking (ux) and from non-smoking (uy). Moreover,
socioeconomic status may affect individual utility from smoking indirectly by affecting an
individual’s tolerance for risk and/or how they discount future rewards and costs (i.e. how
they discount their future health status) [76]. Addressing the model’s inability to account
for gender differences in smoking prevalence and explicitly quantifying the relationship be-
tween other causative factors and model parameters in more elaborate models are potential
areas for future work.
4.8 Conclusion
Despite the above mentioned limitations, the quantitative mathematical model proposed in
this chapter, which we derived from basic principles well-documented in the sociology and
social psychology literature, appears to match real-world smoking prevalence data from a
variety of countries well (to our knowledge, the largest historical data set of this type ever
compiled), and all predictions of the model appear to be supported by the data. Indeed,
we emphasize the strong support of the model by the data, since the model was calibrated
(in Phase (i)) and its predictions were tested (in Phases (ii)-(iii)) using two separate data
sets (tobacco use data and Hofstede’s IDV, respectively). In particular, the model predicts
that the level of individualism or collectivism of a society may significantly affect the
temporal dynamics of smoking prevalence: the strong influence of the individual utility of
smoking (and its decrease due to increased awareness of adverse health effects) is predicted
to lead to faster adoption and cessation of smoking in individualistic societies than in more
collectivistic societies. The significance of this effect can be illustrated by considering the
counterfactual scenario of how the smoking prevalence might have evolved in the United
States had the United States been less individualistic. Specifically, we estimate that a
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reduction in the IDV of the United States of 2% would have resulted in a 16% decrease in
the total number of cigarettes smoked between 1920 and 2010, see Section 4.6.
It has previously been argued that social support mechanisms in collectivistic societies
make it more likely that a person will stop smoking [166, 174] based on findings that social
support (supportive counselors) can help people to adhere to decisions to quit smoking
[94]. In contrast to this behaviour at the individual level, we find that aggregate smoking
prevalence decreases more slowly in collectivistic societies. Since the aggregate smoking
prevalence is a function of both smoking adoption and cessation, our model suggests that
this may be so because social inertia/peer pressure will either inhibit the decision to stop
smoking, or encourage the decision to start smoking, more strongly in collectivistic societies
than in individualistic societies.
These results suggest that it may be effective to consider culture-dependent strategies
for combating the ongoing smoking epidemic. For example, interventions to discourage
smoking can be tailored differently in societies or social groups whose cultures differ in
how they value individualism versus collectivism [142]. Specifically, consider how the goal
of many tobacco control policies is to reduce the individual utility from smoking, often by
increasing the cost of cigarettes through sin taxes or by requiring warnings on cigarette
packages illustrating the danger of smoking to health. Our results suggest that these tac-
tics will be more successful in individualistic societies and less successful in collectivistic
societies. In contrast, tactics that may be more successful in collectivistic societies might
focus on social dangers resulting from smoking, for example by emphasizing the association
between smoking and low social status [13, 91], or emphasizing the large number of indi-
viduals who have already quit. More broadly, these results demonstrate that differences
in culture can measurably affect the dynamics of a social spreading process, and that a
mathematical model can help to illuminate this phenomenon. We welcome future work
comparing a variety of social contagion phenomena across societies. Our model suggests
that the increased cultural inertia in collectivistic societies may potentially lead to slower
change across a wide spectrum of spreading processes (those where important changes
occur in personal utility), a hypothesis that could be supported or rejected by further
study.
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Chapter 5
Modelling the Dynamics of the Body
Mass Index (BMI) at the Individual
and Population Levels: Evidence for
the social spread of obesity
5.1 Introduction
Over the past 35 years there has been a near doubling in the worldwide prevalence of
obesity [60, 131]. This drastic increase is of major concern: obesity is a risk factor for
many chronic illnesses [56, 112] and therefore is responsible for significant economic costs
both directly (e.g., through increased healthcare expenses) [30, 58] and indirectly (e.g.,
through loss of productivity) [74, 175].
The body mass index (BMI), defined as the mass (in kilograms) divided by the height
squared (in meters2), is a standard measure of relative body weight used to classify in-
dividuals as underweight (BMI ≤ 18.5), normal weight (18.5 < BMI ≤ 25), overweight
(25 < BMI ≤ 30), or obese (BMI > 30)1 [49]. Because the risks from being overweight or
obese increase as BMI increases [8, 17, 143], a significant amount of research has been done
on the distribution of BMIs in the population [62, 123, 140, 141, 155, 160, 164]. These
studies have found that the distribution of BMIs in various populations are right-skewed
1Obesity is further subdivided into moderately obese (obesity class I: 30 < BMI ≤ 35), severely obese
(obesity class II: 35 < BMI ≤ 40), and very severely obese (obesity class III: BMI > 40).
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(see Fig. 5.1 for an example), and that the observed increase in obesity prevalence over
time can be explained by an increase in the right-skewness of the BMI distribution and
by an overall rightward shift of the BMI distribution, with many authors arguing for in-
creased right-skewness as the primary cause of the increase in the prevalence of obesity
[62, 140, 141, 160, 164]. These findings have significant implications for public health
intervention policies: if the primary cause of increased obesity prevalence is increased
right-skewness then intervention strategies targeting the entire population may not be as
effective as strategies that target the most overweight individuals (i.e., the right tail of the
BMI distribution), and vice versa [3, 141, 154, 193].
Although there has been speculation as to why the BMI distribution is right skewed
[168], a mechanistic explanation for this phenomenon that links the behaviour of individuals
to the right-skewness of the distribution has yet to be proposed. Specifically, while it has
been observed that the distribution of BMIs in a population is approximately log-normal
[141], explanations for the shape of this distribution are mostly conceptual. For example,
consider the “runaway train” argument [168] which posits that there are multiple forces
inducing weight gain that positively reinforce each other (e.g. weight gain may result
in/from difficulty participating in physical activity, increased caloric intake due to low
self-esteem or body dissatisfaction, and increased exposure to obesogenic environments,
etc...) and only very weak forces opposing weight gain (e.g. social discrimination, physical
discomfort, reduction in appetite, and insulin resistance, etc...). Thus, individuals are
susceptible to a positive feedback loop that is responsible for large amounts of weight
gain. The “runaway train” argument is an intuitively appealing explanation for the right-
skewness of the BMI distribution, under the additional assumption that not all individuals
are equally susceptible to the “runaway train” phenomenon2.
Despite the increasing interest in studying how the distribution of BMIs changes over
time, we remark that there is no established standard approach for comparing two differ-
ent BMI distributions [62]. Most common approaches are graphical [61, 62], for example,
plotting the BMI distribution functions, plotting the cumulative BMI distribution func-
tions, or generating a Tukey mean-difference plot3. While these techniques are useful, they
unfortunately suffer from significant limitations. In particular, these methods are only ca-
pable of qualitatively describing changes in BMI distributions, they may not detect subtle
2It is conceivable that if all individuals were equally susceptible to the “runaway train” phenomenon
then the result would be a rightward shift of the overall distribution with little, if any, increase in right-
skewness.
3In the Tukey mean-difference plot the difference in values of a particular percentile is plotted against
the mean in values of that same percentile. For example if the 50th percentile of BMI distribution A is 25
and the 50th percentile of the BMI distribution B is 28 then this results in a data point with coordinates
(26.5, -3), since 0.5(25 + 28) = 26.5 and since 25− 28 = −3.
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changes in BMI distributions, and may be difficult to apply when comparing many BMI
distributions simultaneously.
In addition to investigations on the shape of the BMI distribution, a significant amount
of research has also been done to identify major contributing factors to the obesity epidemic,
for example see the “Foresight Obesity Map” [24]. These can roughly be divided into factors
intrinsic to the individual (e.g., energy consumption, activity level, age, gender, ethnicity,
education, socioeconomic status, environment, etc...) [93, 125, 160, 164, 169, 170, 189]
and extrinsic factors (e.g., social/peer influences [39, 145, 176, 182], or microbial influences
[178], etc...). Although the effects of intrinsic factors have been well established, there
is some uncertainty over the importance of external factors, especially social and peer
influences [41].
In this chapter we present a mechanistic mathematical model for BMI dynamics with
implications at both the population (macro) and individual (micro) level that is consistent
with three independent sources of BMI data. Our model makes two main contributions
at the macro-level. First, our model predicts a functional form for the BMI distribution
that fits empirical data better than two standard distribution functions commonly used to
describe right-skewed data (i.e. the log-normal and skew-normal distributions). Second,
our model proposes a potential mechanistic explanation for the right-skewness of the BMI
distribution. In addition, we remark that the parameters of our model relate the behaviour
of individuals to the mean, standard deviation, and skewness of the BMI distribution in a
straightforward way, and therefore, allows for the comparison between BMI distributions
from different years or different regions in a consistent manner. For example, in contrast
to the graphic techniques described above, our model allows us to disentangle the effect of
(a) overall rightward shift of the BMI distribution and (b) increased right skewness of the
BMI distribution on the observed increase in the prevalence of obesity over the past three
decades. Our model also makes a significant contribution at the micro-level. Specifically,
our model predicts a functional form for both the average and standard deviation of year-
over-year change of individuals’ BMI, which we verify by fitting to empirical data. At both
the individual and population levels our model allows us to investigate the role of social
and peer influences in BMI dynamics, and provides additional evidence in support of the
hypothesis that social effects make a contribution to BMI dynamics.
We note that our work differs from previous statistical studies [39, 145, 176, 182] that
investigate the role of social and peer influences in that we propose a mechanism through
which social and peer influences can affect dynamics of the BMI, and differs from previ-
ous compartmental [48, 185] and network [11, 73] mathematical models in that our model
closely replicates BMI data from three independent data sets at both the macro- and
micro-level. Interestingly, while the “runaway train” phenomenon may indeed be an im-
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portant driver of individuals’ weight gain, our model illustrates that this phenomenon is
not necessary to explain the right skewness of the BMI distribution.
Finally, as part of the above studies, we compile and present analysis of an entirely new
BMI data set more abundant than any previously reported. BMI measurements calculated
from anonymized medical records for patients of the Northwestern Medicine system of
hospitals and clinics are available from 1997 through 2014. Although this data does not
form a representative sample of the population, it is nevertheless extremely valuable since
it represents the largest known collection of BMI panel data. Specifically, the Northwestern
Medicine medical record data set contains measurements for 329,543 distinct individuals
whose year-over-year change in BMI can be calculated (1,017,518 data points in total).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We specify our mathematical
model for the dynamics of individuals’ BMI in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 then introduces
three BMI data sets that will be used to calibrate and test our model: the National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), the Northwestern Medicine medical
records data set (NU), and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The
population and individual level implications of our model are outlined in Section 5.4, and
we test these implications in Section 5.5 by comparing to the NHANES, Northwestern
Medicine, and BRFSS data sets. Section 5.6 then concludes with a brief discussion.
5.2 Model Specification
The specification of our model for the dynamics of individuals’ BMI proceeds in two stages.
In Section 5.2.1 we specify the deterministic component of our model, which models the
deliberate actions taken by individuals in order to modify their BMI. In Section 5.2.2
we specify the stochastic component of our model, which models random fluctuations in
individuals’ lifestyle (e.g. calorie consumption and activity level) that affect the dynamics
of their BMI.
5.2.1 Deterministic Component of BMI dynamics
Intrinsic Dynamics
A model for a contagion process can be divided into two key components: intrinsic dy-
namics (self) and extrinsic dynamics (interaction with others) [1, 2, 108]. The intrinsic
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dynamics of weight change in healthy adults are thought to follow a “return to equilib-
rium” pattern where, absent social effects, individuals tend to fluctuate about a natural
equilibrium, or “setpoint” [25, 65, 80, 81, 97, 163]. This setpoint weight may depend upon
many factors including genetics, average exercise and eating habits, etc... Though the
setpoint may vary gradually over the course of an individual’s life, we approximate it as a
constant on the shorter time scale over which our model applies.
We start with a simple deterministic model for the intrinsic dynamics by assuming
exponential decay to equilibrium as
dx
dt
= k1(x
? − x) , (5.1)
where x = x(t) represents the BMI of an individual at time t, x? (Setpoint) represents
the individual’s BMI setpoint, and the constant k1 > 0 determines the rate of exponential
relaxation to equilibrium weight (note that we assume constant height in adults over time,
so changes in BMI—defined as the ratio of weight to height squared—are proportional to
weight changes). We will later add stochastic noise terms to account for natural fluctuations
in lifestyle, see Section 5.2.2.
Another way to deduce this same model for intrinsic dynamics is to assume that indi-
viduals tend to maximize some individual utility function uI(x) = uI(x;x
?). This function
could in general have a complicated shape, but by assumption must be peaked at x = x?,
i.e., by assumption uI(x) must have a local maximum at x = x
?. Assuming that this utility
function is smooth, the Taylor series expansion around x = x? is
uI(x) = uI(x
?) + u′I(x
?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(x− x?) + 1
2
u′′I (x
?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(x− x?)2 + . . . , (5.2)
where u′I(x
?) = 0 and u′′I (x
?) < 0 because we have assumed uI(x) is peaked at x = x
?. Note
that in what follows we set the additive constant uI(x
?) to zero for convenience, without
loss of generality. We assume that an individual changes their BMI in such a way as to
increase his or her utility. A further mild assumption is that the rate of change of BMI
will be proportional to the rate of increase of utility, or
dx
dt
= k2
duI
dx
, (5.3)
leading to the same intrinsic dynamics as model (5.1) when the Taylor series is truncated
at quadratic order (the lowest order that gives nontrivial dynamics)4.
4In this case, Equations (5.1) and (5.3) are identical when k1 = −k2u′′I (x?).
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Extrinsic Factors
The extrinsic dynamics of weight change are more difficult to model. Some theories suggests
that individuals can become accustomed to the average BMI of peers under exposure to
different peer environments [167] and, to reduce disparity, may adjust their weights. We
assume that there exists some social utility function uS(x) = uS(x;xpeer) which captures
this proposed peer-influence phenomenon: the social utility should peak when an individual
reaches the same BMI as his or her peer(s), xpeer. Similarly to the intrinsic dynamics, we
expect this utility to be well approximated by a quadratic function (at least locally) and
therefore propose that for a single neighbour the social utility function takes the form
vS(x;xpeer) =
1
2
v′′S(xpeer;xpeer) (xpeer − x)2 ,
where xpeer is the BMI of some peer who influences the individual under consideration, and
where we assume that v′′S(xpeer;xpeer) < 0 is a constant. When multiple peers simultane-
ously influence an individual, the net social utility for individual i becomes
uS(xi) = uS(xi; ~x) =
N∑
j=1
AijvS(xi;xj) =
1
2
v′′S(xj;xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v′′S(xpeer;xpeer)
N∑
j=1
Aij(xj − xi)2 ,
where xi is the BMI of individual i, N is the number of individuals in the population,
~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN)
T , and Aij represents the strength of social influence of individual j on
individual i.
Combining both the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the proposed social contagion
process, we propose the following net utility for individual i:
u(xi) = cI uI(xi) + cS uS(xi) (5.4)
=
1
2
cI u
′′
I (x
?;x?) (x? − xi)2 + 1
2
cS v
′′
S(xpeer;xpeer)
N∑
j=1
Aij(xj − xi)2 ,
where the constants cI and cS set the relative importance of individual versus social factors.
Thus, using the same logic as in Eq. (5.3) above, we find the model for the deterministic
dynamical system is given by dxi/dt ∝ du/dxi, i.e.,
dxi
dt
= kI(x
? − xi) + kS
N∑
j=1
[
Aij(xj − xi)− 1
2
∂Aij
∂xi
(xj − xi)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=aN (xi;~x)
, (5.5)
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where we denote kI > 0 and kS > 0. In order to specify Aij we assume that individuals
interact most strongly with others who are most similar to themselves, i.e. individuals
with similar BMI interact more strongly than individuals with different BMI [33, 44, 121].
Consistent with this assumption, we choose
Aij = A(xi, xj) =
1
N
φxi,σ (xj) , (5.6)
where N is the population size, σ > 0 is a fixed parameter, and φµ,σ(x) is the probability
density function of a normal random variable with mean µ and standard deviation σ
evaluated at x. This has the effect of imposing stronger interaction among more similar
individuals.
5.2.2 Stochastic Component of BMI dynamics
To account for the natural variation of individuals’ BMI over relatively short time scales,
e.g. due to fluctuations in diet and activity level, we append a noise term to Eq. (5.5),
yielding the following stochastic differential equation model.
dxi
dt
= aN(xi; ~x) + ξ (xi, t) , (5.7)
where aN(xi; ~x) is the right-hand-side of Eq. (5.5), ξ(xi, t) is a stochastic random variable,
and where the stochastic differential equation is specified according to the Itoˆ interpreta-
tion. In order to simplify our model, we assume the separable form
ξ(xi, t) = b(xi)η(t) ,
where η(t) represents Gaussian white noise, i.e., 〈η(t)〉 = 0 and 〈η(t)η(t˜)〉 = δ(t− t˜), and
where b(xi) is a deterministic function of xi. Substituting this assumption into Eq. (5.7)
yields the Langevin equation
dxi
dt
= aN(xi; ~x) + b(xi)η(t) . (5.8)
We assume that each individual i behaves according to their own Langevin equation of the
form given in Eq. (5.8), resulting in a system of coupled stochastic differential equations for
finite populations, i.e. for N < ∞. However, although each individual behaves according
to their own Langevin equation we note that in the limit of large population size, i.e.
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as N → ∞, each individual Langevin equation (5.8) can be approximated by a single
Langevin equation, i.e. by
dxi
dt
= a(xi) + b(xi)η(t) , (5.9)
where
a(xi) = kI(x
? − xi) + lim
N→∞
aN(xi; ~x)
= kI(x
? − xi) + kS lim
N→∞
N∑
j=1
[
Aij(xj − xi)− 1
2
∂Aij
∂xi
(xj − xi)2
]
= kI(x
? − xi) + kS
∫ ∞
0
[
φxi,σ(xj) (xj − xi)−
1
2
∂φxi,σ(xj)
∂xi
(xj − xi)2
]
p(xj; t)dxj
(5.10)
and where p(x, t) is the probability density function for BMI x at time t. In the limit of
large population size the dynamics of individual i’s BMI (xi) is independent of the BMI of
any other single individual in the population. In other words, the contribution of the BMI
of individual j 6= i (xj) to the dynamics of individual i’s BMI (xi) is null, i.e. a(xi) really
is a function of only a single variable (xi) and does not depend on any other single xj (for
j 6= i). Because in the limit of large population size each individual behaves identically
according to a single Langevin equation, i.e. to Eq. (5.9), we can approximate the dynamics
of the BMI density p(x; t) by the following advection-diffusion equation (also known as a
Fokker-Planck equation) [68].
∂p
∂t
(x, t) = − ∂
∂x
[p(x, t)a(x)] +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[p(x, t)b2(x)] , (5.11)
where we have dropped the subscript i for convenience of notation, a(x) (see Eq. (5.10))
is called the advection term, and b(x) is called the diffusion term. In order to fully specify
the model, it remains to determine a functional form for b(x). Before doing so, however,
it is useful to review the physical interpretation of a(x) and b(x) in Eqs. (5.9) and (5.11).
The advection term a(x) in the Langevin equation (5.9) represents a deterministic
force acting on an individual’s BMI. In the context of our model, this force is a result of an
individual’s desire to adjust their BMI in order to maximize their utility. In the absence
of the diffusive term, i.e. when b(x) ≡ 0, the Langevin equation (5.9) implies that each
individual’s BMI will converge to the root of a(x). Analogously, in the absence of the
diffusive term, the advection-diffusion equation (5.11) implies that the probability density
function for BMI will converge pointwise to Dirac’s delta function centred at the root of
a(x).
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The diffusion term b(x) in the Langevin equation represents random noise acting on
an individual’s BMI. In the context of our model, this noise is a result of shocks to the
individual that interfere with the planned trajectory towards their ideal weight. In the
absence of the advective term, i.e. when a(x) ≡ 0, the Langevin equation (5.9) implies
that each individual’s BMI will resemble a random walk, i.e. a Wiener process or Brownian
motion. Analogously, in the absence of the advective term the advection-diffusion equation
(5.11) implies that the probability density function for BMI will spread out with diverging
variance, eventually converging pointwise to the zero function.
When both advection and diffusion terms are present, the equilibrium BMI distribution
peq(x), which is the solution to
0 = − ∂
∂x
[peq(x)a(x)] +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[peq(x)b
2(x)] , (5.12)
results from the balance between the advection and diffusion terms, i.e. between a(x) and
b(x), respectively. Specifically, advection acts to concentrate the distribution around the
root of a(x), and diffusion acts to spread out the distribution.
In addition to the discussion above, we can also understand the role of the advection
and diffusion terms in the Langevin equation, i.e. Eq. (5.9), as follows. Let W (t) denote a
Wiener process defined by dW (t) = η(t)dt. Writing Eq. (5.9) in terms of differentials, we
find
dx = a(x)dt+ b(x)η(t)dt = a(x)dt+ b(x)dW .
Then conditioning on the initial BMI yields
mean(dx) = E [dx] = E [a(x)dt] + E [b(x)dW ] = a(x)dt, (5.13)
variance(dx) = E
[
dx2
]− E [dx]2
= E
[
a2(x)dt2
]
+ 2E [a(x)b(x)dWdt] + E
[
b(x)2dW 2
]− (a(x)dt)2
= b(x)2dt , (5.14)
since E [dW ] = 0 and E [dW 2] = dt. It follows that, on average, change in individuals’ BMI
follows the advective term a(x), and the variance in the change in individuals’ BMI follows
b2(x). Equivalently, we expect the standard deviation of individual i’s BMI to scale with
b(xi)
√
dt.
Consistent with data [81], we make the simplifying assumption that fluctuations in an
individual’s BMI are of roughly constant magnitude when measured as a percentage of
their current BMI. We therefore take
b(x) =
√
kb x , (5.15)
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where kb > 0 is a constant parameter, so that the standard deviation is proportional to
the current BMI.
The mathematical model presented above has implications at both the population
(macro) and individual (micro) levels which we detail fully in Section 5.4. In Section 5.4.1
we outline the population level implications of our model, which follow from solving
Eq. (5.12) for the equilibrium BMI distribution peq(x). In Section 5.4.2 we outline the
individual level implications of our model, which follow from Eqs. (5.13) and (5.14). How-
ever, since all of the implications discussed in Section 5.4 are tested against empirical BMI
data, we briefly summarize the BMI data used in this study in the following section.
5.3 Data
In order to calibrate the model developed in the previous section we require two different
types of BMI data. At the population level we consider the empirical BMI distribution,
modelled by the solution to Eq. (5.12). We can compute empirical BMI distributions from
three independently collected data sets: the National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES), medical records for patients of the Northwestern Medicine system of
hospitals and clinics (NU), and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).
At the individual level we consider the average and standard deviation in year-over-year
change in individuals’ BMI, see Eqs. (5.13) and (5.14), respectively. We can compute the
year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI from two independently collected data sets: the
NHANES and NU data sets. We briefly describe the NHANES, NU, and BRFSS data sets
briefly below.
5.3.1 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) refers to a series
of studies designed to collect a representative sample of health and nutrition data for
both adults and children (approximately 5,000 individuals total per year) in the United
States [32]. NHANES data are available for survey years 1999-2000, 2001-2002, . . . , 2011-
2012. Directly measured BMI data are available from measurements taken during a physical
exam. These data are used to compute empirical BMI distributions for each survey year.
In addition, during an interview individuals were asked to self-report their current weight
and height, as well as their weight from the preceding year. These measurements allow us
to calculate self-reported change in BMI over the year preceding the interview. Note: we
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only use NHANES data for individuals 18 years or older at the time of the survey. For
additional information, see Appendix E.1.1.
5.3.2 Northwestern Medicine Medical Records
The Northwestern Medicine (NU) data set consists of medical records for patients of the
Northwestern Medicine system of hospitals and clinics. Anonymized medical records were
available for 750,081 distinct patients from 1997 through 2014, with the majority of records
coming from later years. We calculate a total of 2,056,400 BMI data points from weight
and height data for individuals in this data set that are at least 18 years of age or older.
We use these data to compute the empirical BMI distribution for each year. In addition,
we are able to calculate the year-over-year change in BMI for all individuals with patient
records in consecutive years. We emphasize that this data set provides the most abundant
source of individual level data (comprising a total of 1,017,518 data points for year-over-
year change in individuals’ BMI from 329,543 distinct individuals). Thus, although these
data do not form a representative sample (since they are comprised of medical records),
they are nevertheless extremely valuable since they represents the largest data set of its
type. For additional details, see Appendix E.1.2.
5.3.3 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) refers to a series of telephone
surveys designed to collect a representative sample of health data for adults (aged 18 years
or older) in the United States [31]. BRFSS data are available for survey years 1984, 1985,
. . . , 2013. We note that prior to 2011 BRFSS surveys were conducted over land lines only,
whereas from 2011 onward BRFSS methodology has been modified to include cell phones as
well. We also note that many states did not participate in early BRFSS surveys. Therefore,
for the purposes of this study we only consider surveys from 1987 (the first year where a
majority of states participated in the BRFSS) onwards. The number of individual records
for each BRFSS survey increases from approximately 50,000 in 1987, to approximately
135,000 in 1997, to more than 400,000 from 2007 onward. For each BRFSS survey we
extract the BMI of each individual surveyed and use this data to compute the empirical
BMI for that year. We note that since these data are gathered using telephone interviews,
the weight and height measurements (used in calculating BMI) are all self-reported, in
contrast to the NHANES and NU data sets. Also in contrast to NHANES and NU data
sets, the BRFSS data does not provide sufficient data for us to compute the year-over-year
change in individuals’ BMI. For additional details, see Appendix E.1.3.
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5.4 Methods for Testing Model Implications
We now detail the implications of our model at the population and individual levels. Specif-
ically, at the population level our model predicts that the BMI distribution can be approx-
imated by the solution to Eq. (5.12) (see Section 5.4.1), whereas at the individual level
our model predicts that the mean and variance of the year-over-year change in individuals’
BMI should follow Eqs. (5.13) and (5.14) (see Section 5.4.2).
5.4.1 Methods for Population-level Model Implications
Given a(·) and b(·) as in Eqs. (5.10) and (5.15) and under the additional assumption that
kS = 0 in Eq. (5.10), i.e. that social interactions between individuals have no effect on the
dynamics of individuals’ BMI, solving Eq. (5.12) yields the following distribution
p(0)eq (x) = p
(0)
eq (x; kI/kb, x
?) ∝ x−2(kI/kb+1) exp
(
−2kI
kb
x?
x
)
. (5.16)
We note that since p
(0)
eq (x) ∼ x2−(kI/kb+1) as x → ∞, p(0)eq (x) is a scale-free (or power law)
distribution. The mean, mode, variance5, skewness, and mode skewness of this distribu-
tion can be expressed in terms of x? and k0 = kI/kb and are recorded in Table 5.1, see
Appendix E.2.1 for detailed calculations. In contrast, when we assume that kS > 0 in
Eq. (5.10), i.e. that social interactions between individuals do have an effect on the dy-
namics of individual BMIs (through the interaction kernel Aij as specified in Eq. (5.6)),
there is no closed form solution to Eq. (5.12). Instead, for kS > 0 the solution to Eq. (5.12),
which we denote by peq(x) = peq(x; kI/kb, x
?, kS/kb, σ), must be calculated numerically, see
Appendix E.2.2.
Next, suppose that the parameters of the Fokker-Planck equation were constant. In
this case, the distribution function p(x, t) will converge asymptotically to the equilibrium
distribution, i.e. to p
(0)
eq (x; kI/kb, x
?) when kS = 0 or peq(x; kI/kb, x
?, kS/kb, σ) when kS > 0.
Next, suppose that the parameters of the Fokker-Planck equation have their own dynam-
ics. In this case, the functions p
(0)
eq (x; kI/kb, x
?) and peq(x; kI/kb, x
?, kS/kb, σ) are not truly
equilibrium distributions (since the parameters kI/kb, x
?, kS/kb, and σ are not constant).
Nevertheless, if we assume that changes in the parameters occur over a much slower time
scale than the dynamics of individuals’ BMI, then it follows that the BMI distribution
5We note that in order for the variance to be non-negative we require that 2k0−1 > 0. This is condition
is satisfied in all the empirical BMI distributions considered in this study.
117
Table 5.1: Properties of the equilibrium distribution function for the non-social model
p
(0)
eq (x; k0, x
?) (Eq. (5.16))
Property Value
Mean x?
Mode k0x
?/(k0 + 1)
Variance5 x?2/(2k0 − 1)
Skewness 2
√
2k0 − 1/(k0 − 1)
Mode Skewness
√
2k0 − 1(k0 + 1)
should be well approximated by p
(0)
eq (x; kI/kb, x
?) when kS = 0, i.e. when we assume that
social interactions between individuals do not have an effect on the dynamics of individual
BMIs, and by peq(x; kI/kb, x
?, kS/kb, σ) when kS > 0, i.e. when we assume that social in-
teractions between individuals do have an effect on the dynamics of individual BMIs. We
compare the ability of p
(0)
eq (x; kI/kb, x
?) and peq(x; kI/kb, x
?, kS/kb, σ) to fit empirical BMI
distributions to each other, and to two other candidate distribution functions commonly
used to describe right-skewed data: the log-normal probability distribution function
flog(x;µ, σ) =
1
x
√
2piσ2
exp
[
−(log x− µ)
2
2σ2
]
, (5.17)
and the skew-normal probability distribution function
fskew(x; ξ, ω, α) =
2
ω
φ0,1
(
x− ξ
ω
)
Φ0,1
[
α
(
x− ξ
ω
)]
, (5.18)
respectively, where Φµ,σ(x) is the cumulative distribution function for a normal random
variable with mean µ and standard deviation σ evaluated at x. For additional details on
fitting empirical BMI distributions, see Appendix E.2.3.
5.4.2 Methods for Individual-level Model Implications
Given empirical BMI measurements from individuals at two different time points t1 and t2
we can approximate a(·) and b(·) using Eqs. (5.13) and (5.14) with
dxi(t1) ≈ ∆xi(t1) = xi(t2)− xi(t1).
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Then
aˆ(xi(t1)) = mean (∆xi(t1)/∆t)
≈ a(xi(t1))
= kI(x
? − xi(t1)) + kS
N∑
j=1
[
Aij (xj(t1)− xi(t1))− 1
2
∂Aij
∂xi
(xj(t1)− xi(t1))2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=u′S(xi(t1))
,
(5.19)
bˆ(xi(t1)) =
√
variance(∆xi(t1))/∆t
≈ b(xi(t1))
=
√
kb xi(t1) , (5.20)
where ∆t = t2 − t1 and the mean and variance are taken over bins comprised of similar
xi(t1) values. We compare the performance of our model under the assumption that social
interactions between individuals do have an effect on the dynamics of individual BMIs, i.e.
when kS > 0 in Eq. (5.10), to the performance of our model under the assumption that
social interactions between individuals do not have an effect on the dynamics of individual
BMIs, i.e. when kS = 0 in Eq. (5.10). In the first case, to estimate the parameters kI , x
?, kS,
and σ we regress aˆ(xi(t1)) on xi(t1), u
′
S(xi(t1)), and a constant vector. In the second case,
to estimate the parameters kI and x
? (kS = 0 and σ is undetermined) we regress aˆ(xi(t1))
on xi(t1) and a constant vector. To estimate the parameter
√
kb we regress bˆ(xi(t1)) on
xi(t1). We provide additional details on estimating the parameters using individual level
data in Appendix E.2.4.
We note that the methodology presented in this section can only be applied to NHANES
and NU BMI data, because these are the only data sets that have information on how
individuals’ BMI changes over time.
Testing for Significance of Social Utility Contribution using Synthetic data
By necessity, our social model (i.e. kS > 0 in Eq. (5.10)) will have lower error than our
nonsocial model (i.e. kS = 0 in Eq. (5.10)), since it has two additional parameters than
the nonsocial model. In other words, if S(kI , x
?, kS, σ) denotes the objective function that
is minimized in order to estimate the parameters kI , x
?, kS, and σ then
Sˆ = S(kˆI , xˆ
?, kˆS, σˆ) = min
(kI ,x?,kS ,σ)
S(kI , x
?, kS, σ) ≤ min
(kI ,x?)
S(kI , x
?, 0,−) = Sˆ
∣∣∣
kS=0
.
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In order to investigate the significance of the social utility contribution to a(·) we estimate
the expected error reduction
∆Sˆsyn = Sˆsyn
∣∣∣
kS=0
− Sˆsyn
under ideal circumstances, i.e. under the assumption that the data was generated by our
social model. If the empirically observed reduction in error ∆Sˆ is a similar magnitude
to the ideal expected error reduction ∆Sˆsyn, then this is evidence that the effect of social
utility is significant. Conversely, if the reduction in error ∆Sˆ is much smaller than the
ideal expected error reduction ∆Sˆsyn, then this is evidence that the effect of social utility
is not significant. To compute the expected error reduction ∆Sˆsyn we generate a synthetic
data set for each initial year t1 of NHANES and NU data by simulating Eq. (5.9) from
t = t1 to t = t2 using estimated of parameters kˆI , xˆ
?, kˆS, and σˆ and with initial conditions
xi(t1) taken from the empirical NHANES and NU BMI data, see Appendix E.2.5. The
social and the nonsocial models are then fit to this synthetic data set and used to compute
∆Sˆsyn,1. We repeat this procedure to generate a total of 100 realizations and then set
∆Sˆsyn =
1
100
100∑
i=1
∆Sˆsyn,i .
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Population-level Model Implications
The key prediction of our model at the population level is the distribution of BMIs. Fig-
ures 5.1-5.2 displays the results from fitting four distributions to the observed empirical
BMI data: (1) our model without social effects p
(0)
eq (x; kI/kb, x
?) (Eq. (5.16), solid red), (2)
our model with social effects peq(x; kI/kb, x
?, kS/kb, σ) (Eq. (E.3), dashed red), (3) the log-
normal distribution (null model Eq. (5.17), dash-dotted blue), and (4) the skew-normal
distribution (null model Eq. (5.18), dotted green). From left to right, Fig. 5.1 displays
model distributions and empirical data for the 2011-2012 NHANES survey data, 2011 NU
data, and 2011 BRFSS survey data. Each of the three rows illustrates the data from a
different perspective. The top row plots the BMI distributions on a linear scale and al-
lows us to confirm visually that the BMI distributions are right-skewed. The middle row
plots the BMI distributions on a logarithmic scale and illustrates how both our non-social
p
(0)
eq (x) and social peq(x) models reproduce the right tail of the BMI distributions better
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than either the log-normal or skew-normal distribution. The bottom row of panels displays
the deviation from the log-normal distribution. This allows us to illustrate how both our
social peq(x) models reproduces the BMI distributions better than the non-social p
(0)
eq (x),
log-normal, or skew-normal distribution.
In Fig. 5.2 we display from left to right the root mean square error for NHANES survey
data, NU data, and BRFSS survey data for all years where data are available. Empirical
data and fitted distributions for the remaining years of NHANES, NU, and BRFSS data are
displayed in Figs. E.1-E.3. We observe that our nonsocial model (Eq. (5.10) with kS = 0),
whose equilibrium distribution p
(0)
eq (x) is given in Eq. (5.16), outperforms the log-normal
distribution, since (a) both p
(0)
eq (x) and log-normal distributions have two parameters (i.e.,
two degrees of freedom), and (b) the p
(0)
eq (x) distribution results in lower error. We also ob-
serve that our nonsocial model outperforms the skew-normal distribution, since (a) fitting
both distributions results in a similar amount of error and (b) the skew-normal distribution
has one more parameter than the p
(0)
eq (x) distribution.We emphasize that, even without the
social component (i.e. with kS = 0), our model is able to capture the BMI distribution
better than the log-normal and skew-normal distributions, i.e. two competing distribution
functions commonly used to fit right-skewed data. This is the case even though one of the
competing distributions, i.e. the skew-normal distribution, has an additional parameter.
This provides strong evidence in support of our model, since if our model did not capture
the essence of the dynamics of individuals’ BMI then it would be unlikely to perform as
well as it has against the log-normal and skew-normal distributions.
In addition to our nonsocial model providing a better fit for the BMI distribution
than either the skew-normal or log-normal distributions, we note that our nonsocial model
provides a potential explanation for the right-skewness observed in the empirical BMI
data. Recall that the BMI distribution predicted by our model, which results from solving
the advection-diffusion equation (5.11), is determined by the balance of the advection
term a(x) (see Eq. (5.10) with kS = 0), which tends to concentrate the BMI distribution
function around the root of a(x), and b(x) (see Eq. (5.15)), which tends to diffuse the BMI
distribution. We observe, therefore, that in our model the right-skewness follows from
the assumption that the standard deviation of individuals’ change in BMI is proportional
to the individuals’ BMI, i.e. b(x) =
√
kb x (as specified in Eq. (5.15)). In other words,
the right-skewness follows from the assumption that an individual’s BMI dynamics are
subject to random fluctuations in lifestyle (e.g. giving in to the temptation to eat high
calorie food, spending extra time engaged in physical activity, etc...) whose magnitude
scale roughly with their BMI. Alternatively, we can illustrate just how critical the choice of
b(x) =
√
kb x is to the skewness of the equilibrium distribution by solving Eq. (5.12) with
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Figure 5.1: Results from fitting BMI distributions. From left to right we display data for
NHANES, NU, and BRFSS data sets, respectively. Each panel displays 2011 empirical
BMI data (solid black dots) as well as four fitted probability distribution functions: model
without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model with social utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed
red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-dotted blue), and skew normal null
distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green).
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Figure 5.2: Results from fitting four BMI probability distribution functions: model without
social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model with social utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-
normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-dotted blue), and skew normal null distribution
(Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). From left to right we display data for NHANES, NU, and
BRFSS data sets, respectively. Each panels displays the root mean square error from
fitting models to empirical BMI distributions in all years where data is available.
a(x) as in Eq. (5.10) (still with kS = 0) and with b(x) =
√
kb = constant. Under these
circumstances the equilibrium distribution is a Gaussian centered at the root of a(x), i.e.
when b(x) is a constant the equilibrium distribution becomes symmetric and is no longer
skewed.
Next, because our social model (Eq. (5.10) with kS > 0), whose equilibrium distribution
peq(x) is given in Eq. (E.3) of Appendix E.2.2, has two more parameters than the log-normal
and nonsocial model p
(0)
eq (x), and one parameter more than the skew-normal distribution,
we expect it to result in the lowest error of all the investigated distributions when used to
fit empirical BMI distribution data. This is consistent with our findings (see right panels
of Fig. 5.1). We note, however, that at this stage we cannot be certain that the inclusion
of social utility (kS > 0 in Eq. (5.10)), and the resulting increase in model complexity, is
justified by the modest improvement in the goodness of fit. In other words, it is not yet
clear whether our social model results in a better fit to empirical BMI distribution data
than our nonsocial model because (a) it captures an additional important effect (i.e. the
effect of social interactions on the dynamics of the BMI), or (b) it results in overfitting.
We address the issue of overfitting within our social model by computing the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) [4], and resulting relative likelihood, for each of the proposed
distribution functions in each year for which data are available. Representative results for
the year 2011 are displayed in Table 5.2, full results are displayed in Tables E.1-E.3 in
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Appendix E.3.1. With the exception of years 1994-1996 of the BRFSS data set, we find
that the social model peq(x) is overwhelmingly the most likely of the four models that we
tested. Indeed, with the exception of years 1994-1996 of the BRFSS data set the non-
social p
(0)
eq (x), log-normal, and skew-normal distributions are all less than 1.5% as likely
as the social model peq(x). For the years 1994-1996 of the BRFSS data set the non-social
model p
(0)
eq (x) is the most likely of the four distributions tested, but the social model cannot
necessarily be excluded by the AIC criteria. Specifically, for the years 1994-1996 of the
BRFSS data set the social model peq(x) is 14% as likely as the non-social model, while the
log-normal and skew-normal distributions are less than 2.1× 10−288% as likely as the non-
social model. Taken as a whole, these data are strongly support the hypothesis that our
social distribution results in a better fit to empirical BMI distribution data than the non-
social distribution, the log-normal distribution, and the skew-normal distribution because
it captures an additional important effect, and not because of overfitting. We remark that
we will return to the issue of overfitting in the following section, where we apply our model
to individual level data in order to investigate the importance of social interaction between
individuals on the dynamics of individuals’ BMI.
Table 5.2: Relative likelihood of non-social p
(0)
eq (x), social peq(x), log-normal flog(x), and
skew-normal fskew(x) models for 2011 NHANES, NU, and BRFSS empirical BMI distri-
butions
Relative Likelihood exp[(AICmin − AICi)/2]
Data p
(0)
eq (x) peq(x) flog(x) fskew(x)
NHANES 1.3× 10−2 1 1.4× 10−21 1.1× 10−9
NU < 10−300 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
BRFSS < 10−300 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
Finally, we recall that the parameters k0 = kI/kb and x
? in the distribution p
(0)
eq , given
in Eq. (5.16), can be related to properties of the distribution (e.g., the mean, variance,
skewness, etc...) in a straightforward way, see Table 5.1. Thus, comparing parameter
estimates between different years gives us useful insight into how BMI distributions differ
from each other. For additional details, we refer the reader to Appendix E.3.1 where the
parameter estimates resulting from fitting p
(0)
eq (x) to empirical BMI data are plotted for all
three data sets.
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5.5.2 Individual-level Model Implications
At the individual level our model predicts that both the average and standard deviation
of year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI are approximately linear functions of BMI.
Parameter estimates for a(x) and b(x) (see Eqs. (5.10) and (5.15)) are given in Tables 5.4
and 5.3, respectively, and representative results are displayed in Fig. 5.3, see Figs. E.5-E.6.
Table 5.4 also displays results from the synthetic data experiment described in Section 5.4.2
above.
Table 5.3: Parameter
√
kb estimated from individual level BMI data (fitting
√
kb in
Eq. (5.20)). All parameters estimates are significant at the 95% confidence level.
Data
√̂
kb L2-Error
NHANES 0.083 0.482
NU 0.071 0.461
Synthetic NHANES 0.077 0.271
Synthetic NU 0.069 0.093
We observe from Fig. 5.3 that our model with social effects (i.e. with kS > 0 in
Eq. (5.10)) is able to closely reproduce average dynamics of individual BMIs, i.e. the aver-
age change in individuals’ BMI is closely modelled by a(x) and the standard deviation of
the change in individuals’ BMI is closely modelled by b(x), see Eqs. (5.19) and (5.20), re-
spectively. However, since the average year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI is roughly
linear, we may also infer from Fig. 5.3 that our model without social effects (i.e. with kS = 0
in Eq. (5.10)) is also able to closely reproduce both the average and standard deviation of
year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI. This is consistent with Table 5.4 which shows
that, although the fit resulting from the nonsocial model (kS = 0) results in higher error
than the fit from the social model (kS > 0), the error resulting from both models is roughly
the same order of magnitude, i.e. they are within 3.5% of each other for both NHANES
and NU data sets. Specifically, we observe a 3.1% reduction in error for the NHANES data
set and a 2.4% reduction in error for the NU data set. It is worthwhile noting that these
two figures are remarkably consistent between themselves, especially when we recall that
the NU data set is comprised of medical records and is not a representative sample of the
population.
To better understand these numbers, we compare these results to the expected error
reduction when going from the nonsocial to the social model under “ideal” conditions,
i.e., when synthetic data are directly generated by the social model. The expected error
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Table 5.4: Parameters kI , x
?, kS, and σ estimated from individual level BMI data. We com-
pare the performance of our full model (fitting parameters kI , x
?, kS, and σ in Eq. (5.19))
and our model without social utility (fitting parameters kI and x
? in Eq. (5.19) with
kS = 0). All parameter estimates are significant at the 95% confidence level.
Data Model
Parameters
L2-Error
∆L2-Error
kˆI xˆ? kˆS σˆ (%)
NHANES
nonsocial 0.124 28.0 0 – 0.542 –
social 0.144 27.9 21.5 2.18 0.525 3.1
NU
nonsocial 0.059 28.0 0 – 0.374 –
social 0.069 28.0 9.44 3.44 0.365 2.4
Synth. NHANES
nonsocial 0.115 28.0 0 – 0.325 –
social 0.132 28.0 17.5 2.23 0.306 5.9
Synth. NU
nonsocial 0.057 28.0 0 – 0.128 –
social 0.066 28.0 8.21 3.43 0.106 17.2
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Figure 5.3: Average and standard deviation in year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI.
The line of best fit for average year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI (blue dots) is
given by the regression specified in Eq. (5.19) (solid black line). The line of best fit for
standard deviation for year-over-year in individuals’ BMI (red squares) is given by the
regression specified in Eq. (5.20) (solid black line). The line y = 0 is given by a dashed
black line. 2011-2012 NHANES survey data (left) and for 2011 NU data (right). Note: to
improve visualization of data we display only 1,000 data points for each of aˆ (x) and bˆ (x),
selected uniformly at random.
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reduction is estimated to be 5.9% for synthetic NHANES and 17.2% for synthetic NU data,
see Table 5.4. In the case of the NHANES data, the comparison is quite favorable since we
observe a reduction that is 53% of the ideal expected error reduction (3.1% out of 5.9%).
This provides substantial evidence that social effects play an important role in individual
BMI dynamics. In the case of NU data, the comparison is more ambiguous since we only
observe a reduction that is 14% of the ideal expected error reduction (2.4% out of 17.2%).
However, although the result for the NU data may not provide as strong evidence as the
NHANES data, the NU results are still largely consistent with the hypothesis that social
effects play an important role in BMI dynamics.
Another interesting implication of the data shown in Fig. 5.3 is that the average change
in individual BMI (blue dots) is negative for high BMI and positive for low BMI. This
indicates that individuals with high BMI are more likely to lose weight than individuals
of low BMI (at least over the period of a single year). This is contrary to what one might
expect from the “runaway train” argument, i.e., that individuals with high BMI enter a
positive feedback loop resulting in ever increasing weight gain.
We note that the results of this section are consistent with those of Section 5.5.1. In
fact, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first quantitative mathematical
model able to simultaneously reproduce both population and individual level BMI data.
We emphasize that the consistency of the results at the population and individual levels
mutually support each other, in the sense that if the model did not capture the essential
features of the dynamics the BMI then it would be unlikely that our model would be able
to simultaneously reproduce both the population and individual level dynamics.
5.6 Discussion
5.6.1 Limitations
We previously noted that our mathematical model is capable of reproducing the right-
skewness observed in the empirical BMI distribution data without making use of a “run-
away train” type of phenomenon describing individuals’ tendency to gain weight (i.e. to
increase their BMI). This is somewhat surprising, given the intuitively appealing nature of
the “runaway train” argument. The lack of a “runaway train” in our model can be seen by
examining the Langevin equation for individuals’ behaviour Eq. (5.9) and observing that
over an infinitesimal time interval the dynamics of high BMI individuals are not biased
toward further increasing their BMI. Specifically, for both our nonsocial and social models
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(a) the deterministic contribution of the Langevin equation (i.e. a(x) as in Eq. (5.10))
results in downward pressure on individuals with high BMI (e.g. obese individuals), and
(b) the stochastic contribution of the Langevin equation (i.e. b(x) as in Eq. (5.15)) is
equally likely to result in shocks that increase or decrease BMI. This first feature of our
model is confirmed in the BMI data, for example see Fig. 5.3 which shows that the average
change in individual BMI is negative for high BMI and positive for low BMI. This indicates
that individuals with high BMI are more likely to lose weight than individuals of low BMI
(at least over the period of a single year). Although a “runaway train” phenomenon does
not manifest itself in our model, or in the first two moments of the individual level BMI
data (e.g. see Fig. 5.3), this does not preclude the “runaway train” phenomenon as an
important factor in the dynamics of individuals’ BMI. For example, a “runaway train”
type of phenomenon might manifest itself in higher moments of the change in BMI dx (see
Eqs. (5.19) and (5.20) for the first two moments). This illustrates an important limitation
of our mathematical model, which is only able to account for the first two moments of dx
(all other moments are assumed to be zero). It is possible that the “runaway train” may
manifest itself in higher order moments of dx, for example although high BMI individuals
on average decrease their BMI over the span of one year this average reduction may be
caused by only a few outliers making large reductions in BMI while the remaining high
BMI individuals continue to increase in weight.
In addition to the limitations discussed above in the context of the “runaway train”
phenomenon, there are several additional aspects of the model that could be improved
through future work. For example, in our model we assume that all individuals have the
same natural BMI set point x?. Of course, this is a gross oversimplifications since the nat-
ural set point, which is determined by gender, age, race, activity level, diet, etc..., varies
significantly between individuals. Therefore, a straightforward generalization of our model
might investigate the implications of having individuals’ set points drawn from a distri-
bution of possible set points. Alternatively, we assumed a specific form of interpersonal
social interaction in Eq. (5.6). A natural question is whether our model is sensitive to this
choice, and if so whether other functions may perform as well or better as the one specified
in Eq. (5.6).
Finally, we note that each of the data sets that we considered (NHANES, NU, and
BRFSS) has their own strengths and weaknesses. In particular, the data available to us
are either (a) directly measured (NHANES, NU) or self-reported (BRFSS), or (b) repre-
sentative samples (NHANES, BRFSS) or non-representative samples (NU). The issue of
directly measured or self-reported data is important, since it is possible that individuals
asked to self-report are misreporting their weight and height. Indeed, we can illustrate
the importance of having directly measured weight and height data by comparing BMI
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distributions from NHANES and NU data sets (directly measured data, see Figs. E.1-E.2)
to BMI distributions from BRFSS data sets (self-reported data, see Fig. E.3): for many
of the empirical BRFSS BMI distributions (self-reported) the data point at BMI = 25.5
(i.e. the data point that represents the fraction of individuals with 25 ≤ BMI < 26) is a
significant outlier whereas this is not the case in NHANES or NU data (directly measured).
While there is no way to tell for certain why this is the case, it is interesting to recall that
individuals with BMI ≤ 25 are considered normal or underweight, while individuals with
BMI > 25 are considered overweight or obese. The issue of non-representative data is also
important. In this case, since NU data consist of individuals’ medical records, unhealthy
individuals may be overrepresented in the NU data set. For example, the first two data
points for the NU BMI distributions in Fig. 5.1 (middle, centre panel) illustrates that there
is an unusually large fraction of individuals with extremely low BMI in the NU BMI distri-
bution. While the aforementioned limitations of the data are important to note, however,
we emphasize that our results are nevertheless consistent across all three data sets. In
other words, the conclusions which we draw in this chapter are robust to the limitations
in the data.
5.6.2 Conclusions
In this chapter we establish a mathematical model for the dynamics of individuals’ BMIs
with implications at both the individual and population levels. At the population level we
make two main contributions. First, we predict a functional form for the BMI distribution
that fits empirical data better than the skew-normal and log-normal distributions, espe-
cially in the tail of the distribution. Second, our model provides a mechanistic explanation
for the right-skewness observed in empirical BMI distributions: this appears to be a result
of random fluctuations with magnitudes that scale roughly with the BMI of the individual.
We also note that because there is a straightforward link between the model parameters
and the properties of the BMI distribution (see Table 5.1), our model also provides a rela-
tively straightforward way to compare multiple BMI distributions simultaneously. At the
individual level we also make two main contributions. Our model reproduces the behavior
of both the average and standard deviation in year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI
(see Fig. 5.3). The ability of this simple mechanistic model to reproduce real-world data,
and to connect micro and macro scales, means predictions can be made regarding the im-
pact of proposed interventions. Such an ability may prove valuable in allocating scarce
resources for public health improvements.
At both the individual and population levels our model allows us to investigate the role
of social and peer influences in BMI dynamics, providing additional evidence in support of
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the hypothesis that social effects have an impact on individuals’ BMI dynamics. Specifi-
cally, at the population level we compute the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for our
nonsocial and social models, as well as for the log-normal and skew-normal distributions.
Using the AIC to compute the relative likelihood we show that the social model is sig-
nificantly more likely than the alternatives for the vast majority of NHANES, NU, and
BRFSS BMI distribution data. At the individual level, consistent with our social model
having two more degrees of freedom than our nonsocial model, we find that fitting the
empirical micro-level data to our social model results in lower error than fitting to our
nonsocial model, i.e. ∆Sˆ = Sˆ
∣∣∣
kS=0
− Sˆ > 0. In order to argue that this reduction in error
is significant, i.e. that the reduction in error results from capturing an important feature
of individuals’ BMI dynamics and not from overfitting, we compare the magnitude of ∆Sˆ
to the expected reduction in error when fitting the nonsocial model versus the social model
under ideal circumstances, i.e. ∆Sˆsyn = Sˆsyn
∣∣∣
kS=0
− Sˆsyn > 0. We argue that, because
∆Sˆ and ∆Sˆsyn are of the same order of magnitude, the improvement in model fit ∆Sˆ
is a result of the social model capturing an additional important feature of individuals’
BMI dynamics (and not a result of overfitting), and hence, that social effects play have
an impact on individuals’ BMI dynamics. Because our model consistently identified social
factors as important to individuals’ BMI dynamics at both the individual and population
levels in several independent data sets, our results represent a significant contribution to
ongoing research into whether the obesity epidemic should be considered a social conta-
gion process. These results have significant implications both in the context of the obesity
epidemic (e.g. in developing successful intervention strategies) and in the context of other
potential social contagion processes (e.g. by establishing a modelling framework in which
social contagion processes can be studied).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis we investigated the implications of social influence on decision making pro-
cesses in two different, but related, contexts: collective action problems, and conformity
problems. In Chapters 2-3 we studied social influence on a decision making process in
a political context. In this context, individuals are given a choice of whether or not to
join a political revolution in a dictatorial regime that employs censorship and repression.
This represents a collective action problem for individuals: individuals acting unilaterally
can easily be punished by the regime, but sufficiently many individuals acting collectively
cannot be retaliated against due to the regime’s finite resource constraint. In Chapters 4-5
we studied social influence on decision making processes in an epidemiological context, i.e.
in the context of prevalence of non-communicable diseases. In this context, individuals
are given a choice of whether to join one population subgroup over another (or possibly
many others). This represents what we call a conformity problem, since individuals are
choosing a population subgroup to which they will conform their behaviour. Specifically, in
Chapter 4 we study the conformity problem facing individuals who are deciding whether to
smoke or not to smoke, whereas in Chapter 5 we study the conformity problem facing indi-
viduals who are deciding how to optimize their body mass index (BMI) for optimal utility.
While each chapter of this thesis makes its own contributions to the specific problems that
they study, by framing our work in general terms we hope to highlight how the modelling
approaches presented in this thesis are widely applicable to many related problems that
can be classified under the umbrellas of collective action problems or conformity problems.
We now provide a brief summary of the work presented in this thesis and conclude with
some closing remarks.
Chapter 2 begins by defining a simple one dimensional ordinary differential equation
model whose defining features are the visibility and policing terms which control the growth
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and decay of the size of the revolution, respectively. Intuitively, the policing term models
the finite resource constraint of the regime, i.e. the regime does not have the capacity
to retaliate against or punish large numbers of protesters, whereas the visibility term
models the collective action problem faced by individuals choosing to join the revolution,
i.e. individuals are willing to join only once the revolution has grown large enough that
individuals no longer fear government retribution. This simple model admits a complete
mathematical analysis and a clear interpretation of the model in terms of the stability of
the regime (stable police state, meta-stable police state, unstable police state, and failed
state). We investigate how the model can be applied to the Arab Spring revolutions in
Tunisia and Egypt, noting that our model provides possible answers to questions on causes
and timing of the Arab Spring revolutions, and the role of the Internet and new media
therein. Furthermore, we note that our model is broadly relevant, since its classification
of regime stability can be applied (at least conceptually) to current political situations in
many different countries, for example we specifically consider the cases of Iran, China and
Somalia.
Chapter 3 builds on the model developed in Chapter 2 by specifying a linear threshold
agent-based model (ABM) for the spread of a political revolution in a dictatorial regime
that is consistent with the step visibility function (SVF) model of Chapter 2. Using
the relationship between the ABM and the SVF model as a template we developed two
models of moderate complexity, i.e. the binomial visibility function (BVF) and empirical
visibility function (EVF) models. We show that these new models are of low computational
complexity and admit a simple analysis. Moreover, because these two new models take the
actual structure of empirical networks into account better than the SVF, we are able to
show that they are an improvement over the SVF model in approximating the aggregate
behaivour of the ABM. We note that the analysis of the SVF model, as well as the BVF and
EVF models1, are useful in guiding our computational analysis of the ABM. For example, in
our analysis we extend the concept of the basic reproduction number R0 from epidemiology
to the linear threshold ABM and show how it is related to the initial slope of the BVF and
EVF. Finally, in small scale numerical simulations using online and oﬄine proxy network
data we provide initial support to the hypothesis that the adoption of online social media
may facilitate the spread of political revolutions by effectively changing the connectivity
structure of the population in a way that makes linear threshold spreading more effective.
In Chapter 4 we develop a compartmental model for the dynamics of smoking preva-
lence. Using estimates for smoking prevalence from a number of developed countries, which
we compute for a period of roughly one century, we show that our model matches real-
world smoking prevalence data well. We are further able to show that the predictions of
1These analyses are provided in Chapter 2, i.e. in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.4.2.
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our model (calibrated using estimated smoking prevalence data) are consistent with inde-
pendently collected data, i.e. with Hofstede’s individualism index IDV. In particular, we
are able to confirm our model’s prediction that the level of individualism or collectivism of
a society significantly affects the temporal dynamics of smoking prevalence, i.e. we confirm
that more collectivistic societies tend to have slower rates of smoking adoption and cessa-
tion and that more individualistic societies tend to have faster rates of smoking adoption
and cessation. The significance of this effect is illustrated by considering the counterfactual
scenario of how the smoking prevalence might have evolved in the United States had the
United States been approximately 2% less individualistic, i.e. if the United States had had
the same IDV as the United Kingdom.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we develop an agent-based model (ABM) for individuals’ BMI
dynamics with implications at both the individual and populations levels. We also develop
a new BMI data set more abundant than any previously reported, consisting of BMI
measurements that are calculated from anonymized records of patients of the Northwestern
Medicine system. This results in a data set consisting of over 300,000 distinct individuals
whose BMI can be computed in consecutive years (over 1,000,000 year-over-year change in
BMI data points in total). We test the main predictions of our model using these data,
as well as BMI data from National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES)
and Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) surveys. At the population level
our model provides a mechanistic explanation for the right-skewness observed in empirical
BMI distributions, and fits empirical BMI distributions better than either the log-normal
or skew-normal distributions. At the individual level, our model is able to reproduce the
mean and standard deviation of year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI. At both the
individual and population levels we provide evidence that social factors play a role in the
dynamics of individuals’ BMI.
Given the inherent complexity of human beings and their interactions with one another,
it can be tempting to develop extremely detailed and complex mathematical models in
order to study social phenomena. However, we note that it is often the case that the more
complex a model becomes the less useful it is. Indeed, models that are overly complicated
are often difficult to interpret and analyze, and are prone to overfitting and spurious results
(this is especially the case when the data are sparse and/or noisy). Throughout this thesis
we have advocated for the development of the simplest possible mathematical model that
is still capable of capturing the essence of the research problem in question. Moreover, we
emphasize that the results of this thesis have demonstrated that these simple models can
have significant explanatory power. Indeed, in Chapters 2 and 4 we are able to achieve the
modelling objectives using simple compartmental models only. While more complicated
agent-based models are necessary to model the phenomena considered in Chapters 3 and
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5, we emphasize that in both cases the agent-based models are nevertheless kept as simple
as possible. Moreover, we also note that in both of Chapters 3 and 5 we provide additional
validation for our ABMs by accompanying them with simple population-level models. In
the case of Chapter 3 the ABM is accompanied by the simple compartmental model of
Chapter 2, which we use to guide the computational analysis of the ABM. In the case
of Chapter 5 the ABM for the dynamics of individuals’ BMI is accompanied by a partial
differential equation for the distribution of BMIs in the general population, which we use
to further validate our mathematical model. Specifically, we argue that our ability to
reproduce both individual and population level data in Chapter 5 provides much stronger
evidence of our model’s validity than if we were able to reproduce individual level data only.
In closing, we conclude this thesis with the following general remark: whereas advances in
scientific computing will continue to improve our ability to develop and simulate complex
(e.g. individual-level, or agent-based) mathematical models, simple (e.g. population-level)
mathematical models will continue to play a critical role in applied mathematics .
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Appendix A
Glossary
Abbreviations and Symbols for Chapter 1
Nash Equilibrium In a multiplayer game a Nash Equilibrium is a set of strategies for
each player such that (a) each player knows the strategies of the other players, and
(b) given the strategies of the other players no player can improve their outcome by
changing strategy. 2
Abbreviations and Symbols for Chapter 2
α (Protesters’ visibility) Determines the location of the jump in the step-visibility func-
tion v(·;α), see visibility threshold 1− α. 15
β (Police capacity) Determines the location of the jump in the policing term p(·; β). 16
BinCDF(x;n, p) Cumulative binomial distribution function evaluated at x with n trials
each with success probability p. 19
c1 (Protesters’ enthusiasm) Determines the rate at which individuals join the revolu-
tion. 15
c2 (Policing efficiency) Determines the rate at which individuals are removed from the
revolution. 16
154
c∗ = c1/(c1 + c2) Ratio of protesters’ enthusiasm to sum of protesters’ enthusiasm and
policing efficiency. 22
d = d(r) (Decay term) Models the decay of the fraction of protesters in the population.
15
E (Edges) Set of edges representing social interactions between individuals in the network
G = G(V,E). 19
g = g(r) (Growth term) Models the growth of the fraction of protesters in the popula-
tion. 15
G = G(V,E) (Network) Social network representing individuals (i.e. nodes V ) connected
by social interactions (i.e. edges E). 19
I{·} (Indicator Function) I{X} = 1 if X is true, I{X} = 0 otherwise. 15
p(r; β) (Policing term) A step function that shuts off the decay term when the fraction
of protesters is above the policing capacity β. 16
φ (Average degree) Average degree of individual i ∈ V in the network G = G(V,E).
19
r = r(t) (Fraction of protesters) Fraction of protesters and/or revolutionaries in the
population at time t. 15
r = 0 (Total state control) Equilibrium of total state control. 16
r = 1 (Realized revolution) Equilibrium of the realized revolution. 16
r = c∗ (Civil unrest) Equilibrium of civil unrest. 34
Region I Parameter regime α + β = 1. 20
Region II (Failed State) Parameter regime α + β < 1. 14, 20, 33
Region III Parameter regime α + β > 1. 20
Region III0 (Stable police state) Parameter regime α+β < 1 and c∗ ≤ 1−α. 14, 24,
34
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Region III1 (Unstable police state) Parameter regime, α+β < 1 and c∗ ≥ β. 14, 24,
34
Region IIIe (Meta-stable police state) Parameter regime α+β < 1 and 1−α < c∗ <
β. 14, 24, 34
θi (Threshold) Threshold parameter for individual i; individual i will consider joining
the revolution only if the fraction of his/her neighbours already participating in the
revolution exceeds θi. 18
θ (Average threshold) Average threshold, i.e. θ = 〈θi〉. 19
v(r;α) Visibility term; a step function which shuts off the growth term when the fraction
of protesters is below the visibility threshold 1− α. 15
1− α (Visibility threshold) The visibility function v(r;α) is a step function whose tran-
sition occurs at the visibility threshold 1 − α, i.e. v(r;α) = 0 if r ≤ 1 − α and
v(r;α) = 1 otherwise. 15
V (Nodes) Set of nodes (i.e. individuals) in the social network G = G(V,E). 19
Abbreviations and Symbols for Chapter 3
α (Protesters’ visibility) Determines the location of the jump in the step-visibility func-
tion vs(·;α). 55
ABM Linear threshold agent-based model. 43
β (Police capacity) Determines the location of the jump in the policing term p(·; β). 52
vb(r; θ, ρk) (BVF) Binomial visibility function. 44, 55
c1 (Protesters’ enthusiasm) Determines the rate at which individuals join the revolu-
tion. 51
c2 Policing efficiency parameter; determines the rate at which individuals are removed
from the revolution. 52
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c∗ = c1/(c1 + c2) Ratio of protesters’ enthusiasm to sum of protesters’ enthusiasm and
policing efficiency. 71
Clustering coefficient (Local) The local clustering coefficient for node i with degree
di is the number of wedges, i.e. di(di − 1)/2, divided by the number of triangles
involving node i (node i is in a triangle with nodes j and k if (i, j), (j, k) and (k, i)
are edges in the network). 47
Cumulative degree distribution The cumulative degree distribution is the function
F (k) =
∑k
j=1 ρj, where ρj is the degree distribution. 47
d(t) = d(t|t0) (Decay term) Models the decay of the fraction of protesters in the popu-
lation. 53
DA Degree approximation. 44, 66
E (Edges) Set of edges representing social interactions between individuals in the network
G = G(V,E). 44
ve(r; θ) (EVF) Empirical visibility function. 44, 57
g(t) = g(t|t0) (Growth term) Models the growth of the fraction of protesters in the pop-
ulation. 53
G = G(V,E) (Network) Social network representing individuals (i.e. nodes V ) connected
by social interactions (i.e. edges E). 44
GF (Facebook subnetwork) Network constructed from the ego-networks of ten individ-
ual Facebook members. 47
GP (Physical Contact network) Network generated by distributing wireless sensors to
students, teachers, and staff at a U.S. highschool during a one day period. 47
I{·} (Indicator Function) I{X} = 1 if X is true, I{X} = 0 otherwise. 53
n¯k =
∑
l ρk,lr
(l) Fraction of nodes n ∈ Nk in state 1. 67
Nk Set of nodes that have at least one neighbour of degree k. 66
ν(ra(t0); θ) (Visibility function) Visibility function for the linear threshold ABM. 53
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ODE Ordinary differential equation. 44
ra(t) = ra(t|t0) (Fraction of protesters - ABM) The fraction of nodes in the linear
threshold ABM model that are expected to be in state 1 (i.e. active) at time t,
conditioned on information at time t0. 52
r(k)(t) = r(k)(t|t0) (Fraction of protesters by degree- DA) Fraction of population
with degree k that are expected to be in state 1 (i.e. active) at time t, conditioned
on information at time t0. 67
rd(t) = rd(t|t0) (Fraction of protesters - DA) Fraction of population that are expected
to be in state 1 (i.e. active) at time t, conditioned on information at time t0. 67
R0 Basic reproductive number. 46, 70
ρk,j Degree distribution of Nk. 67
ρk (Degree distribution) The degree distribution ρk is the fraction of nodes in the net-
work with degree k, i.e. the fraction of nodes in the network with k neighbours. 47,
51, 55
Region III0 (Stable police state) SVF model parameter regime α + β < 1 and c∗ ≤
1− α. 58
Region III1 (Unstable police state) SVF model parameter regime, α + β < 1 and
c∗ ≥ β. 58
Region IIIe (Meta-stable police state) SVF model parameter regime α + β < 1 and
1− α < c∗ < β. 58
sv(t) (State) State of individual v at time t, i.e. sv(t) = 1 if individual v is active,
sv(t) = 0 if individual v is inactive. 51
Sparsity The sparsity of a networks is the number of edges divided by the number of
possible edges, i.e. the sparsity is the number of edges divided by N(N − 1)/2 where
N is the number of nodes in the network. 47
vs(r;α) (SVF) Step visibility function. 45, 54
θv (Linear threshold) Individual v may change states from inactive to active only once
the fraction of his/her neighbours that are already active exceeds the linear threshold
θv. 43
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V (Nodes) Set of nodes (i.e. individuals) in the social network G = G(V,E). 44
Vk Set of nodes with degree k. 66
Abbreviations and Symbols for Chapter 4
a (Relative conformity) Determines the balance between individual utility and social
utility. 83
b Timescale of the ordinary differential equation describing the dynamics of smoking preva-
lence. 83
c(t) (Tobacco consumption) Cigarette consumption in grams per person per day at
time t. 86
δ (Information discounting) Discounting factor for new information on the health ef-
fects of smoking. 84
IDV A measure of collectivism versus individualism developed by Hofstede [86]. 80
n(t) (Proxy for smoking knowledge) Cumulative number of scholarly articles on the
health effects of smoking. 84
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 80
sx (Slope) Average rate of increase in smoking prevalence. 80, 96
Social utility from smoking The utility an individual derives indirectly from smoking
through social interactions with other smokers. 80
tmax (Peak year) Peak year in tobacco consumption. 80
Total utility from smoking The total utility from smoking is a weighted product of the
individual utility from smoking and the social utility from smoking. 80
ux (Individual utility from smoking) The utility an individual derives directly from
the act of smoking. 80, 83
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uy (Individual utility from not smoking) The utility an individual derives directly
from the act of non-smoking. 83
u0 (Individual utility from smoking - no knowledge) The individual utility from
smoking in the absence of any knowledge of the health effects of smoking. 84
u∞ (Individual utility from smoking - perfect knowledge) The individual utility
from smoking with perfect knowledge of the health effects of smoking. 84
x = x(t) (Prevalence of smoking) Fraction of the population that smokes at time t. 83
Abbreviations and Symbols for Chapter 5
aN(xi; ~x) (Obesity dynamics - advection term) Deterministic term of the Langevin
equation that describes the dynamics of individuals’ BMI; for use with finite popu-
lation size (N). 111
a(x) (Obesity dynamics - advection term) Deterministic term of the Langevin equa-
tion that describes the dynamics of individuals’ BMI; alternatively the advection
term in the advection-diffusion (Fokker-Planck) equation. 112, 113
Aij (Weighting function) Weighting function that specifies the strength of the social
influence of individual j on individual i. 111, 112
advection-diffusion equation A partial differential equation that describes the aggre-
gate behaviour of particles subject to advection and diffusion phenomena; also known
as a Fokker-Planck equation. 113
AIC Akaike Information Criterion. 123
b(x) (Obesity dynamics - diffusion term) Deterministic component of the stochastic
term of the Langevin equation that describes the dynamics of individuals’ BMI;
alternatively the diffusion term in the advection-diffusion (Fokker-Planck) equation.
112, 113
BMI Body mass index; weight (in kg) divided by height squared (in meters2). 106
BRFSS Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. 115
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η(t) (White noise) Gaussian white noise. 112
flog(x;µ, σ) Log-normal distribution function. 117, 118
fskew(x; ξ, ω, α) Skew-normal distribution function. 118
kI Proportionality constant for the gradient of the individual utility that, together with
kS, sets the relative importance of individual versus social utility in the advection
term a(x). 111
kS Proportionality constant for the gradient of the social utility that, together with kI ,
sets the relative importance of individual versus social utility in the advection term
a(x). 111
kb Proportionality constant for the temporal variance in individuals’ BMI. 114
k0 = kI/kb Ratio of kI to kb. 117
Langevin equation A stochastic differential equation that can be used to describe the
individual behaviour of particles subject to advection and diffusion phenomena. 112
NHANES National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. 115
NU Medical records for patients of the Northwestern Medicine system of hospitals and
clinics. 115
p(x, t) The probability density function for BMI x and time t. 113
peq(x) Equilibrium distribution function for the social model. 115, 117
p
(0)
eq (x) Equilibrium distribution function for the non-social model of individuals’ BMI dy-
namics. 117
φµ,σ(x) The probability density function for a normal random variable with mean µ and
standard deviation σ evaluated at x. 112
Φµ,σ(x) The cumulative density function for a normal random variable with mean µ and
standard deviation σ evaluated at x. 118
σ Width of Gaussian function used to specify weighting function Aij. 112
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S(kI , x
?, kS, σ) Objective function for estimation of kI , x
?, kS, and σ at the individual-level.
119
Sˆ = min(kI ,x?,kS ,σ) S(kI , x
?, kS, σ) Error resulting from fitting social model to empirical
micro-level BMI data. 119
Sˆ
∣∣∣
kS=0
= min(kI ,x?) S(kI , x
?, 0,−) Error resulting from fitting nonsocial model to empirical
micro-level BMI data. 119
uI(x) = uI(x;x
?) (Individual utility) The utility an individual derives from an action
in the absence of any social interactions. 110
uS(x) = uS(x;x
?) (Social utility) The utility an individual derives from an action in the
absence of any social interactions. 110
x? (Setpoint) An individual’s natural equilibrium BMI. 109, 110
x = x(t) The BMI of an individual at time t. 110
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Appendix B
Supplementary Materials for
Chapter 2: The Arab Spring
B.1 Examples of sigmoidal functions
The family of sigmoidal functions S was defined in Section 2.4 to be the set of twice
piecewise differentiable functions s : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfying
(i) ∃s0, s1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
• ∀r ∈ (s0, s1) : s(r) is twice differentiable,
• ∀r ≤ s0 : s(r) = 0, and
• ∀r ≥ s1 : s(r) = 1,
(ii) ∀r ∈ (s0, s1) : s′(r) > 0,
(iii) ∃ξ ∈ (s0, s1) such that
• ∀r ∈ [s0, ξ] : s′′(r) ≥ 0 and
• ∀r ∈ [ξ, s1] : s′′(r) ≤ 0,
(iv) ∀r ∈ (s0, s1) : s′′(r)s(r) ≤ [s′(r)]2.
We now consider three examples of functions that belong to S.
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Example 1: By construction, the function
s(r) =

0 if x ≤ s0
r−s0
s1−s0 if x ∈ (s0, s1)
1 otherwise
,
satisfies conditions (i)-(iii). This function also satisfies condition (iv), since
s′′(r)s(r) = 0 ≤ (s1 − s0)−2 = [s′(r)]2.
Example 2: By construction, the function
s(r) =

0 if x ≤ s0
1
2
sin
[
pi
2
(
2r−s0−s1
s1−s0
)]
+ 1
2
if x ∈ (s0, s1)
1 otherwise
,
satisfies conditions (i)-(iii). For convenience, we denote Θ(r) = pi
2
(
2r−s0−s1
s1−s0
)
. We now
verify that s(r) satisfies condition (iv), since
s′′(r)s(r)− [s′(r)]2 = −1
4
[Θ′(r)]2
(
sin2 [Θ(r)] + sin [Θ(r)] + cos2 [Θ(r)]
)
= −1
4
[Θ′(r)]2 (1 + sin [Θ(r)])
≤ 0.
Example 3: By construction, the function
s(r) =

0 if x ≤ s0
1
2
tanh [log(r − s0)− log(s1 − r)] + 12 if x ∈ (s0, s1)
1 otherwise
,
satisfies conditions (i)-(iii). For convenience, we denote Θ(r) = log(r − s0)− log(s1 − r).
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We now compute s′′(r)s(r)− [s′(r)]2.
s′′(r)s(r)− [s′(r)]2 =
(
− sech2 [Θ(r)] tanh [Θ(r)] [Θ′(r)]2 + 1
2
sech2 [Θ(r)] Θ′′(r)
)
×
(
1
2
tanh [Θ(r)] +
1
2
)
− 1
4
sech4 [Θ(r)] [Θ′(r)]2
= −1
4
[Θ′(r)]2 sech2 [Θ(r)]
×
(
(tanh [Θ(r)] + 1)2 − 2r − s0 − s1
s1 − s0 (tanh [Θ(r)] + 1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 if r≤ s0+s1
2
(B.1)
= −1
4
[Θ′(r)]2 sech2 [Θ(r)] (tanh [Θ(r)] + 1)
×
(
tanh [Θ(r)] + 2
s1 − r
s1 − s0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 if r≥ s0+s1
2
. (B.2)
Because −2r−s0−s1
s1−s0 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ r ≤ s0+s12 , the right hand side of Eq. (B.1) is non-positive
whenever r ≤ s0+s1
2
. Because tanh [Θ(r)] ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ r ≥ s1+s0
2
, the right hand side of
Eq. (B.2) is non-positive whenever r ≥ s0+s1
2
. It follows that
∀r ∈ (s0, s1) : s′′(r)s(r)− [s′(r)]2 ≤ 0,
i.e. s(r) satisfies condition (iv).
165
Appendix C
Supplementary Materials for
Chapter 3: A Hierarchy of Linear
Threshold Models
C.1 Physical Contact Network Data
In this appendix, we briefly discuss the network extraction protocol for the physical contact
network GP from [158].
The network presented in [158] was constructed by distributing wireless sensors to stu-
dents, teachers, and staff at a U.S. high school during a one day period from approximately
08:00 to 16:30. When two wireless sensors are in proximity of one another, i.e. when they
are less than approximately 3m apart, they register an interaction with a temporal res-
olution of 20s. Data are given for each separate interaction in comma separated value
(CSV) format with three columns: identification number (ID) of first wireless sensor, ID of
second wireless sensor, duration of interaction (measured in 20s increments). A weighted
undirected network GP,0 is formed by connecting each pair of individuals with an edge
whose weight is given by the total amount of time they spent in proximity to one another.
In order to admit a comparison with the unweighted undirected Facebook subnetwork,
we de-weight network GP,0 by discarding all edges whose weight is less than the minimum
duration wP , and by weighting all remaining edges equally. We select the largest connected
component of the resulting network, and for convenience we refer to this network as the
physical contact network, GP .
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The choice of the minimum duration wP is important since it determines, for example,
the average degree of the physical contact network GP . We choose wP such that the
average degree of GP is close to the average degree of GF , for the following reason. In the
simulations carried out in Chapter 3 to compare propagation under the linear threshold
ABM on GP and GF , we seed the networks with a fixed percentage of active nodes and
use the same threshold θ on both networks. We want to calibrate the average degree of
GP to the average degree of GF , such that, on average, nodes in GP have the same chance
as nodes in GF to satisfy the linear threshold criterion and see the revolution. After this
calibration, differences in propagation between GP and GF (for the same θ) are only due to
the differences in network structure that go beyond the average degree. This motivates us
to choose wP = 34 sensor measurements, equivalent to 11 minutes and 20 seconds, in order
to match the average degrees of GP and the Facebook subnetwork as closely as possible.
C.2 Gillespie’s Algorithm
Following [6], we numerically simulate the ABM by implementing Gillespie’s Algorithm. In
this appendix we give a brief overview of this algorithm. We first introduce some notation.
As above, let ra denote the fraction of individuals in the population that are expected to
be active in the revolution at time t. For each node v ∈ V we let γv(t) = 1 if v can see the
revolution at time t, i.e. if v satisfies Eq. (3.1), and let γv(t) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
we let ξ1,v and ξ2,v denote the first arrival times of independent Poisson processes with
rates c1 and c2, respectively.
Gillespie’s Algorithm is based on the fact that the sum of two independent Poisson
variables is also a Poisson variable with rate equal to the sum of the rates of the original
processes. It follows that∑
v∈V
[ξ1,v (1− sv(t)) γv(t) + ξ2,v sv(t) p(ra(t); β)]
is a Poisson process with rate
Λ =
∑
v∈V
[c1 (1− sv(t)) γv(t) + c2 sv(t) p(ra(t); β)] .
The first arrival time of this process, therefore, is an exponential random variable τ with
rate Λ. At time t + τ the state of exactly one of the nodes will change. Moreover, since
ξ1,v and ξ2,v are independent, the probability that the state of node v will change is
Pv =
c1 (1− sv(t)) γv(t) + c2 sv(t) p(ra(t); β)
Λ
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The Gillespie Algorithm then proceeds iteratively in three steps.
1. Find the time τ of the next event by drawing τ from an exponential distribution with
rate Λ.
2. Determine which node changes state by drawing one node from V = {vi}Ni=1, where
node v ∈ V is drawn with probability Pv.
3. Update t← t+ τ and re-calculate sv(t), r(t), γv(t).
We include the implementation of this algorithm in Matlab below.
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ABM Gil.m (Matlab m-file)
% ABM simulation that uses the Gillespie’s Algorithm
%
% Input:
% L: cell array, cell i is a row vector listing
% neighbours of node i
% itn: number of iterations to record
% dt: size of each iteration
% theta: threshold (scalar or Nx1 vector)
% c1, c2: protesters’ enthusiasm, policing efficiency
% beta: police capacity
% ic: initial condition (fraction chosen unif. at random)
%
% Output:
% r: r(t) for t = 0:dt:itn*dt
% T_final: the time at which the dynamics end (or inf if
% dynamics do not end before itn*dt)
function [r, T_final] = ABM_Gil(L, itn, dt, theta, c1, c2, beta, ic)
N = length(L); % Number of individuals
T_final = itn*dt; % Placeholder for T_final
%% Set up initial condition
r = zeros(itn+1, 1); % Record r at equal timepoints given in time
r(1) = floor(ic*N)/N;
time_temp = 0; % Keep track of time inside the loop
time_next = 1; % *dt = Next time to record r
r_temp = r(1); % Keep track of r inside loop
% Select floor(ic*N) individuals uniformly at random to be active
A_num = floor(ic*N); % Number of active nodes
A_idx = zeros(N,1); % Indices of active nodes padded with 0’s
A_idx(1:A_num) = datasample(1:N, A_num, ’Replace’, false);
A = zeros(N,1); % A(i) = 1 if i is active (=0 o/w)
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ABM Gil.m (Matlab m-file - continued)
A( A_idx ) = 1;
% Fraction of neighbours that are active
neigh_activity = zeros(N,1);
for i=1:N
% calculate fraction of neighbours that are active
neigh_activity(i) = mean( A(L{i}) );
end
% Nodes who are considering joining the revolution
C = (1 - A).*(neigh_activity >= theta);
C_num = sum(C); % Number of considering
C_idx = [find(C);...
zeros(N-C_num, 1)]; % Indices of considering nodes (pad with 0)
% Calculate rate (Lambda)
rate = c1*C_num + c2*A_num*(r_temp < beta);
% While the time elapsed is less that T_final
% While 0 < r_temp < 1 (r = 0 and r = 1 are absorbing states)
% While rate > 0 (this condition implies 0 < r_temp < 1)
while time_temp < T_final && rate > 0
% Step 1: Choose time of next event and event index
% Choose tau ~ Exponential(rate)
tau = 1/rate*log(1/rand);
time_temp = time_temp + tau;
% Step 2: Determine which node changes state
% Step 3: Update
% Determine whether C->A (inactive to active) or A->I/C (active to
% inactive)
if (r_temp >= beta) || (rand < c1*C_num/(c1*C_num + c2*A_num))
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ABM Gil.m (Matlab m-file - continued)
% If r(itn-1) >= beta then only C->A is possible
% If rand~U(0,1) < c1*C_num/(...) then choose C->A
% Choose one of C_idx at random to change from C to A.
mu = datasample(1:C_num,1);
CtoA = C_idx(mu);
% Update status of chosen node
A(CtoA) = 1;
A_num = A_num + 1;
A_idx(A_num) = CtoA;
C(CtoA) = 0;
C_num = C_num - 1;
C_idx = [C_idx(1:mu-1); C_idx(mu+1:end); 0];
neigh_change = L{CtoA};
else
% Otherwise choose A->I/C
% Choose one of A_idx at random to change from A to I/C
mu = datasample(1:A_num,1);
AtoI = A_idx(mu);
% Update status of chosen node
% Since we do not know whether A->I or A->C we update C with
% the update of neighbours (below)
A(AtoI) = 0;
A_num = A_num-1;
A_idx = [A_idx(1:mu-1);A_idx(mu+1:end);0];
neigh_change = [AtoI, L{AtoI}];
end
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ABM Gil.m (Matlab m-file - continued)
% Step 3: (Continued) update neigh_activity, C, C_num, C_idx
for i = neigh_change
neigh_i = L{i};
neigh_activity(i) = mean(A(neigh_i));
if length(theta) > 1
C(i) = (1-A(i))*(neigh_activity(i)>=theta(i));
else
C(i) = (1-A(i))*(neigh_activity(i)>=theta);
end
% if C(i)==1 then add/remove i to C_idx and C_num, if necessary
mu = find(C_idx==i, 1);
if (C(i)==1) && isempty(mu)
C_num = C_num+1;
C_idx(C_num) = i;
elseif (C(i)==0) && ~isempty(mu)
C_num = C_num-1;
C_idx = [C_idx(1:mu-1);C_idx(mu+1:end);0];
end
end
r_temp = mean(A);
% Step 4: Record, if necessary
while (time_next<itn+1) && (time_next*dt < time_temp)
time_next = time_next+1;
r(time_next) = r_temp;
end
% Recalculate rate for next step
rate = c1*C_num + c2*A_num*(r_temp < beta);
end
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ABM Gil.m (Matlab m-file - continued)
% If the while loop ends due to an absorbing state or bottle neck (i.e.
% r_temp=0, r_temp=1, or rate=0) then fill out the rest of the vector r
% with the last value of r_temp.
r(find(r==0,1):end) = r_temp;
if time_temp < T_final
T_final = time_temp;
else
T_final = inf;
end
C.3 Optimization of visibility parameter (α) for the
step-visibility function (SVF) model
In this section we present the Matlab code used to compute the optimal α for the SVF
model for a given θ of the ABM, see Section 3.4.3. The file dependencies are as follows:
• fit alpha.m → ABM Gil.m, StepOBJ.m
• StepOBJ.m → StepSoln.m
In words, fit alpha.m is the root m-file that provides the Matlab code for computing the
optimal α for the SVF model for a given θ of the ABM. The m-file fit alpha.m uses the
file ABM Gil.m to simulate the ABM via Gillespie’s Algorithm (see Appendix C.2). The
optimal α is computed using the Matlab function fminsearch with the objective function
defined in StepOBJ.m. Finally, the file StepOBJ.m uses the file StepSoln.m which computes
the solution to the SVF ODE as given in Section 2.3.2.
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fit alpha.m (Matlab m-file)
% fit_alpha.m: Find the alpha that best fits the output of the SVF 1-D ODE
% model to the simulated ABM process
%
% In order for this procedure to work, parameters must be in Region III0
% and initial condition must be in (1-alpha, beta).
%
% Input:
% - X: Nx1 cell array, cell i lists neighbours of node i
% - params: [c1, c2, beta, r0, itn, dt, rep]
% - c1, c2, beta, r0 are parameters for the SVF ODE
% - itn + 1 is the number of times which the ABM is recorded
% - dt is the amount of time between ABM recorded values
% - rep is the number of realizations of the ABM
% - theta: linear thresholds (scalar or Nx1 vector)
%
% Global variables:
% - rep: number of realizations of ABM
% - r0: initial condition for which to solve SVF ODE
% - beta, c_1, c_2: parameters for SVF ODE
% - t: times at which to solve SVF ODE
% - r: 2-dimensional array containing ABM realizations.
% - Rows are different times (t)
% - Columns are different realizations (rep).
%
% Output:
% - alpha: optimal alpha
% - R: First rep columns ABM realizations. Last column sol’n to SVF ODE
% - error_alpha:[alpha values, L2 error between ABM
% simulations and SVF ODE]
%
% m-file dependencies:
% - ABM_Gil.m
% - StepOBJ.m
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fit alpha.m (Matlab m-file - continued)
function [alpha, R, error_alpha] = fit_alpha(X, params, theta)
global rep r0 beta c1 c2 t r
c1 = params(1); c2 = params(2); beta = params(3); r0 = params(4);
itn = params(5); dt = params(6); rep = params(7);
t = (0:dt:dt*itn)’;
r = zeros(itn+1, rep);
%% Step 1: Simulate ABM
for j = 1:rep
r(:,j) = ABM_Gil(X, itn, dt, theta, c1, c2, beta, r0);
end
R = r;
%% Step 2: Fit alpha to simulation data
alpha = fminsearch(@StepOBJ, 1-theta);
[~, Y_temp] = StepOBJ(alpha);
R = [R, Y_temp];
%% Step 3: Find error
error_alpha = (.70:0.001:.9)’;
error_alpha = [error_alpha, zeros(length(error_alpha), 2)];
for j = 1:length(error_alpha)
error_alpha(j,2) = StepOBJ(error_alpha(j,1));
end
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StepOBJ.m (Matlab m-file)
% Compute the L2-error for between the solution to the SVF ODE and the ABM
% realizations.
%
% Input:
% - x = alpha
%
% Global variables:
% - rep: number of realizations of ABM
% - r0: initial condition for which to solve SVF ODE
% - beta, c_1, c_2: parameters for SVF ODE
% - t: times at which to solve SVF ODE
% - r: 2-dimensional array containing ABM realizations.
% - Rows are different times (t)
% - Columns are different realizations (rep).
%
% Output:
% - S: L-2 error
% - Y: vector giving SVF solution
function [S,Y] = StepOBJ(x)
global rep r0 beta c1 c2 t r
Y = StepSoln(x, [c1, c2, beta, r0], t);
S = kron(Y, ones(1,rep));
S = ( S - r ).^2;
S = sum(sum(S));
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StepSoln.m (Matlab m-file)
% Calculate the solution to SVF ODE
%
% Input:
% - x = alpha
% - params = [c1, c2, beta, r0]
% - r0: initial condition for which to solve ODE
% - beta, c_1, c_2: parameters for ODE
% - t: times at which to solve ODE
%
% Output:
% - Y: solution to ODE
function Y = StepSoln(x, params, t)
% make sure that t is a column vector
t = reshape(t, length(t), 1);
c1 = params(1);
c2 = params(2);
beta = params(3);
r0 = params(4);
if (1-x <= beta) && (c1/(c1+c2) <= 1-x) && (r0 < beta) && (1-x < r0)
% Region III0/I with r0 in (1-alpha, beta)
talpha = 1/(c1+c2)*log( (c1-r0*(c1+c2)) / (c1-(1-x)*(c1+c2)) );
idx = find(t > talpha,1);
if isempty(idx)
idx = length(t) + 1;
end
Y = (c1 - (c1-r0*(c1+c2)) * exp( -(c1+c2)*t(1:(idx-1)) ) ) / (c1+c2);
Y = [Y; (1-x)*exp( -c2*(t(idx:end) - talpha) )];
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StepSoln.m (Matlab m-file - continued)
elseif (1-x <= beta && r0 >= beta) || (beta < 1-x && r0 > 1-x)
% Region I, III0, IIIe, III1 with r0 >= beta, or
% Region II with r0 > 1-alpha
Y = 1-(1-r0)*exp(-c1*t);
elseif (1-x <= beta && r0 <= 1-x) || (beta < 1-x && r0 < beta)
% Region I, III0, IIIe, III1, with r0 <= 1-alpha, or
% Region II with r0 < beta
Y = r0*exp(-c2*t);
elseif c1/(c1+c2) < beta && c1/(c1+c2) > 1-x && r0 < beta && 1-x < r0
% Region IIIe with r0 in (1-alpha, beta)
Y = c1/(c1+c2) - (c1/(c1+c2) - r0)*exp(-(c1+c2)*t);
elseif 1-x <= beta && beta <= c1/(c1+c2) && r0 < beta && 1-x < r0
% Region I/III1 with r0 in (1-alpha, beta)
tbeta = -1/(c1+c2)*log( (c1/(c1+c2) - beta)/(c1/(c1+c2) - r0) );
idx = find(t>tbeta,1);
if isempty(idx)
idx = length(t) + 1;
end
Y = c1/(c1+c2) - (c1/(c1+c2) - r0)*exp(-(c1+c2)*t(1:idx-1));
Y = [Y; 1 - (1-beta)*exp(-c1*(t(idx:end)-tbeta))];
elseif beta < 1-x && r0 >= beta && r0 <= 1-x
% Region II with r0 in[beta, 1-alpha]
Y = r0*ones(length(t),1);
end
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Appendix D
Supplementary Materials for
Chapter 4: Modelling the Prevalence
of Smoking
D.1 Smoking Prevalence (x) and Cigarette Consump-
tion (c) Data
The following is a link to Additional file 2 of [108], which is a comma separated values
(CSV) file containing four columns: country number as it appears in Table 4.1, year (t),
measurement (x(t) or c(t)), and type of measurement (0 indicates a smoking prevalence
measurement, while 1 indicates a cigarette consumption measurement).
D.2 Proxy Data (n): articles published on the health
effects of smoking
The following is a link to Additional file 3 of [108], which is a comma separated values
(CSV) file containing three columns: year (t), number of articles published in year t, and
cumulative number of articles published up to and including year t (n(t)).
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D.3 Matlab Code for Modelling the Prevalence of
Smoking
The following is a link to Additional file 4 of [108], which is ZIP file containing Matlab
data files and simulation code used in preparation of Chapter 4.
D.4 US Population Data for Smoking Counterfactual
Scenario
The following is a link to Additional file 5 of [108], which is comma separated values (CSV)
file containing two columns: year (t) and population (Npop(t)).
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Appendix E
Supplementary Materials for
Chapter 5: Modelling the Dynamics
of the Body Mass Index (BMI)
E.1 Data
E.1.1 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
(NHANES)
NHANES data are available from the NHANES website
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/nhanes_questionnaires.htm.
Directly measured BMI measurements are given by the variable BMXBMI. Self-reported
BMI measurements are calculated from the variables WHD010 (self-reported height at
time of interview) and WHD020 (self-reported weight at time of interview). Self-reported
year-over-year change in BMI are calculated from self-reported BMI and from variables
WHD010 and WHD050 (self-reported weight one year prior to interview).
Data were downloaded directly from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) website as “.XPT” files (in SAS format) and imported into Matlab. The variable
BMXBMI is found in data files with names starting with “BMX”, the variables WHD010,
WHD020, and WHD050 are found in data files with names starting with “WHQ”. We also
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make use of the variable RIDAGEYR (age at time of interview), which is found in data
files with names starting with “DEMO”, and the SEQN variable (interviewee identification
numbers), which is found in all data files. File names are completed by adding the suffix
“.XPT” for survey year 1999-2000, “ B.XPT” for survey year 2001-2002, “ C.XPT” for
survey year 2003-2004, etc...
E.1.2 Northwestern Medicine (NU) Medical Records
The NU data set consists of medical records from the Northwestern Medical system of
hospitals and clinics, i.e., patients of the following Chicago area locations:
• Bucktown (1776 N. Milwaukee Avenue, Chicago, IL, 60647),
• Deerfield (350 S. Waukegan Road Suites 100, 150 and 200, Deerfield, IL, 60015),
• Delano Court (in the Roosevelt Collection, 1135 S. Delano Court Suite A201,
Chicago, IL, 60605),
• Evanston (1704 Maple Avenue Suites 100 and 200, Evanston, IL, 60201),
• Glenview (2701 Patriot Boulevard, Glenview, IL, 60026),
• Grayslake (1475 E. Belvidere Road, Pavilion C Suite 385, Grayslake, IL, 60030),
• Highland Park (600 Central Avenue Suite 333, Highland Park, IL, 60035),
• Lake Forest Hospital (660 N. Westmoreland Rd., Lake Forest, IL, 60045),
• Libertyville (1800 Hollister Drive Suite 102, Libertyville, IL, 60048),
• Lakeview (1333 W. Belmont Avenue Suites 100 and 200, Chicago, IL, 60657),
• Loop 1 (20 S. Clark Street Suite 1100, Chicago, IL, 60603),
• Loop 2 (111 W. Washington St. Suite 1801, Chicago, IL, 60602),
• Northwestern Memorial Hospital (251 E. Huron St., Chicago, IL, 60611),
• River North (635 N. Dearborn Street Suite 100, Chicago, IL, 60654),
• Sauganash (4801 W Peterson, Suite 406, Chicago, IL, 60646),
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• Skokie (10024 Skokie Blvd Suite 304, Skokie, IL, 60077), and
• SoNo (South of North Avenue, 1460 N. Halsted Street Suites 203, 502, and 504,
Chicago, IL, 60642).
We note that the NU data set may contain multiple measurements per individual per
year. In that case the BMI for individual i in year t is calculated using the average weight
of individual i in year t and the average height of individual i taken over all years.
E.1.3 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
BRFSS data are available from the BRFSS website
http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/annual_data/annual_data.htm.
BRFSS surveys record BMI measurements in variable BMI for survey years 1984-1999,
BMI2 for survey years 2000-2002, BMI3 for survey year 2003, BMI4 for survey years
2004-2010, and BMI5 for survey years 2011 onwards. Data were downloaded directly
from the CDC website as “.XPT” files (in SAS format), converted to CSV format, and
then imported into Matlab. File names for BRFSS survey data for years 1978–2010 start
with “CDBRFS”, while file names for BRFSS survey data for years 2011–2013 start with
“LLCP”. File names are completed by adding the suffix “87.XPT’ for year 1987, “88.XPT”
for year 1988, etc...
E.2 Additional Details for Methods
E.2.1 Properties of p
(0)
eq (x; k0, x
?) (Eq. (5.16))
We note that for any population the BMI distribution must be strictly contained in the
interval [0,∞). This implies that peq(0) = 0 and that limx→∞ peq(x) = 0. Assuming that
b(0) = 0 (which holds for our model, see Eq. (5.15)), it follows that integrating Eq. (5.12)
yields
0 = −peq(x)a(x) + 1
2
d
dx
[
peq(x)b
2(x)
]
+ peq(0)a(0)− 1
2
d
dx
[
peq(x)b
2(x)
]
x=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
, (E.1)
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which has the solution
peq(x) = ξ exp
(
2
∫ x
0
a(x˜)− b(x˜)b′(x˜)
b2(x˜)
dx˜
)
, (E.2)
where ξ is a normalization constant such that
∫∞
0
peq(x)dx = 1. When a(x) = kI(x
? − x)
and b(x) =
√
kb x, i.e., when we assume kS = 0 in Eqs. (5.10) and (5.15), we can re-arrange
Eq. (E.1) to yield
dp
(0)
eq
dx
(x) = 2
kI(x
? − x)− kbx
kbx2
p(0)eq (x) ,
which implies that p
(0)
eq (x) is a single peaked probability distribution whose mode1 is given
by the expression x? kI
kb
/(kI
kb
+ 1). We can also re-arrange Eq. (E.1) to yield
xp(0)eq (x) = −
kb
kI
d
dx
[
x2
2
p(0)eq (x)
]
+ x?p(0)eq (x) ,
which implies that
〈x〉 =
∫ ∞
0
xp(0)eq (x)dx = −
kb
kI
∫ ∞
0
d
dx
[
1
2
x2p(0)eq (x)
]
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+x?
∫ ∞
0
p(0)eq (x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= x? .
Multiplying Eq. (E.1) by x and re-arranging yields
x2p(0)eq (x) = −
1
2
kb
kI
d
dx
[
x3p(0)eq (x)
]
+
1
2
kb
kI
x2p(0)eq (x) + xx
?p(0)eq (x) ,
which implies〈
x2
〉
=
∫ ∞
0
x2p(0)eq (x)dx
= −1
2
kb
kI
∫ ∞
0
d
dx
[
x3p(0)eq (x)
]
dx+
1
2
kb
kI
∫ ∞
0
x2p(0)eq (x)dx+ x
?
∫ ∞
0
xp(0)eq (x)dx
=
1
2
kb
kI
〈
x2
〉
+ x?2 .
Re-arranging now yields 〈x2〉 = 2x?2 kI
kb
/(2kI
kb
− 1). We note that we require 〈x2〉 ≥ 0,
i.e. that 2kI/kb > 1. We also note that this condition is satisfied by all empirical BMI
1The mode of a continuous random variable with probability density function f(x) is argmaxx f(x).
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distributions in the NHANES, NU, and BRFSS data sets. Similarly, multiplying Eq. (E.1)
by x2, re-arranging, integrating, and solving for 〈x3〉, yields 〈x3〉 = kI
kb
/(kI
kb
− 1) 〈x2〉x?.
The mean, variance, skewness, and mode skewness can now be computed using the
following relations to the mode and the first three moments.
mean = 〈x〉
variance =
〈
x2
〉− 〈x〉2
skewness =
〈x3〉 − 3 〈x〉 (variance)− 〈x〉3
(variance)
3
2
, and
mode skewness =
mean−mode
(variance)
1
2
.
E.2.2 Solving Eq. (5.12) numerically for p
(0)
eq (x) and p
(n)
eq (x)
For a(x) and b(x) as in Eqs. (5.10) and (5.15), respectively, the solution to Eq. (5.12) is
given implicitly by Eq. (E.2), i.e., Eq. (E.2) becomes
peq(x) ∝ p(0)eq (x; ki/kb, x?) exp
2kS
kb
∫ x
0
∫ ∞
0
φx˜,σ(xˆ)(xˆ− x˜)
(
1− 1
2
(xˆ−x˜)2
σ2
)
peq(xˆ)
x˜2
dxˆdx˜
 .
In order to solve for peq(x) we implement the following iterative scheme.
p(n+1)eq (x) = p
(n+1)
eq (x; kI/kb, x
?, kS/kb, σ)
∝ p(0)eq (x; kI/kb, x?) exp
2kS
kb
∫ x
0
∫ ∞
0
φx˜,σ(xˆ)(xˆ− x˜)
[
1− 1
2
(xˆ−x˜)2
σ2
]
p
(n)
eq (xˆ)
x˜2
dxˆdx˜
 .
(E.3)
Let m = 90, ∆z = 1, and ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m : zi = 10.5 + (i− 1)∆z. We set
p(0)eq (zi) =
z
−2(kI/kb+1)
i exp
(
−2kI
kb
x?
zi
)
∑m
j=1 z
−2(kI/kb+1)
j exp
(
−2kI
kb
x?
zj
)
∆z
.
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We then set
p(n+1)eq (zi) = p
(0)
eq (zi)×
exp
2kS
kb
i∑
k=1
m∑
j=1
1
2
(
1 + I{k<i}
) φzk,σ(zj)(zj − zk)(1− 12 (zj−zk)2σ2 ) p(n)eq (zj)
z2k
∆z2
 .
where I{X} = 1 if X is true and I{X} = 0 otherwise, and where we terminate the iterative
process once ∥∥∥∥∥p(n+1)eq − p(n)eqm
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(
p
(n+1)
eq (zi)− p(n)eq (zi)
m
)2
< 10−12 .
E.2.3 Fitting distribution functions to empirical BMI data
Suppose that f(x; θ) is a probability density function with parameters θ. We fit f(x; θ)
to empirical BMI data measurements {xi}Ni=1 using the principle of maximum likelihood
parameter estimation. Specifically, we set
θˆ = argmax
θ
N∏
i=1
f(xi; θ),
where Lf (θ|x) =
∏N
i=1 f(xi; θ) is called the likelihood function. In Matlab we perform this
optimization using the Matlab function fminsearch to solve the equivalent optimization
problem
θˆ = argmin
θ
− log(Lf (θ|x)) = argmin
θ
−
N∑
i=1
log [f(xi|θ)]
We note that we compute a separate set of parameters for each year of BMI data.
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a generalization of the principle of maximum
likelihood parameter estimation [4]. Suppose that we have data ~x that is distributed
according to an unknown distribution function g(x). Further suppose that we wish to
approximate g(x) by the distribution function f(·|θ) with parameters θ. We can estimate
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the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of θ by maximizing the average log-likelihood
function SN(f(·|θ)), i.e.
θˆ = argmax
θ
1
N
log (Lf (θ|x)) = argmax
θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
log(f(xi|θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=SN (f(·|θ))
.
It can be shown that the mean log-likelihood function SN(f(·|θ)) converges with prob-
ability 1 to
S(g; f(·|θ)) =
∫
g(x) log(f(x|θ))dx.
From this quantity we define
I(g; f(·|θ)) = S(g; g)− S(g; f(·|θ)),
which is called the Kullback-Leibler mean information for the discrimination between g(x)
and f(·|θ), and which can be shown to be non-negative with I(g; f(·|θ)) = 0 ⇐⇒ f(x|θ) =
g(x) almost everywhere. Roughly speaking, I(g; f(·|θ)) can be interpreted as the amount of
information lost when f(·|θ) is used to approximate g(x). This quantity induces a natural
model selection criteria, i.e. we select the model that minimizes I(g; f(·|θ)).
The key observation for the establishment of the AIC criterion is that the quantity
I(g; f(·|θ)) can be approximated as follows. Suppose that the true model is g(x) = f(x|θ0)
for some θ0 ∈ Θ and suppose that θˆ is the MLE for the model restricted to some subspace
Θ′ ⊂ Θ, i.e.
θˆ = argmax
θ∈Θ′⊂Θ
Lf (θ|x).
Then it can be shown that
E
[
2N I(g; f(·|θˆ))
]
= E
[
2N I(f(·|θ0); f(·|θˆ))
]
= c+ 2k − 2
N∑
i=1
log
(
f(xi|θˆ)
)
= c+ 2k − 2 log
(
Lf (θˆ|x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=AIC(f(·|θˆ))
,
where c is a constant, k is the dimension of Θ′, and where AIC(f(·|θˆ)) = 2k−Lf (θˆ|x) is the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). It follows that minimizing I(p; f(·|θ)) is equivalent to
minimizing the AIC.
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We now define the relative likelihood ratio for model selection. Suppose that we com-
pute the AIC two different functional forms resulting in AIC values AIC1 = 2k1−2 log (L1)
and AIC2 = 2k2 − 2 log (L2) with AIC1 < AIC2. Then the relative likelihood ratio
r = exp
(
AIC1 − AIC2
2
)
= exp (k1 − k2) L2L1
is interpreted as follows: model 1 is r times as likely to be the “best” approximation to
the true distribution than model 2. In this case, “best” is in the context of minimizing the
AIC (i.e. minimizing the loss of information when using models 1 or 2 to approximate the
“true” distribution g(x)).
E.2.4 Estimating parameters (kI , x
?, kS, σ) from individual level
data
Consider individual i from survey year t = t1 with BMI measurements at times t1 and
t2 = t1 + ∆t, i.e. with xi(t1) and xi(t2). We denote the change in BMI by ∆xi(tt) =
xi(t2)− xi(t1). For  > 0 we define
aˆ(xi(t); ) =
∑
j:|xj(t)−xi(t)|<
∆xj(t)
∆t
N(xi(t), )
, and (E.4a)
bˆ(xi(t); ) =
√√√√∑j:|xj(t)−xi(t)|< ∆x2j (t)∆t
N(xi(t), )
−∆t
[∑
j:|xj(t)−xi(t)|<
∆xj(t)
∆t
N(xi(t), )
]2
, (E.4b)
respectively, where N(xi(t), ) is the number of individuals j with |xj(t)− xi(t)| < , i.e.,
N(xi(t), ) =
∑
j:|xj(t)−xi(t)|<
1 .
To estimate
√
kb we compute bˆ(xi(t); ) from BMI data and regress it on xi(t). Solving
for the remaining parameters now breaks down into two cases, i.e. kS > 0 and kS = 0.
Assume that kS > 0 in Eq. (5.10), i.e. that social interactions between individuals do
have an effect on the dynamics of individuals’ BMI. In this case, in order to estimate the
remaining parameters, i.e. (kI , x
?, kS, σ), we define the objective function
S(kI , x
?, kS, σ; ) =
√√√√∑i,t [aˆ(xi(t); )− a(xi(t))]2∑
i,t 1
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and solve the optimization problem(
kˆI , xˆ
?, kˆS, σˆ
)
= argmin
(kI ,x?,kS ,σ)
S(kI , x
?, kS, σ; ), (E.5)
where we have suppressed the dependence of (kˆI , xˆ
?, kˆS, σˆ) on  for convenience of notation.
Recall from Eq. (5.10) that
a(xi(t)) = kI(x
? − xi(t)) + kS duS
dxi
(xi(t)),
where
duS
dxi
(xi(t)) =
∫ ∞
0
φxi(t),σ(xj(t))(xj(t)− xi(t))
(
1− 1
2
(xj(t)− xi(t))2
σ2
)
p(xj(t), t)dxj.
Observe that, for fixed σ, the objective function S(kI , x
?, kS, σ; ) is the objective function
for the linear regression of aˆ(xi(t); ) on −xi(t), duSdxi (xi(t);σ), and a constant. It follows,
therefore, that there is a unique (k˜I(σ), x˜
?(σ), k˜S(σ)) that solves(
k˜I(σ), x˜
?(σ), k˜S(σ)
)
= argmin
(kI ,x?,kS)
S(kI , x
?, kS, σ; ) , (E.6)
and that this solution can be computed using linear regression. Solving the optimization
problem in Eq. (E.5) is now reduced to a one dimensional problem, i.e., we solve
σˆ = argmin
σ
S
(
k˜I(σ), x˜
?(σ), k˜S(σ), σ
)
and set (kˆI , xˆ
?, kˆS) = (k˜I(σˆ), x˜
?(σˆ), k˜S(σˆ)).
Assume that kS = 0 in Eq. (5.10), i.e. that social interactions do not have an effect
on the dynamics of individuals’ BMI. In this case, in order to estimate the remaining
parameters, i.e. (kI , x
?) (with kS = 0 and σ undetermined), we regress aˆ(xi(t); ) on
−xi(t) and a constant.
We note that the methodology presented in this section can only be applied to NHANES
and NU BMI data, because these are the only data sets that have information on how
individuals’ BMI changes over time. We are able to compute ∆xi(t) for individuals i in
the NHANES data set with self-reported weights WHD010 (current, i.e. at time t2) and
WHD050 (one year prior to survey, i.e. at time t1), and with self-reported height WHD020.
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For convenience we set t = 1999 for the 1999-2000 NHANES survey, t = 2001 for the 2001-
2002 NHANES survey, etc... We note that for NHANES data ∆t = 1. For NU data we
also consider ∆t = 1, i.e., we consider individuals for whom we can compute BMI in two
consecutive years. NU data for individuals in consecutive years exists for years
t ∈ {1996, . . . , 2013}.
As above, if multiple weight measurements are present in year t we calculate the BMI for
that year using the average weight in year t, whereas if multiple heights measurements are
present then we calculate BMI using the average height (where the average is taken over all
years). We note that for both data sets we use  = 1 to compute Eqs. (E.4a) and (E.4b).
All computations are performed in Matlab. Regressions are performed using the Matlab
function regress. Optimization are performed using the Matlab function fminsearch.
E.2.5 Simulating Stochastic Differential Equation
We simulate Eq. (5.9) using the following forward Euler method with ∆t = 0.01:
1. Initialize initial condition xi(t1) from the data and set at time t = t1.
2. For each individual i compute a(xi(t)) and b(xi(t)).
3. For each individual generate a random variable ηi ∼ N (0, 1).
4. Set xi(t+ ∆t) = xi(t) + a(xi)∆t+ b(xi)ηi
√
∆t and set t = t+ ∆t.
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until t = t1 + 1 = t2.
E.3 Results
E.3.1 Population-level Model Implications
Empirical BMI distributions and fitted models
The following three figures, i.e. Figs. E.1-E.3, display the results from fitting empirical
NHANES, NU, and BRFSS data to the nonsocial model distribution p
(0)
eq (x), the social
model distribution peq(x), the log-normal distribution flog(x), and the skew-normal distri-
bution fskew(x).
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Figure E.1: Results from fitting NHANES BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four
probability distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red),
model with social utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—
dash-dotted blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). NHANES
BMI distributions are calculated from NHANES survey years: (a) 1999-2000, (b) 2001-
2002, (c) 2003-2004, (d) 2005-2006, (e) 2007-2008, and (f) 2009-2010. Results from 2011-
2012 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Figure E.2: Results from fitting NU BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four probability
distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model with so-
cial utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-dotted
blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). NU distributions are
calculated for years (a) 1996, (b) 1997, . . . , (o) 2010, (p) 2012, (q)2013, and (r) 2014.
Results from 2011 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Figure E.2: Results from fitting NU BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four probability
distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model with so-
cial utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-dotted
blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). NU distributions are
calculated for years (a) 1996, (b) 1997, . . . , (o) 2010, (p) 2012, (q)2013, and (r) 2014.
Results from 2011 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Figure E.2: Results from fitting NU BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four probability
distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model with so-
cial utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-dotted
blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). NU distributions are
calculated for years (a) 1996, (b) 1997, . . . , (o) 2010, (p) 2012, (q)2013, and (r) 2014.
Results from 2011 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Figure E.3: Results from fitting BRFSS BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four prob-
ability distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model
with social utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-
dotted blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). BRFSS dis-
tributions are calculated for years (a) 1987, (b) 1988, . . . , (x) 2010, (y) 2012, and (z)
2013.Results from 2011 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Figure E.3: Results from fitting BRFSS BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four prob-
ability distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model
with social utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-
dotted blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). BRFSS dis-
tributions are calculated for years (a) 1987, (b) 1988, . . . , (x) 2010, (y) 2012, and (z)
2013.Results from 2011 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Figure E.3: Results from fitting BRFSS BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four prob-
ability distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model
with social utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-
dotted blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). BRFSS dis-
tributions are calculated for years (a) 1987, (b) 1988, . . . , (x) 2010, (y) 2012, and (z)
2013.Results from 2011 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Figure E.3: Results from fitting BRFSS BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four prob-
ability distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model
with social utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-
dotted blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). BRFSS dis-
tributions are calculated for years (a) 1987, (b) 1988, . . . , (x) 2010, (y) 2012, and (z)
2013.Results from 2011 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Figure E.3: Results from fitting BRFSS BMI distributions (solid black dots) to four prob-
ability distribution functions: model without social utility (Eq. (5.16)—solid red), model
with social utility (Eq. (E.3)—dashed red), log-normal null distribution (Eq. (5.17)—dash-
dotted blue), and skew normal null distribution (Eq. (5.18)—dotted green). BRFSS dis-
tributions are calculated for years (a) 1987, (b) 1988, . . . , (x) 2010, (y) 2012, and (z)
2013.Results from 2011 are shown in Fig. 5.1.
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Akaike Information Criterion
The following three tables, i.e. Tables E.1-E.3, display the results from computing the rel-
ative likelihood ratio for fitting empirical NHANES, NU, and BRFSS data to the nonsocial
model distribution p
(0)
eq (x), the social model distribution peq(x), the log-normal distribution
flog(x), and the skew-normal distribution fskew(x).
Table E.1: Relative likelihood of non-social p
(0)
eq (x), social peq(x), log-normal flog(x), and
skew-normal fskew(x) models for NHANES empirical BMI distribution
Relative Likelihood exp[(AICmin − AICi)/2]
Year p
(0)
eq (x) peq(x) flog(x) fskew(x)
1999 2.8× 10−5 1 2.5× 10−34 7.5× 10−23
2001 2.9× 10−4 1 3.4× 10−30 8.5× 10−32
2003 3.1× 10−5 1 2.7× 10−29 1.2× 10−27
2005 1.7× 10−5 1 3.0× 10−29 2.1× 10−19
2007 1.0× 10−2 1 1.3× 10−25 7.7× 10−13
2009 1.3× 10−5 1 3.0× 10−29 6.2× 10−21
2011 1.3× 10−2 1 1.4× 10−21 1.1× 10−9
Table E.2: Relative likelihood of non-social p
(0)
eq (x), social peq(x), log-normal flog(x), and
skew-normal fskew(x) models for NU empirical BMI distribution
Relative Likelihood exp[(AICmin − AICi)/2]
Year p
(0)
eq (x) peq(x) flog(x) fskew(x)
1996 1.9× 10−10 1 1.7× 10−24 5.3× 10−9
1997 2.1× 10−10 1 7.5× 10−35 2.9× 10−13
1998 3.8× 10−33 1 5.0× 10−56 8.4× 10−43
1999 3.8× 10−33 1 6.0× 10−84 4.2× 10−75
2000 1.4× 10−19 1 1.4× 10−77 5.0× 10−56
2001 1.9× 10−35 1 1.8× 10−136 8.0× 10−78
2002 1.8× 10−64 1 9.9× 10−202 2.6× 10−114
2003 – 2014 < 10−300 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
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Table E.3: Relative likelihood of non-social p
(0)
eq (x), social peq(x), log-normal flog(x), and
skew-normal fskew(x) models for BRFSS empirical BMI distribution
Relative Likelihood exp[(AICmin − AICi)/2]
Year p
(0)
eq (x) peq(x) flog(x) fskew(x)
1987 9.8× 10−138 1 < 10−300 2.5× 10−228
1988 4.1× 10−135 1 < 10−300 5.9× 10−242
1989 4.3× 10−243 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
1990 2.3× 10−241 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
1991 8.6× 10−279 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
1992 1.0× 10−299 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
1993 < 10−300 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
1994 1 0.14 < 10−300 2.1× 10−290
1995 1 0.14 < 10−300 < 10−300
1996 1 0.14 < 10−300 < 10−300
1997 – 2013 < 10−300 1 < 10−300 < 10−300
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Nonsocial model fitted parameters
Below we plot the parameter estimates resulting from fitting p
(0)
eq to empirical BMI data.
It is interesting to note that not only do we observe in Fig. E.4 that the parameters kI/kb
and x? are indeed highly negatively correlated, but the relationship between kI/kb and x
?
seems to be approximately linear. Indeed, it appears that the relationship between kI/kb
and x? could described by the same line of best fit in all three independently collected data
sets. We emphasize that this relationship is not a consequence of the way in which we
specified our mathematical model, but a feature of the data that our model has uncovered
and that will need additional research in order to properly explain.
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Figure E.4: Relationship between fitted parameters kI/kb and x
? of p
(0)
eq (x; kI/kb, x
?). Val-
ues of parameters kI/kb and x
? resulting from fitting p
(0)
eq (x) (given in Eq. (5.16)) to empir-
ical BMI distributions for each year of available data. (Blue dots) NHANES surveys; (red
exes) NU data; (green crosses) BRFSS surveys. The parameters kI/kb and x
? are highly
negatively correlated.
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E.3.2 Individual-level Model Implications
The following two figures, i.e. Figs. E.5-E.6, display the results from computing the average
and standard deviation in year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI.
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Figure E.5: Average and standard deviation in year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI.
The line of best fit for average year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI (blue dots) is
given by the regression specified in Eq. (5.19) (solid black line). The line of best fit for
standard deviation for year-over-year in individuals’ BMI (red squares) is given by the
regression specified in Eq. (5.20) (solid black line). The line y = 0 is given by a dashed
black line. NHANES survey years: (a) 1999-2000, (b) 2001-2002, (c) 2003-2004, (d) 2005-
2006, (e) 2007-2008, and (f) 2009-2010. Results from 2011-2012 are shown in Fig. 5.3.
Note: to improve visualization of data we display only 1,000 data points for each of aˆ (x)
and bˆ (x), selected uniformly at random.
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Figure E.6: Average and standard deviation in year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI.
The line of best fit for average year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI (blue dots) is
given by the regression specified in Eq. (5.19) (solid black line). The line of best fit for
standard deviation for year-over-year in individuals’ BMI (red squares) is given by the
regression specified in Eq. (5.20) (solid black line). The line y = 0 is given by a dashed
black line. NU data for years (a) 1996, (b) 1997, . . . , (o) 2010, (p) 2011, (q)2012, and (r)
2013. Note: to improve visualization of data we display only 1,000 data points for each of
aˆ (x) and bˆ (x), selected uniformly at random.
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Figure E.6: Average and standard deviation in year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI.
The line of best fit for average year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI (blue dots) is
given by the regression specified in Eq. (5.19) (solid black line). The line of best fit for
standard deviation for year-over-year in individuals’ BMI (red squares) is given by the
regression specified in Eq. (5.20) (solid black line). The line y = 0 is given by a dashed
black line. NU data for years (a) 1996, (b) 1997, . . . , (o) 2010, (p) 2011, (q)2012, and (r)
2013. Note: to improve visualization of data we display only 1,000 data points for each of
aˆ (x) and bˆ (x), selected uniformly at random.
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Figure E.6: Average and standard deviation in year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI.
The line of best fit for average year-over-year change in individuals’ BMI (blue dots) is
given by the regression specified in Eq. (5.19) (solid black line). The line of best fit for
standard deviation for year-over-year in individuals’ BMI (red squares) is given by the
regression specified in Eq. (5.20) (solid black line). The line y = 0 is given by a dashed
black line. NU data for years (a) 1996, (b) 1997, . . . , (o) 2010, (p) 2011, (q)2012, and (r)
2013. Note: to improve visualization of data we display only 1,000 data points for each of
aˆ (x) and bˆ (x), selected uniformly at random.
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